Chapter 2 Reconsidering Mainstream Theories & Beyond
2.4 Relational Theory
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contrast between a materialist view, usually held by neorealists and neoliberals, and an ideational view held by constructivists. The materialist view stands for the view that power and national interest are the driving forces in the international system. Here, power is ultimately signified by military capabilities, supported by economic resources. On the other hand, for the ideational view ideas matter, "The starting premise is that the material world is indeterminate and is interpreted within a larger context of meaning" (Jackson &
Sørensen, p. 213).
While being applied in international relations, constructivism is inspired by philosophical and sociological theoretical developments. A. Giddens (1984) brought forward the concept of “structuration” as a way of analyzing the relationship between structures and actors. Giddens argued that structures do not necessarily determine the behavior of actors, something that neorealists claim with stating that the structure of anarchy constraints states. Giddens offers the perspective that structures do constrain and enable actors, but that the structure itself is also transformed by the actions of actors within the structure. This notion of “structuration” therefore brings about a more dynamic and less rigid perspective on the relationship between the actor and the structure. These principles helped to inspire new relational theories to be developed in the 1990s.
2.4 Relational Theory
A more recent branch of international relations theory that has catched the attention of students and scholars of international relations is relationalism. Relationalism focusses, as the name clearly indicates, on the relations between states, and takes the 'relation' as the essential foundation of analysis. At the beginning of their article Relations
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(1999) explain the difference between “substantialism” and “relationism”. Substantialism pertains to the perspective that the essential core of analysis is entities (Emirbayer, 1997).
In international relations discourse, especially neorealism this means that 'states' are the essential starting point of analysis. But relationalism, however, puts things in a different perspective. Jackson & Nexon argue that relationalism, “treats configurations of ties between social aggregates of various sorts and their component parts as the building blocks of social analysis" (Tilly, 1996: 2, in Jackson & Nexon, 1997, p. 292). This means that, taking into consideration this dichotomy of substantialism and relationalism, the majority of international relation theory can be considered substantialist. They argue that relationalism is primarily concerned with processes, and coin the term processual relationalism.
The primary relevance of relational theory is the fact that due to its dynamic approach it can be used to explain change. For substantialist theories this is a problem;
the relations are here seen as an action, a result or a product of a state, but will not inherently change the essence of the state: "Substantialism makes change difficult to explain" (Jackson & Nexon, 1997, p. 296)5. Also other relational-based approaches have been developed (e.g. Qin, 2009; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). The theory that will be discussed now is the Balance of Relationship theory.
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2.5 Balance of Relationship
The Balance of Relationship theory, as brought forward by Shih & Huang (n.d., 2014, in press) and Huang (2015), can also be considered to be a relational theory because it, in contradiction to substantialist theories, doesn't treat the concept of 'relationship' as a tool (of primarily states) but as the core tenet of the analysis. The BoR views international relations as a primarily bilateral process through which states attempt to stabilize long-term reciprocal relationships with each other.
Although the BoR is relational, it can also be considered to be a materialist theory, because it recognized the neorealist claim that states are trying to maximize their national interests. The BoR argues that they do this, however, by balancing their relationships and not necessarily with self-help. The purpose of this is to reduce uncertainty about the international system, based on the rationale that a condition of minimal insecurity in the international system offers a context that is rationally most desirable to secure national interests in the long run.
It is a theory that focuses on the process of the interaction between states, and explains how apparent inconsistencies and choices that at first glance might seem irrational according to the framework of realism, can very well be the result of careful consideration by policymakers (Shih & Huang, in press; Huang, 2015).
But why is it important to analyze apparent inconsistencies? And why is this important for the analysis of the Dutch foreign policy towards China? In the end, realists would argue, the Dutch foreign policy is confined by the structure of the international system. So what is the value of relationalism in international relations, and what is the
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value of applying the Balance of Relation theory in the analysis of Dutch foreign policy towards China?
First of all, the bilateral foreign policy of the Netherlands towards China defies the very core assumption of realism, because it is not based on fear. The survival of the state has never been directly threatened by China, and its foreign policy has never expressed such considerations.
Secondly, ignoring the processes that form the foreign policy makes it hard to explain questions that involve change. Why did the Netherlands stop openly criticizing China's human rights violations after 1997? And why did the Netherlands stop the very beneficial trade with Taiwan after 1981? It is necessary to dive into the processes that constructed the foreign policy to be able to answer these questions.
Saying that the foreign policy of the Netherlands is constrained and dictated by the international system, is similar to what Jackson & Nexon argue to be “a common substantialist solution to the change problem, namely the utilization of a 'punctuated equilibrium model" (p. 298). They argue that in this model, change in units occurs suddenly through the kick of exogenous change which leads to a flurry of radically new forms. But having to resort to exogenous change is an often unsatisfying explanation.
Indeed, many theorists who draw upon this metaphor seem to use instead of an explanation:
We suspect that in many instances if analysts looked closely enough at processes of change they might discover that their 'exogenous' shocks are really not all that exogenous after all (p. 298).
