Academia and Chinese Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Case Study of China’s EU Policy - 政大學術集成

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(1)National Chengchi University Diplomacy Department. Master’s Thesis. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 治 Chinese Academia政and 大立 Foreign Policy Decision Making: er. io. sit. y. Nat. A Case Study of China’s EU Policy n. al 中國大陸學界與中共外交政策決策關係之研究 iv Ch. n U engchi. ─以中共的歐盟政策為例. Supervising Professor: Lu Yeh-Chung Student:. Nicola C. Dean. September 2013.

(2) Abstract. This thesis discusses the role of academia in foreign policy-decision making in the People’s Republic of China, considering in particular the case of European Studies academia and China’s European Union policy, which merits greater scrutiny by outside observers. Faced with ever more complex foreign relations, the structure of Chinese foreign policy making is incorporating a growing number of external actors at both formal and informal levels. Academic circles are a case in point; as foreign policy research institutes evolve, diversify and optimise, their potential influence within policy making processes and circles is expanding in scope, and academics and their respective institutes are able to consolidate the impact of their research through a range of pathways, levels, and sources of influence. The European Studies field in China is robust and certain noteworthy experts are regularly called upon for advice and comment. What’s more, China’s only ever foreign policy paper in 2003 dealt with European Union policy, demonstrating the significance of Sino-European relations. In addition to applying the framework of academic influence identified herein to the case of the European Studies field, this thesis also provides a preliminary investigation of some of the field’s key research issue areas and current academic discourse, as well as connections with China’s European Union policy decisions in practice.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Key Words: Academia, Chinese Foreign Policy Decision Making, European Studies, European Union, Policy Influence, Research Institutes. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(3) 摘要. 本論文旨在論述中國大陸學術界在中共外交政策的決策過程中所扮演的角色，並聚焦在值得外界特別關注的個案─中國大陸的歐洲研究學界與中共的歐盟政策。在面對愈來愈複雜的外交關係環境下，無論是在正式或非正式的層面，有更多外圍組織或人員被納入中共的外交決策結構之中，其中最貼切的例子就是學術界。隨著中國大陸地區外交相關科系或研究機構的演變、多元性和優質化的發展，其對外交政策之決策過程與範圍的潛在影響力正在增長。學者與其相關的研究機構透過各種可能影響的途徑、層次和來源，來鞏固其研究的影響力。中國大陸歐洲研究的領域目前正蓬勃發展，有些傑出的專家經常被約見來提供建言或評論。除此之外，2003 年中國政府公布了中共的歐盟政策官方文件，這是中共有史以來唯一宣布過的外交政策文件，其展現中歐關係的重要性。本研究除了將論文中所界定的學術影響力框架應用於該歐洲研究的個案之外，也提供學界對此一領域主要研究範圍和學術論述的一個初步調查，以及其對中共的歐盟政策決策上實務性的關聯。. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 關鍵詞：學術界、中共外交決策、歐洲研究、歐盟、研究機構. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(4) Table of Contents Chapter One:. Introduction………………………………………………………………1. 1.1. Literature Review……………………………………………………………………………2 1.1.1 The Formulation of China’s Foreign Policy…………………………………3 1.1.2 International Relations Academia in China…………………………………5 1.1.3 China’s Relations with the European Union………………………………8. 1.2. Research Structure…………………………………………………………………………..11 1.2.1 Research Puzzle……………………………………………………………………….12 1.2.2 Research Questions………………………………………………………………12 1.2.3 Research Design………………………………………………………………………12 1.2.4 Scope……………………………………………………………………………………13 1.2.5 Limitations………………………………………………………………………………14 1.2.6 Expected Contributions……………………………………………………………15 1.2.7 Thesis Composition…………………………………………………………….17. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Practitioners and Decision Making in China’s Foreign Policy……………………………………………………………………….19. ‧. Chapter Two:. 政治大. y. Nat. 2.2. China’s Foreign Policy Decision Making………………………………………….23 2.2.1 Formal Structures……………………………………………………………………23 2.2.2 Informal Mechanisms………………………………………………………………31. er. al. n. 2.3. sit. A Brief History of China’s Foreign Policy Decision Making……………..20. io. 2.1. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Peripheral Actors in Chinese Foreign Policy…………………………………...35. Chapter Three: C h i n a ’ s E v o l v i n g I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s Academia…………………………………………………………………40 3.1. The Evolution of International Relations Academia in China………….41. 3.2. Classifying China’s International Relations Research Institutes…….50. 3.3. China’s International Relations Research Institutes: Roles and Functions………………………………………………………………………………………….56. i.

