Chapter 4 The Netherlands & the People's Republic of China
4.1 The Beginning
4.1.2 The recognition of the PRC
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When the new cabinet takes office, Prime Minister Jelle Zijlstra and Minister of Justice Antoon Struycken tried to solve the problem as quickly as possible. Their efforts paid off. The engineers were interrogated, under the condition that the interrogation would take place in the Chinese mission. After this they left the country directly. Finally everybody could go home.
4.1.2 The recognition of the PRC
One of the most important reasons for the unfriendly relations between the People's Republic of China and the West was the attitude of the United States, that in the 1950s and 60s were aiming at the isolation of China and the toppling of the communist regime in Beijing.
However in 1972, US President Richard Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China was an important step in formally normalizing relations between the US and the PRC. It was the first time that a president of the US visited the PRC, and ended a period of 25 years of separation.
Before his election as president, Nixon already spoke about the need for better relations with the PRC, with which the U.S. did not maintain diplomatic relations as it still recognized the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan as the only legal government of China. Early in his first term, Kissinger flew on a secret diplomatic mission to Beijing, where he met with Premier Zhou. On July 15 in 1971, the President announced that he would visit the PRC the following year.
The visit allowed the American public to view images of China for the first time in over two decades. Throughout the week the President and his most senior advisers
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Mao Zedong, while First Lady Pat Nixon toured schools, factories and hospitals in the cities of Beijing, Shanghai and Hangzhou with the large American press corps in tow.
Nixon dubbed the visit "the week that changed the world." (Goh, 2005).
The repercussions of the Nixon visit were vast, and included a significant shift in the Cold War balance, pitting the PRC with the US against the Soviet Union.
This new perspective of US foreign policy created a breakthrough. It made possible an approachment of China to the US and other industrialized countries, including Japan, and heralded the normalization of diplomatic relations between these nations. Consequently, in the Netherlands the cabinet-Biesheuvel decided to adapt its foreign policy towards China on October 1971. This is the moment that the PRC is about to enter the United Nations.
Although some political parties in the Netherlands were doubtful of signing the motion of Albania's Resolution 2758 on October 25, 1971, recognizing People's Republic of China as the only lawful representative of China to the United Nations and expelling the Republic of China, it didn't lead to any parliamentary debates (Bos, 2008).
On the initiative of Minister Norbert Schelzer of Foreign Affairs, the parliament supported the Albanian resolution for the expulsion of the Republic of China [Taiwan] from the United Nations and the acceptance of the communist People's Republic of China (Van den Braak, 2008).
The Netherlands deplored the fact that Taiwan couldn't retain its position within the United Nations, next to the PRC. Taiwan was offered a seat, but Chiang Kai-shek refused. This refusal demonstrated his ignorance for political realism: the Kuomintang in
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Taipei stubbornly insisted that it represented China as a whole, while the PRC was leaving no doubts that the political independence of Taiwan was intolerable. Every single time when the PRC would sign a diplomatic treaty after 1972, it would emphasize the position of Taiwan as a province of China (Erikson & Chen, 2007).
On October 1971, Representative of the Dutch government R. Fack elaborated on the Dutch standpoint at the United Nations regarding the China-Taiwan issue, arguing that the factual existence of a political entity that is not accepted by the United Nations harms its principle of universality (K.T.K., 1971-1972)9. Furthermore, during a discussions on December 1971 it was stated that:
The Minister mentioned in his speech to the UN that the Netherlands, that already recognizes the PRC since 1950, would like to see the PRC occupy the seat of China in the UN. This however, should not imply the expulsion of Taiwan from the Union, because Taiwan is representing a piece of land that doesn't fall under the authority of the government in Beijing. (...) The Netherlands will willfully support every initiative that is oriented towards the facilitation of a seat for Taiwan in the United Nations. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971).
Eventually, Taiwan’s seat in the United Nations would never be realized, and the implications for the Dutch relations with both sides of the strait were discussed in parliament. This resulted in the realization that any formal relations with Taiwan would no longer be possible.