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2.5.1 State of nature: anarchy and harmony
Hobbes's England had experienced political revolution and religious conflict of such intensity as to draw a whole society to the edge of nothingness. So dramatic had been the suddenness with which England had been plunged into war and revolution, so great had been the devastation, and so bitter had been the enmities that for the next three centuries and more English politics was conducted on the unwritten premise that history ought not be allowed to repeat itself. This experience with the political void inspired one of the most important conceptions of the political thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that of 'the state of nature', the condition of political nothingness (Wolin, 2009, p. 218).
The title of this paragraph ought not to be confused with the more conventional dichotomy of anarchy and hierarchy in e.g. Hierarchy in International Relations by D.
Lake (1996), where the central idea is that powerful states build an order that weaker states submit to. Instead, here anarchy is equated with a condition of maximum insecurity, and harmony with a condition of minimal insecurity about the international system.
Similar to materialist theories the Balance of Relationship recognizes that the core interests of states are survival, independence and security. However, it emphasizes that the core assumption of realism regarding the behavior of states that result from these interests, namely that this selfcentered fight for survival expresses itself in an international system of anarchy, is merely hypothetical. This is different from realism,
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that operates under the assumption that anarchy is an inevitable condition of the system that states can merely accept.
Discussing this difference guides us back to how we interpret the Hobbesian state of nature. In assuming anarchy as an inevitable condition, in which fear and insecurity dominate the motives for action among actors, realism takes the Hobbesian state of nature quite literally, imposing it on reality as a permanent and undeniable force. The Balance of Relationship however, does not take anarchy as an immovable structure but rather as an undesirable condition that rational actors are to overcome if they were to secure their national interests in the long run (Huang & Shi, 2014, p. 19). Indeed, the state of nature in which anarchy permanently reigns free equates a state of maximum insecurity about the system, a plight that Hobbes found himself in, but in most cases is merely hypothetical (Smith, 2006). It is hypothetical, because in reality states do possess a certain degree of relational security and rarely take survival as the goal of foreign policy decision-making (Shih & Huang, in press). But according to the BoR, even in the case that a nation comes close to a state of maximum insecurity, it will naturally seek to improve its position by engaging in relational security with others.
Shih and Huang (in press) argue that if anarchy is a system of nature in which the isolated state is forced to adopt a self-help strategy, harmony should be anarchy's antithesis, a system of nature in which states adopt self-restraint to avoid the disruption of reciprocal relationships (p. 7). Just as the ideal type of an anarchic system is hypothetical, so is the harmonic system. They are each other’s counterparts:
Under BoR, BoP only takes place when a reciprocal bilateral relationship is not enforceable. On the other hand, the reciprocal bilateral relationship is the solution
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systems necessarily switch in cycles (Shih & Huang, in press, p. 35)
The Balance of Relationship focuses on the process of stabilizing a relationship, and sees the disruption of a relationship not necessarily as anarchic, disastrous or permanent, but rather as a temporary turbulence that is an inherent part of having a relationship. From time to time it is healthy if it clarifies one’s intention to the other side or suggests the preferred direction for restoration of the relationship (Shih & Huang, in press, p. 13). The instrument that states use to manipulate these temporary turbulences is the policy that they apply towards the other state.
which the state finds itself. Also, as a consequence, this means that judgment might be different for every different individual: "Different leaderships may arrive at different judgments under similar conditions" (Huang & Shi, 2014).
Here, I want to argue that the actors that are involved can basically be divided in two types. First of all, there are the 'decision-making actors'. These are the actors that
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determine the position of their state through observation. This pertains to their position in the international system in general, but also to their position with regard to the 'other' decision-making actor on the other end of the bilateral relationship. The other type of actors are the 'informing actors'. These are actors that have no direct influence in the decision-making process of foreign policy, but help the decision-making actors to reach a judgement about the character of the international system and their position in it. From the perspective of the decision-making actor, informing actors can be considered the 'media' through which they, by empirical data-gathering, try to construct an image about the international system and their position in it that best reflects the reality of the situation, upon which they can formulate policy that is best suited to it. If the international system would be a pitch dark room, the informing actors would function as the senses of the decision-making actor, making it able to grope, and not bump its head against a low-hanging lamp. These two type of actors are not necessarily mutually exclusive, nor necessarily mutually inclusive. A Minister of Foreign Affairs is one of the principal decision-making actors in the foreign policy process, and also, through direct relations an important 'informing actor'. Parliamentarians, although they sometimes play an important role as decision-making actor, often have less access to direct information regarding the character of the international system and are more dependent on pure informing actors, like the media, or civil society in order to come to a conclusion. This pertains to what Jackson & Nexon call the 'agent-structure' problem. Agent-structure problems are concerned with the causal or constitutive relationship between individual actors and aggregate social forces. They draw on the work of Giddens (1984) for the answer:
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Agents and structures are 'mutually constitutive', meaning that they are not causally linked but co-determined －agents instantiate structures through their actions, even as those structures simultaneously constrain and enable agency (Jackson & Nexon, 1999, p. 295).