(5) Chapter Four:. Mechanisms of Academic Influence on China’sForeign Policy………………………………………………………… .62. 4.1. Models of Research Utilisation………………………………………………………...63. 4.2. Pathways of Research Utilisation in China……………………………………...68. 4.3. Factors of Policy Influence………………………………………………………………71 4.3.1 Levels of Influence…………………………………………………………………...72 4.3.2 Sources of Policy Influence……………………………………………………….74 4.3.3 Differentiated Sources of Influence…………………………………………..81. 4.4. An Illustrative Case………………………………………………………………………….86. 立. 學. Academic Influence and China’s Policy towards the European Union………………………………………………………92. ‧ 國. Chapter Five:. 政治大. China’s Policy towards the European Union……………………………………94. 5.2. Identifying Influential Actors in the European Studies Field………102 5.2.1 The European Studies Field……………………………………………………103 5.2.2 European Studies Research Institutes……………………………………..106 5.2.3 Individual Academics……………………………………………………………..110 5.2.4 Major Publications…………………………………………………………………115. 5.3. Europe and China on the Global Stage…………………………………………..116. 5.4. Problems in China-EU Relations……………………………………………………123. 5.5. Learning from the European Union………………………………………………130. ‧. 5.1. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Chapter Six:. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Conclusion……………………………………………………………..141. Appendix I…………………………………………………………………………………………149 Appendix II………………………………………………………………………………………150. References………………………………………………………………………………………152. ii.

(6) List of Abbreviations. 學. ‧. y. sit. n. al. er. io. SCO SIRPA SSCI. 立. 政治大. Nat. CIISS CIIS CIIS ERS CMAC CPPCC CSEUS CSSCI ECSA EU FALSG FISS ILD MoFA MofCOM NCCPC PLA SASS SASTIND. Association of South-East Asian Nations +3 (China, Japan, South Korea) Asia-Europe Meeting Chinese Association for European Studies Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of European Studies Chinese Communist Party Centre for European Studies at Renmin University China-EU Association China Foreign Affairs University China Foreign Affairs University, European Studies Centre China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Institute of European Studies China Institute for International Strategic Studies China Institute of International Studies China Institute of International Studies, European Research Section Central Military Affairs Commission (PRC) Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chinese Society for European Union Studies China Social Sciences Citation Index European Community Studies Association European Union Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group Foundation for International Strategic Studies International Liaison Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC) Ministry of Commerce (PRC) National Congress of the Communist Party of China People’s Liberation Army Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (PRC) Shanghai Cooperation Organisation School of International Relations and Public Affairs (Fudan University) Social Sciences Citation Index. ‧ 國. ASEAN +3 ASEM CAES CASS CASS IES CCP CESRUC CEUA CFAU CFAU ESC CICIR CICIR IES. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. iii.

(7) Chapter 1 Introduction China’s unprecedented rise is presenting the rest of the world with an enigmatic new great power, making its presence indelibly felt across the globe. And yet, many outsiders remain prone to misunderstanding or misinterpreting many of modern China’s manoeuvres and objectives on the global stage. In order to overcome this obstacle, it is imperative to construct a better understanding regarding a range of aspects of China’s. 政治大. engagement with the outside world. With this in mind, this thesis will attempt to make a. 立. certain contribution to ‘unravelling the mystery’ of China’s foreign policy dynamics by. ‧ 國. 學. considering one specific topic in particular. As China’s domestic politics become more. ‧. diverse and decentralised, and its external relations simultaneously flourish and complexify, there is more leeway for non-governmental domestic actors to influence. y. Nat. er. io. sit. foreign policy decision making. As this study will demonstrate, China’s evolving academia is beginning to do just this. Growing progressively in scope and influence,. al. n. v i n researchCinstitutes, university h e n g c h i U departments,. international relations. and individual. academics are increasingly making their voice heard among foreign policy practitioners and wielding a real impact on policy decisions. Closer examination of international relations academia and its research output can thus shed light onto much of the thinking behind China’s foreign policy choices. This thesis will look in turn at China’s foreign policy decision making (Chapter Two); China’s evolving international relations academia (Chapter Three); and the mechanisms of academic influence on policy (Chapter Four). Finally, Chapter Five will illustrate the insights of the preceding three chapters with the example of the European Union, offering a preliminary exploration of. 1.

