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Chapter  2   Reconsidering  Mainstream  Theories  &  Beyond

2.6   Research  Question

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the immediate acquisition of national interests. This means that the Balance of Relationship is best reflected in situations that BoP analyses might perceive as irrational.

2.5.3.2 Symbolic sanctions

Other than self-restraint, the Balance of Relationship also predicts that in order to balance its relationship, states might use symbolic sanctions to restore a reciprocal bilateral relationship regardless of its power relation. This action is not taken to actually destroy the other, but rather to harm the credit of the other state that betrays the relationship. In this way states can give feedback to the other state to inform them that their actions are perceived as destabilizing. Symbolic sanction by the weaker state upon the stronger state is most indicative for BoR.

2.6 Research Question

The literature on Dutch foreign policy suggests that the Netherlands have, after the Second World War conducted an increasingly active stance in the international community, taking up the role of defender of human rights and loyal ally of the United States.

Contradictorily, the literature on Dutch Chinese foreign policy indicated that the Netherlands, in the same period, has not taken up this role towards China with an intensity that corresponds with it. The question that arises from this discrepancy is:

Why did the Netherlands, at the moment that it was regarded as the most ardent advocate of international law and human rights, not punish China for its human rights violations?

On the other hand, the literature on Dutch foreign policy suggested that the

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to be realist, balancing its power against the major nations in continental Europe by supporting the United States. If the foreign policy of the Netherlands is, according to realism, based on fear of being dominated by its neighboring powers and seeks to gain direct national interest, naturally the question regarding policy towards China arises:

Why did the Netherlands sell arms to Taiwan and then decided to stop selling arms, while a continuation of this trade was highly profitable?

As one can see, there are inconsistencies in Dutch foreign policy towards China.

This leads to the general research question of this master thesis:

How can the inconsistency of Dutch foreign policy towards China be explained?

After reviewing the most prominent theories of international relations, now there will be argued that the relational theory of the Balance of Relationship (Shih & Huang, in press) should provide the most suitable framework to answer these questions.

The three mainstream theories in international relations that were introduced have all neglected an important dimension that is crucial to answering these questions, namely the study of processes and relational complexity (Qin, 2009). These theories, neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism are not strong models to explain change and inconsistencies. Rather, they explain similar behavior in similar situations. As has been argued previously, substantialism makes change difficult to explain (Jackson & Nexon, 1997, p. 296).

Realism only explains the behavior of states on the level of the international system (Hollis & Smith, 1990). It fails to recognize that international politics is a dialogue of different actors and perspectives and leads us to expect states to behave in certain predictable ways. In order to answer these questions however, we need a theory

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that is useful for explaining change, irregularities, and inconsistencies in the relations between the Netherlands and China.

Concurrently, the other materialist theories, including the concepts of the Balance of Power and bandwagoning are not as suitable for the analyses of Dutch foreign policy towards China, because its basic assumptions are undermined by the political reality of the relation: The Netherlands doesn't base its foreign policy towards China on the fear of being deprived of its security. Hay (2002) argues that neoliberals have trouble to explain the causes of cooperation and conflict between states. Also do neoliberals tend to overestimate the importance of institutions. Although a certain policy might be institutionalized, take for instance the existence of Common Security and Defence Policy (formerly known as European Security and Defence Policy), European powers still act on their own beliefs or interests (Wivel, 2005), which can be concluded after seeing the troops of the United Kingdom invade Iraq in 2003, while France and Germany were shaking their heads in disagreement.

In conclusion, applying relational security to reduce the level of anarchy is a known strategy to all states, and the three aforementioned theories overlook the necessity of relational security as well as the capacity of nations to achieve it. In contrast to these three theories, the Balance of Relationship sees international relations as a dynamic process, that involves judgement. As mentioned previously, it can be considered a materialist theory, since it recognizes the importance of national interest. However, the basic assumptions that explain how policy is constructed and why inconsistency is an inherent element of policy is more suitable for answering the questions asked in this thesis and should be applicable since the Balance of Relationship is retrievable anywhere

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there is inconsistency or the occurrence of incomprehensible compromise or sanctions (Shih & Huang, in press, p. 16).

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2.7 Hypothesis

When we take the theoretical propositions of the Balance of Relationship elaborated before, and apply these to the Dutch foreign policy towards China, we can come up with a set of general hypotheses that are central to this master thesis. From the general propositions of the theory of the Balance of Relationship that the primary goal of states is to stabilize reciprocal relationships the general hypothesis derived:

Hypothesis: The Dutch foreign policy towards China is aimed at stabilizing the relationship when instability occurs. When the destabilization of the relationship is perceived to be caused by itself, the foreign policy will be based on :

H1: Self-restraint, in the form of ontological tolerance and/or the yielding of national interest. On the other hand, when the destabilization of the relationship is perceived to be caused by the other, the foreign policy will be based on :

H2: Symbolic sanctions, in the form of a combination of restraint and Self-help.