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Consequently, China specifically stated in the agreement between the Netherlands and China that was signed on May 16th 1972 - in which the mutual diplomatic representations were lifted to ambassadorial level - that Taiwan is a province of China.
The Netherlands decided to respect this stance and confirmed that it recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government in China. In the same agreement the governments agreed on the principle of mutual non-intervention. The first point of reference for the two parties to maintain a stable relationship was established.
Sinologist and diplomat Jan Vixsebosxe returned to Beijing in 1972 and became the first Dutch ambassador in the People's Republic of China. With his lengthy experience in China in the 1950s and 1960s he was seen as the ideal man to strengthen the ties between the two countries. Consequently, quickly the relations between the Netherlands and the PRC improved. Dredging companies received contracts to deepen the harbor in Shanghai, and Shell, the company that had to close its office in Shanghai because of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 returned to China (Shell, 2004). For the next decade, the relations further improved, which was symbolized by the visit of princess Beatrix and her husband prince Claus to China in 1977.
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4.2 Case 1 - The Submarine Crisis (1980 - 1984)After the death of the founding father of the People's Republic of China Mao Zedong on September 1976 - leaving behind a public display of millions of Chinese lamenting their beloved leader - the border of China opened again under Hua Guofeng and the in 1977 rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping. The new start incentivized the Netherlands to strengthen its official relations. In the spring of 1977 princess Beatrix and her husband prince Claus travel to China. They pay a visit to Dazhai, a commune known from Mao Zedong's dictum, "Learn Agriculture from Dazhai", which was set up as the model commune for agricultural production during the 1960s and 1970s (Spence, 1991).
Three years later, Prime Minister Dries van Agt and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Chris van der Klaauw visit China. The Dutch dignitaries speak with the highest officials of the country. Party Leader Hua Guofeng praises Van Agt for his rapid ascension of the Great Wall and cites a poem of Mao Zedong. "'Those who didn't climb the wall are not men, and those who did are heroes', you are a man and a hero", said Hua to the almost blushful Prime Minister. (Reformatorisch Dagblad, 1980).
Hua would later probably have regretted those kind words, since Van Agt and Van der Klaauw forgot to notify him of an important development in the Netherlands that would turn the relations with China sour. Right at the time of their visit there were fiery debates in the Netherlands about the delivery of submarines to Taiwan, that also could be deployed as weapons (van der Heijden, 2009, p. 82).
Because of its rapid economic development in the 1970s, Taiwan had become a much appreciated trading partner of Dutch businesses, and during this period Taiwan was looking for new opportunities to buy arms. An outstandingly detailed book written by
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4.2.1 The deal
In June 1978, Taiwanese officials together with a German businessman representing the German air force approached Verolme Electra, at that time a company belonging to the Rijn-Schelde-Verolme (RSV) shipbuilding group. The peculiar composition of this group was explained by the fact that Taiwan was interested in buying Lockheed Starfighters from Germany. It was mentioned in the press that a new generation of highly ranked civil servants in Taiwan aimed to diversify the heretofore exclusive reliance on American arms. Taiwan should, they argued, try to find new arms suppliers (Everts, 1985, p. 270). Direct deliveries from Germany to Taiwan were impossible, but they reasoned that an indirect transfer through a Dutch company would be an interesting possibility. These initial contacts lead to a series of negotiations between the military authorities of Taiwan and representatives of RSV.
At first, the negotiations came to a stop when the Dutch government was not willing to break with the standard policy that no arms should be delivered to a state that was not recognized by the Netherlands. For the next two years to come, several arms deals with Taiwan were all refused. But the Taiwanese government was not so easily deterred. Although the Dutch government refused to cooperate in the transfer of the German airplanes, the negotiations eventually led to a package of civilian and military orders, which would include the construction of two advanced submarines (p.269). The board of RSV filed an official request at the Dutch authorities that were responsible for the granting of export licenses and on November 29th 1980 the government agreed to issue the license (p. 269). The lobby of RSV had already started to gain the support of parliament. It met generally with positive responses from those members of parliament
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－most of them active in the economic sector －who were privately approached. When the matter became public, however, it turned out that the deal with Taiwan was controversial not only within parliament, but that also the cabinet was split.