(8) the case by identifying the key players in European Studies in China, the prominent debates within the field and the potential influence of academia on China’s policy towards the EU. Both China and the EU have become major actors in the world as a whole, and are also of great importance to each other both economically and strategically. However, although Chinese scholars keep careful watch over European analysis of China’s manoeuvres, European observers perpetually overlook the crucial and influential research output of China’s academics. This thesis will take the first preliminary steps to. 政治大. revealing key trends in the analysis of Europe, evaluating not only which information. 立. academia supplies to China’s decision making practitioners, but also which academics’. ‧ 國. 學. work is most worth scrutinising.. ‧. It is hoped that this thesis will ultimately highlight why it is important to look. y. Nat. ‘behind the scenes’ at the influence of the diverse actors beginning to stamp their mark. er. io. sit. on China’s policy decisions, as well as boosting the insights of future research by explaining how to narrow research targets down to those academics and institutes with. n. al. the most influence.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1.1 Literature Review In order to gain a broader understanding of the issues approached in this research and inform the generation of relevant research questions, related literature will now be briefly considered, in three categories: the formulation of China’s foreign policy; international relations academia in China; and China’s relations with the European Union.. 2.

(9) 1.1.1 The Formulation of China’s Foreign Policy In the past, China’s foreign policy was decided almost solely by the country’s top leaders, in particular figureheads such as Mao Zedong (毛泽东) and Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), and was relatively restricted due to both domestic and international conditions, such as the rigid Leninist political structure and the global ideological cleaving of capitalism and communism. (Wills, 2011) However, over time, the creation of Chinese foreign policy has become more and more diversified. (Deng and Wang, 2005) “The advent of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up policy in the late 1970s marked the beginning of a. 政治大. gradual transformation of China’s regional and global role from a passive ideological. 立. observer to that of an active, more pragmatic participant.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002:. ‧ 國. 學. 597) Following this, from the era of Jiang Zemin (江泽民) to the leadership of Hu Jintao. ‧. (胡锦涛), great strides have been made in the development of Chinese foreign policy,. sit. y. Nat. not least the entering into multilateral international institutions and the widening of. io. al. er. China’s foreign policy scope to include more peripheral states. (Roy, 1998) China is growing in confidence and taking more initiative in formulating active foreign policies,. n. v i n C h stance as before. rather than following a simply ‘responsive’ e n g c h i U (Feng, 2004). However, for analysts and outsiders, as noted by Marc Lanteigne (2009): “the decision-making process which guides the development and paths of Chinese foreign policy has been difficult to observe.” (p. 19) It is important to first note which actors are formally involved in the process of constructing China’s foreign policy. Primarily, analysts look to the make-up and behaviour of the Politburo Standing Committee, including President Hu Jintao (now Xi Jinping (习近平)), and under it the larger Politburo, as well as the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) and its subsidiary International Liaison Department. (Lu, 1997; Bachman, 1998; Lanteigne, 2009) On the. 3.

(10) whole, these high ranking organisations create policy for major states or actors such as the European Union, United States and Russia. (Rozman, 2013) Underneath these are various related ministries with lesser responsibilities. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs generally handles policy toward smaller, more marginal states. (Lanteigne, 2009) Analysis of foreign policy decision making is not restricted to formal structures alone. Analysing any country’s foreign policy involves more than institutions, but must also take into account more informal approaches such as individual preferences and. 政治大. decision making dynamics, as well as outside influences. (Hudson, 2007) In particular,. 立. Chinese decision making is infused with informal hierarchies in which those that are. ‧ 國. 學. implicitly junior follow the lead of more senior practitioners, often in subtle deference within formal structures, or in behind-the-scenes negotiations. (Lu, 1997) Informal. ‧. hierarchies are thus also an important consideration in the overall policy making. er. io. sit. y. Nat. dynamic.. In addition, the influence of peripheral actors is of particular interest to this. al. n. v i n CPeople’s research. The Chinese military, the Army (PLA), has always been an h e n gLiberation chi U influential actor in terms of foreign policy, sometimes in its own right and sometimes as. an official actor within the decision making structure. (Roy, 1998) In addition, as the private sector grows and globalisation spreads, Chinese businesses are beginning to gain a foothold in foreign affairs. (Lai, 2010) As pioneers of Chinese development, the interests of large businesses are of immediate importance to China and the government. One of the newest influential actors is civil society, including NGOs and social interest groups. (Lanteigne, 2009) Chinese awareness of civil society is on the rise in general, but this began at a very low starting point as the participation of general society in. 4.

