Chapter 3 Methodology
3.1 Case study
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Methodology
Although meta-analysis has pointed out that still 30% of publications in the field of international relations do not have a clear methodology section (Sprinz, & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004), this chapter is included to clarify the methodology of this research. The reason for this is that the provision of a methodology helps to clarify the operationalization of the constructs and variables, is useful for the falsification of the hypotheses and gives a framework for repetition of the research in the future. This is useful, since there always could be relational problems in the future. Also, systematic methods of testing can help guard against methodological errors. First the type of analysis that will be used in this thesis will be discussed, after which a framework of the variables will be provided together with definitions of the constructs.
3.1 Case study
The form of analysis that will be applied in this thesis is a case study analysis.
However, it is important to realize that data is composed as a chronological descriptive-historical narrative. The reason for this is that the total number of potential cases in the entire history of the relations between Netherlands and the People's Republic of China is limited to only 5. In other words, there have been only 5 major relational problems between the Netherlands and China since they met each other. Therefore, the choice has been made to provide an entire historical development of the relations between the Netherlands and the People's Republic of China, in which the case description is
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embedded. The level of study is conducted at the “unit-level”, with the aim of evaluating the actions and interactions of states through the properties and interactions of ‘agents’.
A case study is a well-defined aspect of a historical happening that the investigator selects for analysis. Case studies can be useful to show that, in the particular historical circumstances, the outcome was to be expected according to the theory (Sprinz
& Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004). Case study methods have considerable comparative advantages relative to others methods, like statistical methods or formal methods (Collier 1993). One of the strengths of case studies is the opportunity to achieve high levels of construct validity, or the ability to measure in a case the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts that a researcher intends to measure. Many of the variables of interest to political scientists, such as democracy, power, and political culture, are notoriously difficult to operationalize and measure. Thus, it is important to carry out 'contextualized comparisons', that is, comparison that 'self-consciously seeks to address the issue of equivalence by searching for analytically equivalent phenomena, even if expressed in substantively different terms across different contexts.
Also, case studies help us to examine in detail the observable implications of hypothesized causal mechanisms in individual cases. One of the most important reasons to use the case study method in this thesis is because it can be used to give historical explanations. Historical explanation is quite different from the development and testing of variable-centered theories based on the statistical study of large number of cases. In historical explanation, the researcher uses theories at each step of a historical process to
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show how the variables made subsequent steps and the ultimate outcome likely under the historical circumstances of the case (Roberts, 1996).
One of the most common critiques of case study methods is that they are prone to 'selection bias' (Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004; Achen and Snidal, 1989; Geddes 1990). In statistical terms, selection bias occurs when the researcher selects cases that represent a sample that is non-random. The most severe and also the most common kind of selection biases in qualitative research is confirmation bias. This means that a research only selects cases of which the independent and the dependent variables vary as the hypothesis suggest they should vary, while at the same time ignoring cases that appear to contradict the theory. Collier and Mahoney argue that this type of selection bias can both understate or overstate the relationship between the independent and dependent variable, and is particularly misleading when the results are overgeneralized to wider populations (1996, p. 71-72). They suggest that researchers should search for similar cases in which the independent variable of interest is present but the predicted effect is absent and for those in which the independent variable is absent but the dependent variable present.
In order to prevent the possibility of selection bias, in this thesis all cases in which the independent variable of interest is present are selected for analysis, except for the first case. After explaining the analytical model and the definitions of the constructs will be clarified why the first case is omitted from the analysis.
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3.2 Analytical Framework
Before we can define what qualifies as a case for this thesis, it is important to clarify the use of the variables and constructs. Given the hypothesis that
Hypothesis: The Dutch foreign policy towards China is aimed at stabilizing the relationship when instability occurs, we can determine that the construct '(in)stability' is the independent nominal variable and the construct ‘Dutch foreign policy' is the dependent nominal variable.
Given the hypothesis that when the destabilization of the relationship is perceived to be caused by itself, the foreign policy will be based on
H1: Self-restraint, in the form of ontological tolerance and/or the yielding of national interest, and on the other hand, when the destabilization of the relationship is perceived to be caused by the other, and the foreign policy will be based on
H2: Symbolic sanctions, in the form of a combination of help and Self-restraint, we can conclude that the dependent variable 'Dutch foreign policy' can have three nominal values which do not have an intrinsic order, respectively 'ontological tolerance', 'yielding of national interest' and 'self-help'. The values 'ontological tolerance' and 'yielding of national interest' are both forms of the 'self-restraint', and 'symbolic sanctions' represents policy that has a combination of 'self-help' and at least one form of 'self-restraint'. Self-help here indicates a behavior that usually is based on material interest.
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Figure 1. Illustration of analytical model BoR.
The way to interpret the model illustrated in Figure 1 is to think of the horizontal axis to represent the '(in)stability' of the relationship over time. One can then observe that there are three periods, namely a period of 'stability', followed by a period of 'instability', after which the relation returns to a period of 'stability'.