Considerable differences of opinion existed within the various ministries. First of all, the Dutch government agreed on the view of the government of the People's Republic of China that Taiwan was a province of the PRC. The Netherlands did not recognize the Taiwanese government. They knew that a delivery of submarines to Taiwan would not be taken kindly by the Chinese government in Beijing. On the other hand, the order would serve to be a tremendous help in supporting the ailing shipbuilding sector in the Netherlands. Especially the Ministry of Economic Affairs was convinced by this argument. Others, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs however, argued that the prospects of growing economic relations with the PRC were equally important and would perhaps become even more important in the future. It would, therefore, not make sense to antagonize this partner. Furthermore －and according to Everts this was the main argument of the foreign affairs specialists - some feared the diplomatic and international/legal consequences of carrying out the order. When the issue was discussed in parliament, the government was asked by Member of Parliament Waltsman to reconsider the granting of the license:
The Member of Parliament Waltsman, heard the deliberation, and believing that the delivery of strategic goods to Taiwan should be considered contradictory to the Dutch foreign policy aimed at peace and security, and a sustainable relationship with the People's Republic of China, condemns the decision of the
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delivery of strategic goods to Taiwan, and asks the Government to bethink its decision to grant these licenses. (K.T.K. 1980-1981)
Also Van der Hek and Ter Beek issued similar concerns (K.T.K. 1980-1981. Nr.
16520.4) but these motions, among others, were narrowly defeated. At this time the Chinese reactions became known, strongly condemning the continuation of the arms deal.
The matter was discussed once more in parliament in January 1981, and once more a new resolution was submitted suggesting the government to reconsider its decision:
Member of parliament Brinkhorst considers that given the developments and facts that occurred since the granting of the export licenses to RSV for the delivery of two submarines to Taiwan, a reconsideration of this decision is preferable, and requests the Administration to come back from its decision to grant the license to RSV. (K.T.K. 1980-1981. Nr. 16520.12)
The developed that Brinkhorst was referring to was the threatening response of China. The resolution was defeated by a narrow margin of 76 to 74 votes because the government parties now closed ranks and helped to secure the survival of the cabinet (Everts, 1985, p. 270). The next month the government would give its final verdict on the matter, emphasizing the benefits of the deal, and concluding that the license could not be withdrawn at this stage:
Letter of the Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs to the Chairman of the House of Representatives : The Government cannot, given the very worrisome conditions of employment in our country, withdraw the request of RSV. As the
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Minister of Economic Affairs has said previously, this order - that partially involves military equipment, but also for a large part civil supplies - is associated with a great deal of employment. (...) The Government cannot ignore the fact that in recent years the Dutch community has invested large amounts of money in the shipbuilding industry. (...) The Government is not free to withdraw itself from its commitment. (...) In this case is not possible for the Government to meet the requirements of the Chamber. The Government has to keep its pledged word. (...) The Government wants to emphasize that the intended transaction (...) does not include any form of recognition of the current regime in Taipei. (K.T.K. 1980-1981. Nr. 16520.14)
So in the end the contribution to the employment carried the most weight, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Taiwan-lobby won the argument. During the debates Prime Minister Van Agt had made clear that his government considered the matter to be a one-time affair, which made it politically very difficult to agree to any potential similar orders in the future. Nevertheless, China reacted immediately.
4.2.2 The reaction
As the foreign affairs specialists already had anticipated, the delivery of the submarines to the 'rogue' state on Taiwan was considered to be completely unacceptable by the PRC. Primarily because of the One-China policy that the Netherlands and the People's Republic of China agreed upon in 1972, but also because Van Agt and Van der Klaauw didn't even mention the deal to the Chinese leaders during their visit. Several
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the situation. They argued that by not even mentioning the submarine-deal, it looked like the Dutch dignitaries didn't take the Chinese leaders seriously (van der Heijden, 2009, p.