(11) politics has historically been greatly marginalised in modern China. This is beginning to change, but civil society as yet has nowhere near the influence seen in other countries. (Deng and Wang, 2005) Finally, and most importantly for this research, China’s foreign policy is increasingly influenced by academics, official research institutes, and university departments. Well-educated academics are beginning to wield their influence over China’s foreign policy direction and it is thus important to take into consideration their views and analyses when considering China’s foreign relations.. 治政 1.1.2 International Relations Academia大 in China 立 ‧ 國. 學. The world of international relations academia in China is flourishing. China’s international relations research institutes now overwhelm those of the USA and Europe. ‧. in terms of number and size. (Leonard, 2008) It is the responsibility of these research. Nat. sit. y. institutes, as well as academics hailing from China’s most powerful universities, such as. n. al. er. io. Beijing, Qinghua, and Shanghai Fudan, to analyse China’s international image, measure. i n U. v. Comprehensive National Power, and consider potential outcomes of policy decisions.. Ch. engchi. (Leonard, 2008) As such, many ideas are mooted during consideration and research which occasionally give rise to new guiding philosophies for China’s continued international development, as well as for policies targeted at individual countries and regions. As Shambaugh (2002) explains, in recent times, “Chinese IR think tanks have evolved in their functions, responsibilities and influence. Cumulatively, they have gained in importance (although there are exceptions to this generalisation) and today they must be considered important actors in the foreign policy making process in the PRC.” (p. 581). 5.

(12) In the past, during the politically-charged eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, research institutes were tightly controlled and often functioned only as representatives of the various Party organisations to which they were affiliated. (Shambaugh, 2002; Zhu, 2013) However, Tanner (2002) argues that now a newer generation of research institutes have begun to spring up in China. Many scholars in research institutes today are free to pursue relatively unlimited topics and even to criticise existing government policy. (Zhu 2009; 2013) As the world of academia grows in size and influence, the ideas debated within these research institutes may reach the attention of policy makers.. 政治大. There are many ways in which the work of academics may influence policy. On. 立. occasion, policy makers will actively solicit the advice of academics, either through. ‧ 國. 學. informal consultation or by commanding the organisation of conferences and research groups to address specific policy questions. Academics may also have opportunities to. ‧. submit unsolicited research products to leaders and thereby influence policy (Glaser. y. Nat. sit. and Saunders, 2002; Zhu, 2009) In addition to this, there are also indirect methods of. n. al. er. io. garnering influence. The debates and discussions gaining traction in the freer. i n U. v. intellectual environment in China may also add to the general understanding of decision. Ch. engchi. makers on any given topic. (Weiss, 1979; Glaser and Medeiros, 2007; Zhu, 2013) As such, academics may also collectively influence policy making by indirectly shaping general opinion about an issue. For outside analysts wishing to gain a greater comprehension of the dynamics of policy making in China, considering policy after it has already been made does not tell the whole story. The source of many prevalent ideas in the foreign affairs field can be traced to the world of academia. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007; Leonard, 2008) Studying the output of research institutes can provide clear insights into the debates and schools. 6.