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Methodology

Although meta-analysis has pointed out that still 30% of publications in the field of international relations do not have a clear methodology section (Sprinz, & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004), this chapter is included to clarify the methodology of this research. The reason for this is that the provision of a methodology helps to clarify the operationalization of the constructs and variables, is useful for the falsification of the hypotheses and gives a framework for repetition of the research in the future. This is useful, since there always could be relational problems in the future. Also, systematic methods of testing can help guard against methodological errors. First the type of analysis that will be used in this thesis will be discussed, after which a framework of the variables will be provided together with definitions of the constructs.

3.1 Case study

The form of analysis that will be applied in this thesis is a case study analysis.

However, it is important to realize that data is composed as a chronological descriptive-historical narrative. The reason for this is that the total number of potential cases in the entire history of the relations between Netherlands and the People's Republic of China is limited to only 5. In other words, there have been only 5 major relational problems between the Netherlands and China since they met each other. Therefore, the choice has been made to provide an entire historical development of the relations between the Netherlands and the People's Republic of China, in which the case description is

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embedded. The level of study is conducted at the “unit-level”, with the aim of evaluating the actions and interactions of states through the properties and interactions of ‘agents’.

A case study is a well-defined aspect of a historical happening that the investigator selects for analysis. Case studies can be useful to show that, in the particular historical circumstances, the outcome was to be expected according to the theory (Sprinz

& Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004). Case study methods have considerable comparative advantages relative to others methods, like statistical methods or formal methods (Collier 1993). One of the strengths of case studies is the opportunity to achieve high levels of construct validity, or the ability to measure in a case the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts that a researcher intends to measure. Many of the variables of interest to political scientists, such as democracy, power, and political culture, are notoriously difficult to operationalize and measure. Thus, it is important to carry out 'contextualized comparisons', that is, comparison that 'self-consciously seeks to address the issue of equivalence by searching for analytically equivalent phenomena, even if expressed in substantively different terms across different contexts.

Also, case studies help us to examine in detail the observable implications of hypothesized causal mechanisms in individual cases. One of the most important reasons to use the case study method in this thesis is because it can be used to give historical explanations. Historical explanation is quite different from the development and testing of variable-centered theories based on the statistical study of large number of cases. In historical explanation, the researcher uses theories at each step of a historical process to

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show how the variables made subsequent steps and the ultimate outcome likely under the historical circumstances of the case (Roberts, 1996).

One of the most common critiques of case study methods is that they are prone to 'selection bias' (Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004; Achen and Snidal, 1989; Geddes 1990). In statistical terms, selection bias occurs when the researcher selects cases that represent a sample that is non-random. The most severe and also the most common kind of selection biases in qualitative research is confirmation bias. This means that a research only selects cases of which the independent and the dependent variables vary as the hypothesis suggest they should vary, while at the same time ignoring cases that appear to contradict the theory. Collier and Mahoney argue that this type of selection bias can both understate or overstate the relationship between the independent and dependent variable, and is particularly misleading when the results are overgeneralized to wider populations (1996, p. 71-72). They suggest that researchers should search for similar cases in which the independent variable of interest is present but the predicted effect is absent and for those in which the independent variable is absent but the dependent variable present.

In order to prevent the possibility of selection bias, in this thesis all cases in which the independent variable of interest is present are selected for analysis, except for the first case. After explaining the analytical model and the definitions of the constructs will be clarified why the first case is omitted from the analysis.

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3.2 Analytical Framework

 

Before we can define what qualifies as a case for this thesis, it is important to clarify the use of the variables and constructs. Given the hypothesis that

Hypothesis: The Dutch foreign policy towards China is aimed at stabilizing the relationship when instability occurs, we can determine that the construct '(in)stability' is the independent nominal variable and the construct ‘Dutch foreign policy' is the dependent nominal variable.

Given the hypothesis that when the destabilization of the relationship is perceived to be caused by itself, the foreign policy will be based on

H1: Self-restraint, in the form of ontological tolerance and/or the yielding of national interest, and on the other hand, when the destabilization of the relationship is perceived to be caused by the other, and the foreign policy will be based on

H2: Symbolic sanctions, in the form of a combination of help and Self-restraint, we can conclude that the dependent variable 'Dutch foreign policy' can have three nominal values which do not have an intrinsic order, respectively 'ontological tolerance', 'yielding of national interest' and 'self-help'. The values 'ontological tolerance' and 'yielding of national interest' are both forms of the 'self-restraint', and 'symbolic sanctions' represents policy that has a combination of 'self-help' and at least one form of 'self-restraint'. Self-help here indicates a behavior that usually is based on material interest.

 

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Figure 1. Illustration of analytical model BoR.

The way to interpret the model illustrated in Figure 1 is to think of the horizontal axis to represent the '(in)stability' of the relationship over time. One can then observe that there are three periods, namely a period of 'stability', followed by a period of 'instability', after which the relation returns to a period of 'stability'.