82). China immediately revoked its ambassador. The diplomatic relations were being reduced to chargé d'affaires and the only correspondent in China, Willem van Kemenade working for NRC Handelsblad, was expelled from the country in May 198110.
R.H. Solomon (1981) discussed the matter, concluding that the punishment for the Netherlands acted as a warning signal for the US government under Jimmy Carter, reminiscent to the Chinese saying: "To kill the chicken to scare the monkey".
Thus, by year's end U.S.-P.R.C. relations, while superficially normal, approached the brink of a major disruption. Public discussion of the Taiwan arms sale issue in the United States during 1980 and 1981 had contributed to mobilizing the potent sentiment of Chinese nationalism. Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues had signaled the seriousness of their concern about the issue early in 1981 by downgrading relations with the Netherlands government in response to the sale of two Dutch submarines to Taiwan; they now seemed prepared (or compelled) to press the issue to the point of downgrading or even breaking diplomatic relations with the United States (Solomon, 1982).
Without openly stating whether or not the government considered the course of action to have been a mistake or not, it would from now on push towards restoring the relations. A report of the Court of Audit from 1981 states:
10 Later Van Kemenade would teach Chinese foreign and security policy and write articles for journals like
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The Government deeply regrets that the People's Republic of China, as a result of the willingness of the Government to issue a license for the export of two submarines by RSV to Taiwan, has seen reason to reduce the diplomatic relations with the Netherlands to the level of chargé d'affaires. For its part, the Dutch Government will do its utmost best to restore the good relationship with the People's Republic of China, that culminated in the visit of Prime Minister Van Agt in November 1980 (K.T.K. 1981-1982. Nr. 17100.2.).
Although the government clearly wants to normalize the relations with the PRC at this point, it is also explained that the measures taken by China were not as devastating as one might have thought. The exchanges and interactions between the countries in this period were not halted by the dispute. A letter concerning the annual state budget of the year 1982 states that:
After the diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and the People's Republic of China were reduced to the level of chargé d'affaires last year, the government has appointed an experienced diplomat as chargé d'affaires on the short term.
Partly because of this chargé d'affaires the Chinese government has been told that the Dutch Government attaches a lot of value to a good relationship with the People's Republic of China. Now several non-official missions were undertaken to analyse the possibilities for further cooperation regarding grassland. Also a delegation from Rotterdam visited China. Furthermore several business visits have been taken place in both countries. The trade relation has been undisturbed.
The scientific exchanges are the same as before. Also the exchanges regarding
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education proceed undisturbed. A large amount of Chinese students is currently studying in the Netherlands, and several Dutch students are studying in China.
From the Chinese side has been understood that it positively looks at the future regarding the bilateral relationship with the Netherlands, despite the fact that it still strongly condemns the fact that the Dutch Government issued an export license for the delivery of submarines to Taiwan. China retains the position that no further official improvement can be expected until the submarine case is solved satisfactorily (K.T.K. 1981-1982. Nr. 17100.7).
4.2.3 Normalization
In 1983 the Netherlands gets its chance to straighten its relationship with China, when again a Taiwanese delegation visits to buy more submarines. This time around, the cabinet refused to issue the license for the export of the submarines: further trade in arms to Taiwan would jeopardize the development of a peaceful solution between the PRC and the ROC. This immediately triggered the response from the Chinese government. On 1 February 1st 1984, the Netherlands and the PRC agree to restore the full diplomatic
In 1983 the Netherlands gets its chance to straighten its relationship with China, when again a Taiwanese delegation visits to buy more submarines. This time around, the cabinet refused to issue the license for the export of the submarines: further trade in arms to Taiwan would jeopardize the development of a peaceful solution between the PRC and the ROC. This immediately triggered the response from the Chinese government. On 1 February 1st 1984, the Netherlands and the PRC agree to restore the full diplomatic