(13) of opinion which eventually come to shape the thinking of policy makers – before policy is made. Tanner (2002) argues: “Since their emergence in the early 1980s, China’s growing networks of government affiliated research institutes (colloquially referred to as ‘think tanks’ by most foreign analysts) have become some of the most important windows through which foreign analysts can observe China’s usually opaque policymaking system.” (p. 559) This is corroborated almost word-for-word by Zhu (2009): “These institutions are usually regarded as windows through which foreign scholars can take a peek at the closed policy process of Chinese politics, though few such observers. 政治大. have actually looked inside the mechanism at their behaviour and function.” (p. 356). 立. Zhu’s final point rings particularly true. There is thus far only a very restricted. ‧ 國. 學. body of literature on China’s research institutes, and even less in the English language. In 2002, China Quarterly ran a special issue dedicated to China’s research institutes,. ‧. which outlined general explanations of the system and the potential influence of. y. Nat. sit. scholars, but little has been added since. In addition to an understanding of the world of. n. al. er. io. academia itself, external observers are sorely lacking comprehension of the actual. i n U. v. output of China’s many research institutes. In light of Leonard (2008)’s claim that. Ch. engchi. “China’s ideas on world order… will have as dramatic an effect on our foreign policies as its cheap exports had on our economic ones,” (p. 117) it is imperative that analysts begin to take note of the work of Chinese academics. As Tanner writes, “A final, universal concern among these [China Quarterly special issue] authors is that Western researchers, especially governments, are not using the vast amounts of unique research materials from think tank sources to anything like maximum advantage… The unprecedentedly wide-open policy debate that takes place in these unclassified journals is a rich and greatly under-utilised database on. 7.

(14) the range of policy opinions inside the Chinese government, and scholars who have exploited it have reaped a rich harvest.” (p. 574) In short, better and deeper analysis of Chinese research institute output can only add to the accuracy and insightfulness of foreign observers’ analyses.. 1.1.3 China’s Relations with the European Union As this brief review will demonstrate, the European Union is an appropriate selection. 政治大. for a case study due to its significant and growing importance to China, as well as the. 立. overall magnitude of the Sino-EU relationship on the global stage. In addition, given the. ‧ 國. 學. constant interest in Sino-US relations, the burgeoning Sino-EU relationship offers greater unexplored ground for research.. ‧. The European Union (then the European Economic Community) and China first. y. Nat. io. sit. established diplomatic relations in 1975. On May 6th 2010, the two parties celebrated. al. er. the 35th anniversary of PRC-EU relations. According to Michael Yahuda, writing in 1994,. n. v i n C himpinged much upon “Since neither Europe nor China has the other in terms of security engchi U. or economic relations, it is appropriate to consider the relationship as secondary from China’s point of view.” (p. 266) However, even in such a short time, this situation has now fundamentally changed. For example, the PRC’s Department of Policy Planning, in its China’s Foreign Affairs 2004 Edition, states “Constantly developing China-EU relations is a key component of China’s foreign policy.” (p. 331) Narramore (2008) even reports that “China’s relations with both the European Union and its individual member states have drawn so close over the past decade that some scholars refer to an emerging China–Europe ‘axis.’” (p. 87). 8.

(15) In particular, China and the EU share extensive economic ties which are crucial for both parties. Trade between the two actors is huge: according to Europa, the EU’s official website, the EU is China’s largest trading partner, and China is the EU’s second largest trading partner. Trade in goods and services from the PRC to the EU amounted to 227.7 billion Euros in 2009, and the equivalent from the EU to the PRC amounted to 99.7 billion Euros, in addition to 5.3 billion Euros of Foreign Direct Investment. It is thus in the economic interests of both countries to also maintain stable political ties to ensure smooth transactions and mutually beneficial policies.. 政治大. During the annual summit on 28th November 2007, China and the EU established. 立. a High Level Trade and Development Dialogue. This was an important step in tightening. ‧ 國. 學. relations economically. In 2010, a High Level Strategic Dialogue was established. This is a particularly important step that will address shared foreign policy and common. ‧. strategic concerns for the bilateral partnership. (Europa) China-EU ties are split into. y. Nat. sit. sectoral dialogues. Issues concern a range of subjects, such as Education and Culture,. n. al. er. io. Environment, Customs Co-operation, Regional Policy, Employment and Social Affairs,. i n U. v. Nuclear Energy, Trade, Economic and Financial Issues, and Political and Human Rights Dialogues. (Europa). Ch. engchi. Zhu Liqun, in Shambaugh, Sandschneider and Zhou (2008) provides many informative insights into Chinese scholars’ perspectives on the European Union. Zhu concludes that “Scholars… take a positive, straightforward and non-ideological approach to looking at the EU and China-EU relations.” (p. 169) In particular, many scholars believe that the positive relations between China and the EU will combine forces to balance US hegemony and establish a multilateral international system. Qiu Yuanlun, cited by Zhu, posits that “In recent and future years, the first power that can. 9.