In this thesis, the words 'instability', 'crisis' and 'turbulence' are all defined as : a period in which both sides of the relationship have incongruent interpretations of the nature of the relationship, which causes them to be uncertain about the other party's commitment to the relationship, and/or consider the other party's behavior to be unpredictable.

Both sides of the relationship have certain expectations of the other party's behavior and idea's about what the conditions are that other side should comply to in order to sustain the long-term calculus of a stable relationship. At a moment that the

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behavior of both parties is in accordance with each other's expectations and conditions (which causes them to be more certain about the prospects of the other's behavior) we can speak of a period of 'stability'. The behavior of the actors in a period of stability is represented by 'congruency'.

'Stability' and 'instability' are not two completely split concepts that can be observed in one particular moment in time. Instead of seeing it as a 'light switch' that one can turn on and off, the concepts of stability and instability implore to be interpreted as two ends of a gliding scale. It is very much a dynamic process, continuously changing and rarely touching the hypothetical ends of the scale -also in line with the theoretical explanation of the dichotomy of anarchy and harmony in the theory section 'State of Nature'.

As explained in the theory section 'The Role of Actors’, the degree of instability is subjectively determined by the decision-making actors. The determination of the decision-making actors is based on information and focusing events provided by informing actors that observe incongruent interpretations of the nature of the relationship.

Periods of 'instability' are instigated by a 'destabilization'. This pertains to a moment or period in time during which the behavior of one party is perceived by the other party to be disruptive to the relation. Relevant for this analytical framework is the fact that a party can assign the 'destabilization' to be caused by itself, represented in the model by 'self', or by the other, represented by 'other'. The time frame of 'destabilization' is not fixed, since it is a relational process. Before one party can observe the 'destabilization', the other party must already have executed the destabilizing action.

When the destabilizing party is not aware of the fact that its actions are considered by the

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other party to be destabilizing, it has to wait for feedback from the other party before it can start to determine whether or not it considers itself to be to culprit of the situation.

The model predicts that when a party has determined the relationship to be 'destabilized' by itself it will proceed to implement policy that is characterized by 'self-restraint', either in the form of ontological tolerance', indicated by 'O.T.' and/or the yielding of direct national interest, indicated by 'Y.N.I.'. When the 'destabilization' is determined to be caused by the other, it will move on to implement policy that is characterized by 'symbolic sanctions', as indicated by the H2 hypothesis.

This will lead to a moment or period of 'stabilization' of the relationship resulting in a common reassessment of the nature of the relationship, in order to re-establish 'congruent policy'. The period or moment before 'destabilization' up until the period or moment of the re-establishment of 'congruent policy' will be the range that defines a 'case' in this thesis.

The reason why the first case, carrying the name ‘The Welder Incident' (1966), will not be included in the analysis is because first of all, at this time there were no formal diplomatic relations established yet between the Netherlands and the People's Republic of China. There was not yet a basis that was commonly agreed upon, upon which the parties could build congruent interpretations of the relationship. Secondly, the incident was filled to the brim with irrationalities, miscommunication, misunderstanding, erroneously executed foreign policy and contradictory information. 6

                                                                                                               

6  For further reference, in 1989, the historian Donald McCormick (writing under the pseudonym Richard Deacon) devoted a chapter of his book, 'A History of the Chinese Secret Service' to the incident.

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The Netherlands & the People’s Republic of China

4.1 The Beginning  

The rise and involvement of the People's Republic of China was strongly felt by Netherlands and in particular by the Dutch companies that were based in the region.

Initially, after the Japanese surrender on August 15th 1945 most of the Dutch companies that were still active in 1941 in China, like Havenwerken, Shell, Unilever and the banks, resumed their activities. However, because of the communist takeover in 1949 the Dutch companies were forced in the early 1950s to leave the country. The communist government was determined to prevent a repetition of history: 'Foreigners can never again control China, like they did for 100 years with Unequal Agreements'. This rationale that was one of the key elements of modern China's founding narrative (Kaufman, 2011).

The decades after this they would work from Hong Kong and Taiwan. In the People's Republic of China, that was proclaimed by Mao Zedong, Western companies were not longer welcome. On exception, though, is Shell, of which all the possessions were confiscated in 1951. The Chinese government forced the company to sell benzine and oil, most likely because at that time the Chinese government didn't develop its own fuel distribution system yet. As a result, Shell was the only Dutch company, and only Western oil company that had its office in Shanghai for another 15 years (Shell, 2004).

In the years after WWII the foreign policy of the Netherlands is - when it comes to Asia - unchangeably focussed on colonial trade. After the transfer of sovereignty of

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desperate need of new markets. So in order to secure the commercial interests, the Hague turned its head to China, because a country with a population over 400 million people was held as a worthy replacement for South East Asia. However, the only way to do this

desperate need of new markets. So in order to secure the commercial interests, the Hague turned its head to China, because a country with a population over 400 million people was held as a worthy replacement for South East Asia. However, the only way to do this