In this thesis, the words 'instability', 'crisis' and 'turbulence' are all defined as : a period in which both sides of the relationship have incongruent interpretations of the nature of the relationship, which causes them to be uncertain about the other party's commitment to the relationship, and/or consider the other party's behavior to be unpredictable.
Both sides of the relationship have certain expectations of the other party's behavior and idea's about what the conditions are that other side should comply to in order to sustain the long-term calculus of a stable relationship. At a moment that the
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behavior of both parties is in accordance with each other's expectations and conditions (which causes them to be more certain about the prospects of the other's behavior) we can speak of a period of 'stability'. The behavior of the actors in a period of stability is represented by 'congruency'.
'Stability' and 'instability' are not two completely split concepts that can be observed in one particular moment in time. Instead of seeing it as a 'light switch' that one can turn on and off, the concepts of stability and instability implore to be interpreted as two ends of a gliding scale. It is very much a dynamic process, continuously changing and rarely touching the hypothetical ends of the scale －also in line with the theoretical explanation of the dichotomy of anarchy and harmony in the theory section 'State of Nature'.
As explained in the theory section 'The Role of Actors’, the degree of instability is subjectively determined by the decision-making actors. The determination of the decision-making actors is based on information and focusing events provided by informing actors that observe incongruent interpretations of the nature of the relationship.
Periods of 'instability' are instigated by a 'destabilization'. This pertains to a moment or period in time during which the behavior of one party is perceived by the other party to be disruptive to the relation. Relevant for this analytical framework is the fact that a party can assign the 'destabilization' to be caused by itself, represented in the model by 'self', or by the other, represented by 'other'. The time frame of 'destabilization' is not fixed, since it is a relational process. Before one party can observe the 'destabilization', the other party must already have executed the destabilizing action.
When the destabilizing party is not aware of the fact that its actions are considered by the
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other party to be destabilizing, it has to wait for feedback from the other party before it can start to determine whether or not it considers itself to be to culprit of the situation.
The model predicts that when a party has determined the relationship to be 'destabilized' by itself it will proceed to implement policy that is characterized by 'self-restraint', either in the form of ontological tolerance', indicated by 'O.T.' and/or the yielding of direct national interest, indicated by 'Y.N.I.'. When the 'destabilization' is determined to be caused by the other, it will move on to implement policy that is characterized by 'symbolic sanctions', as indicated by the H2 hypothesis.
This will lead to a moment or period of 'stabilization' of the relationship resulting in a common reassessment of the nature of the relationship, in order to re-establish 'congruent policy'. The period or moment before 'destabilization' up until the period or moment of the re-establishment of 'congruent policy' will be the range that defines a 'case' in this thesis.
The reason why the first case, carrying the name ‘The Welder Incident' (1966), will not be included in the analysis is because first of all, at this time there were no formal diplomatic relations established yet between the Netherlands and the People's Republic of China. There was not yet a basis that was commonly agreed upon, upon which the parties could build congruent interpretations of the relationship. Secondly, the incident was filled to the brim with irrationalities, miscommunication, misunderstanding, erroneously executed foreign policy and contradictory information. 6
6 For further reference, in 1989, the historian Donald McCormick (writing under the pseudonym Richard Deacon) devoted a chapter of his book, 'A History of the Chinese Secret Service' to the incident.
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The Netherlands & the People’s Republic of China
4.1 The Beginning
The rise and involvement of the People's Republic of China was strongly felt by Netherlands and in particular by the Dutch companies that were based in the region.
Initially, after the Japanese surrender on August 15th 1945 most of the Dutch companies that were still active in 1941 in China, like Havenwerken, Shell, Unilever and the banks, resumed their activities. However, because of the communist takeover in 1949 the Dutch companies were forced in the early 1950s to leave the country. The communist government was determined to prevent a repetition of history: 'Foreigners can never again control China, like they did for 100 years with Unequal Agreements'. This rationale that was one of the key elements of modern China's founding narrative (Kaufman, 2011).
The decades after this they would work from Hong Kong and Taiwan. In the People's Republic of China, that was proclaimed by Mao Zedong, Western companies were not longer welcome. On exception, though, is Shell, of which all the possessions were confiscated in 1951. The Chinese government forced the company to sell benzine and oil, most likely because at that time the Chinese government didn't develop its own fuel distribution system yet. As a result, Shell was the only Dutch company, and only Western oil company that had its office in Shanghai for another 15 years (Shell, 2004).
In the years after WWII the foreign policy of the Netherlands is - when it comes to Asia - unchangeably focussed on colonial trade. After the transfer of sovereignty of
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desperate need of new markets. So in order to secure the commercial interests, the Hague turned its head to China, because a country with a population over 400 million people was held as a worthy replacement for South East Asia. However, the only way to do this was to establish diplomatic ties with the regime in Beijing, that's why the Netherlands made every effort to keep the consulates in China open (van der Heijden, 2009, p. 62).