This means that the use of the word 'state' is necessarily simplifying its true meaning, and its connection to the international system. So when in the propositions below the word 'state' is used, this refers to the decision-making actors of that state.
2.5.3 Theoretical propositions
After judging the reality of the situation, Shi and Huang (in press) argue that in order to balance, or stabilize a relationship, a state can have three responses to a perceived problem in a bilateral relationship:
1) If a state perceives itself to be the culprit that caused the problem in the relationship, or at least realizes that it should take responsibility in order to restore the relation, the state will make policy to try to compensate or yield, in order to enable to other side to return to the long-term calculus of a stable relationship.
2) If a state perceives the problem in the relationship to be too threatening, it will break the relationship and start again. In order to do credit to one's commitment to the original relationship one should break up to start anew when the situation is perceived as too threatening.
3) If a state perceives the problem in the relationship to be solvable but caused by the other state, it will base their policy on a mix of punishment and reward.
Because one wants to avoid the embarrassment that neither one-sided concession
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nor unilateral sanctions is effective, a state should resort to a mix of punishment and reward to rectify the relationship.
The theory of Balance of Relationship brings forward the concept of ontological tolerance, a term that is used to describe a tolerance towards the way others specify concepts and conceptualize constructs. Also it introduces a concept that is controversial with regard to traditional realist discourse, the yielding of direct national interest. Now, in this thesis it will be argued that these concepts can both be categorized as two types of self-restraint, namely self-restraint as ontological tolerance, and as self-restraint as giving up direct national interest in order to secure the stability of the relationship.
2.5.3.1 Self-restraint
Shih and Huang (in press) argue that the Balance of Relationship is based on reciprocal tolerance rather than shared values. It explains the limited relevance of differences in ideas, moral concepts and institutions with the rationale that because the primary goal of states is to secure reciprocal stability, these values can be given up for the sake of long-term stability.
This implies that when a state adheres to a certain set of ideas, it will inconsistently enforce these values facing different countries at different times (p. 16).
This makes inconsistency a systematic feature of the Balance of Relationship.
Not only can values be readily disregarded, also are states willing to yield apparent and immediate national interests for the preservation of stability. Although states might try to balance and secure direct national interests at the same time, the
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the immediate acquisition of national interests. This means that the Balance of Relationship is best reflected in situations that BoP analyses might perceive as irrational.
2.5.3.2 Symbolic sanctions
Other than self-restraint, the Balance of Relationship also predicts that in order to balance its relationship, states might use symbolic sanctions to restore a reciprocal bilateral relationship regardless of its power relation. This action is not taken to actually destroy the other, but rather to harm the credit of the other state that betrays the relationship. In this way states can give feedback to the other state to inform them that their actions are perceived as destabilizing. Symbolic sanction by the weaker state upon the stronger state is most indicative for BoR.
2.6 Research Question
The literature on Dutch foreign policy suggests that the Netherlands have, after the Second World War conducted an increasingly active stance in the international community, taking up the role of defender of human rights and loyal ally of the United States.
Contradictorily, the literature on Dutch Chinese foreign policy indicated that the Netherlands, in the same period, has not taken up this role towards China with an intensity that corresponds with it. The question that arises from this discrepancy is:
Why did the Netherlands, at the moment that it was regarded as the most ardent advocate of international law and human rights, not punish China for its human rights violations?
On the other hand, the literature on Dutch foreign policy suggested that the
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to be realist, balancing its power against the major nations in continental Europe by supporting the United States. If the foreign policy of the Netherlands is, according to realism, based on fear of being dominated by its neighboring powers and seeks to gain direct national interest, naturally the question regarding policy towards China arises:
Why did the Netherlands sell arms to Taiwan and then decided to stop selling arms, while a continuation of this trade was highly profitable?
As one can see, there are inconsistencies in Dutch foreign policy towards China.
This leads to the general research question of this master thesis:
How can the inconsistency of Dutch foreign policy towards China be explained?
After reviewing the most prominent theories of international relations, now there will be argued that the relational theory of the Balance of Relationship (Shih & Huang, in press) should provide the most suitable framework to answer these questions.
The three mainstream theories in international relations that were introduced have all neglected an important dimension that is crucial to answering these questions, namely the study of processes and relational complexity (Qin, 2009). These theories, neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism are not strong models to explain change and inconsistencies. Rather, they explain similar behavior in similar situations. As has been argued previously, substantialism makes change difficult to explain (Jackson & Nexon, 1997, p. 296).
Realism only explains the behavior of states on the level of the international system (Hollis & Smith, 1990). It fails to recognize that international politics is a dialogue of different actors and perspectives and leads us to expect states to behave in certain predictable ways. In order to answer these questions however, we need a theory