Chapter 4 The Netherlands & the People's Republic of China
4.2 Case 1 -‐ The Submarine Crisis (1980 -‐ 1984)
4.2.2 The reaction
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Minister of Economic Affairs has said previously, this order - that partially involves military equipment, but also for a large part civil supplies - is associated with a great deal of employment. (...) The Government cannot ignore the fact that in recent years the Dutch community has invested large amounts of money in the shipbuilding industry. (...) The Government is not free to withdraw itself from its commitment. (...) In this case is not possible for the Government to meet the requirements of the Chamber. The Government has to keep its pledged word. (...) The Government wants to emphasize that the intended transaction (...) does not include any form of recognition of the current regime in Taipei. (K.T.K. 1980-1981. Nr. 16520.14)
So in the end the contribution to the employment carried the most weight, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Taiwan-lobby won the argument. During the debates Prime Minister Van Agt had made clear that his government considered the matter to be a one-time affair, which made it politically very difficult to agree to any potential similar orders in the future. Nevertheless, China reacted immediately.
4.2.2 The reaction
As the foreign affairs specialists already had anticipated, the delivery of the submarines to the 'rogue' state on Taiwan was considered to be completely unacceptable by the PRC. Primarily because of the One-China policy that the Netherlands and the People's Republic of China agreed upon in 1972, but also because Van Agt and Van der Klaauw didn't even mention the deal to the Chinese leaders during their visit. Several
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
the situation. They argued that by not even mentioning the submarine-deal, it looked like the Dutch dignitaries didn't take the Chinese leaders seriously (van der Heijden, 2009, p.
82). China immediately revoked its ambassador. The diplomatic relations were being reduced to chargé d'affaires and the only correspondent in China, Willem van Kemenade working for NRC Handelsblad, was expelled from the country in May 198110.
R.H. Solomon (1981) discussed the matter, concluding that the punishment for the Netherlands acted as a warning signal for the US government under Jimmy Carter, reminiscent to the Chinese saying: "To kill the chicken to scare the monkey".
Thus, by year's end U.S.-P.R.C. relations, while superficially normal, approached the brink of a major disruption. Public discussion of the Taiwan arms sale issue in the United States during 1980 and 1981 had contributed to mobilizing the potent sentiment of Chinese nationalism. Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues had signaled the seriousness of their concern about the issue early in 1981 by downgrading relations with the Netherlands government in response to the sale of two Dutch submarines to Taiwan; they now seemed prepared (or compelled) to press the issue to the point of downgrading or even breaking diplomatic relations with the United States (Solomon, 1982).
Without openly stating whether or not the government considered the course of action to have been a mistake or not, it would from now on push towards restoring the relations. A report of the Court of Audit from 1981 states:
10 Later Van Kemenade would teach Chinese foreign and security policy and write articles for journals like
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
The Government deeply regrets that the People's Republic of China, as a result of the willingness of the Government to issue a license for the export of two submarines by RSV to Taiwan, has seen reason to reduce the diplomatic relations with the Netherlands to the level of chargé d'affaires. For its part, the Dutch Government will do its utmost best to restore the good relationship with the People's Republic of China, that culminated in the visit of Prime Minister Van Agt in November 1980 (K.T.K. 1981-1982. Nr. 17100.2.).
Although the government clearly wants to normalize the relations with the PRC at this point, it is also explained that the measures taken by China were not as devastating as one might have thought. The exchanges and interactions between the countries in this period were not halted by the dispute. A letter concerning the annual state budget of the year 1982 states that:
After the diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and the People's Republic of China were reduced to the level of chargé d'affaires last year, the government has appointed an experienced diplomat as chargé d'affaires on the short term.
Partly because of this chargé d'affaires the Chinese government has been told that the Dutch Government attaches a lot of value to a good relationship with the People's Republic of China. Now several non-official missions were undertaken to analyse the possibilities for further cooperation regarding grassland. Also a delegation from Rotterdam visited China. Furthermore several business visits have been taken place in both countries. The trade relation has been undisturbed.
The scientific exchanges are the same as before. Also the exchanges regarding
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
education proceed undisturbed. A large amount of Chinese students is currently studying in the Netherlands, and several Dutch students are studying in China.
From the Chinese side has been understood that it positively looks at the future regarding the bilateral relationship with the Netherlands, despite the fact that it still strongly condemns the fact that the Dutch Government issued an export license for the delivery of submarines to Taiwan. China retains the position that no further official improvement can be expected until the submarine case is solved satisfactorily (K.T.K. 1981-1982. Nr. 17100.7).
4.2.3 Normalization
In 1983 the Netherlands gets its chance to straighten its relationship with China, when again a Taiwanese delegation visits to buy more submarines. This time around, the cabinet refused to issue the license for the export of the submarines: further trade in arms to Taiwan would jeopardize the development of a peaceful solution between the PRC and the ROC. This immediately triggered the response from the Chinese government. On 1 February 1st 1984, the Netherlands and the PRC agree to restore the full diplomatic relations. The formal mutual statement of the Netherlands and China of 2 February, 1984 reads:
The representation of the Dutch government has informed the representation of the Chinese government of the decision of the Dutch government to not issue a license for the further export of weapons to Taiwan. The Chinese government appreciates the decision of the Dutch government. (…) Both parties agree to not only normalize but also intensify the relations (d'Hooghe, 1992).