On March 27th 1950 the Dutch government decided to recognize the central government of the on October 1st 1949 proclaimed People's Republic of China, that after fighting a long civil war effectively occupied the vast majority of the Chinese territory.
Although the Netherlands would have preferred to establish normal diplomatic relations with the PRC, an exchange of ambassadors proved to be impracticable as a result of the Korean war (1950-1953) and the fact that the most important ally of the Netherlands, the United States of America, showed no interest in the recognition of the PRC at that time (p. 62).
Two years later the effort to establish diplomatic ties looked futile, when a whole range of circumstances lead to the forced closure of Dutch embassies in China. An analysis conducted by Van der Zwan (1996), a researcher of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concluded that the perpetuation of the Dutch consulates was impossible because the international affairs in general and especially those concerning the Korean War completely isolated China from the Western world. Foreigners left China after 1950 on a massive scale. Sporadic diplomatic contact remained between the Netherlands and China but in every other aspect the Chinese border was completely closed for the Netherlands (Van der Zwan, 1996).
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Because of the loss of Indonesia in 1949 also the embassy in Hong Kong lost its general purpose. The isolation that was self-imposed by the communist leaders in China provided the diplomats in Hong Kong a new purpose:
Because of the isolation of China the consulate-general became an important observatory for future developments and also became an important hub for the exploration of commercial possibilities that the spectacular economic development of Hong Kong offered the Dutch trade (p. 43)
After the Korean War and the Convention of Geneva in 1954 where the repatriation of French troops out of Vietnam was realized, the Netherlands and China found a moment of repose to strengthen their relations by appointing chargés d'affaires in the same year. However, the ideological pursuit of the Chinese in the 1950s to an economic development reminiscent of the Soviet model, and later in the 1960s to a form of autarky, was not conducive to a deeper level of cooperation with the Netherlands.
4.1.1 The welder incident
The early stages of Sino-Dutch relations were rather erratic, characterized by misunderstanding, and remained quite fragile in the early 1960s. The welder incident that occurred in 1966 best illustrates this, and is a good example of how Western and communist countries treated each other in the Cold War.
It all starts in the rainy summer of 1966 when an unsuspecting pedestrian, who was walking his dog, found a Chinese man lying heavily wounded on a street in the Hague. His name is Hsu Tzu Tsai, a 42-year old Chinese welder specialized in arc
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welding. Together with 8 of his comrades and colleagues he had visited an international congress about welding technique in Delft (VPRO, 2001). The pedestrian brings Hsu to the hospital. But when he is lying on a stretcher in the radiology department, and before anybody could make any contact with him, a raid of Chinese individuals rushed into the hospital, grabbed the man and dragged him to the Chinese embassy where he came to pass away from his injuries.
From the files of de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD)7, the Chinese welders appeared to be not just regular welders but highly educated rocket scientists. The BVD was already aware of this before the group entered the country:
In advance there was some level of attention for this group, since it would be interesting to find out more information about the current level of development of technique in China at this point in time (Van der Putten, 2001).
The situation escalated when the Netherlands reacted by kicking the Chinese commissioner out of the country. This, however, was not the intention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Luns, who himself was abroad during this unfortunate development.
Lawyer Bert van den Braak (2008) writes:
The expulsion by the Netherlands was the result of a communication malfunction.
Luns was in Togo and was giving instructions through the telephone to his substitute, the Minister of Education Diepenhorst. Luns told him: "You can never let him go", but Diepenhorst misheard: "You should let him go (p. 21).
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Also, the Dutch government sought to find out what the intentions of the engineers were and demanded the Chinese government the right to interrogate them.
China refused with an argument based on the intervention in domestic affairs, upon which the whole Chinese representation in the Hague was sealed off. Two guard towers were constructed and the building was under constant observation of the policy and the secret service, looking from a distance through their binoculars in their Volkswagen.
Everybody who went in and out was being checked. Only the Chinese diplomats were able to leave the building, because of their diplomatic immunity that was granted to them some years before8, but the engineers would eventually be in detention for over 5 months.
This enraged the Chinese government and declared the Dutch diplomatic representative in Beijing, G.J. Jongejans persona non grata, who at that point found himself in the same position as his Chinese colleagues in the Hague. Within a few days a diplomatic Cold War broke out between the two countries. To make matters worse, the postmortem examination resulted in the conclusion that the man was not maltreated nor forced out of the window. Most likely, he fell down when he was trying to escape the building by tying two sheets together. This confirms the suspicion of the Chinese: Xu is a traitor that is in contact with the American CIA. The Dutch BVD also has the same suspicions. While Jongejans was still held captive the situation in China deteriorates; the Great Proletarian Revolution broke out.
8 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 is an international treaty that defines a
8 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 is an international treaty that defines a