(16) challenge the United States seems to be the EU, which is determined by the EU’s position in international economy and politics.” (p.150). In this regard, Lanteigne (2009) considers the Chinese policy approach: “Further European engagement was beneficial to Beijing as a means of tacitly balancing American power as well as encouraging multipolarisation in the international system.” (p. 129) It is clear that, at least as far as the Chinese are concerned, Europe and China are two of the most important players on the world stage. For this reason, Chinese scholars such as Song (2008) also take a positive view. 政治大. on the expansion of the European Union: “For most Chinese specialists, EU enlargement. 立. provides more opportunities than challenges.” (p. 182). He explains “a stronger EU is. ‧ 國. 學. also good for the further development of China-EU relations, as well as China’s position in the world community.” (p. 183) This point of view reflects the stance that co-. ‧. operation between the European Union and China is beneficial not only bilaterally, for. y. Nat. al. er. io. strategically important for China on a global scale.. sit. example by economic advantages, but also that increased co-operation with the EU is. n. v i n Csums Song Xinning (2001) neatly “The unremitting rise of both China and the h eup: ngchi U. EU in the international political economy is an undeniable fact.” China and the European Union have both become major global actors in the space of mere decades. As such, understanding the interplay of China-EU relations is of international significance.. 10.

(17) 1.2 Research Structure 1.2.1 Research Puzzle As the literature review has demonstrated, firstly, the structure of the decision-making of China’s foreign policy has been shown to be somewhat complex and opaque, though it is evident that the actors involved in the entire foreign policy process are diversifying. Secondly, the world of academia within China is growing rapidly and is in a position to influence China’s policy. As such, analysis of Chinese academia’s research output is. 政治大. increasingly important. Finally, the relations between China and the European Union. 立. are now of huge importance to both parties, both economically and strategically. It is. ‧ 國. 學. argued that China and the EU may create an ‘axis’ to offset US hegemony. This makes the relations of these two actors extremely significant globally, and well worthy of greater. ‧. research.. y. Nat. io. sit. So what is the connection between these three aspects? This research will. al. er. attempt to tie these three aspects together. By separately analysing the structure of. n. v i n C h the evolutionUof China’s international relations China’s foreign policy decision making, engchi. academia, and the ways in which academics stand to influence foreign policy, it will be possible to better understand the relation between scholarly research and China’s ultimate policy decisions. This thesis will then provide a preliminary, exploratory case study of the example of European Studies in China, employing the insights of the previous chapters to identify the most influential academics and consider the debates and analyses of their research. It is hoped that by creating a systematic understanding of the mechanisms of influence employed by Chinese international relations academia in terms of China’s. 11.

(18) foreign policy, it will be possible for further research to utilise these insights to conduct more in-depth empirical studies of specific research output and policy fields.. 1.2.2 Research Questions Primary Research Question:What is the role of academia in terms of China’s foreign policy decision making?. 政治大. Expanding on this primary research question, this research further encompasses three. 立. secondary research questions:. ‧ 國. 學. 1. How is foreign policy formulated in China, and by whom is it decided?. ‧. Nat. sit. y. 2. How is China’s evolving international relations academia structured, and what. n. al. er. io. role and function does it play?. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 3. To what extent does European Studies academia exert influence over China’s policy towards the European Union?. 1.2.3 Research Design This research will begin by reviewing literature on the formulation of China’s foreign policy in practice, establishing the potential role of external actors within the foreign policy decision making structure. In light of this investigation, one such external group of actors will be identified, namely the world of academia and research. The structure of. 12.

(19) this group will be analysed due to its potential effects on net policy influence. Next, relevant literature on the mechanisms of influence employed by Chinese academia will be considered, taking into account differentiated mechanisms related to the unique structure of the Chinese research institute system. Once the assumptions of differentiated mechanisms of influence have been identified it will be possible to apply this model to any academic within the Chinese system. After considering China’s current policy towards the European Union, this study will then apply these assumptions to the European Studies field, identifying the key. 政治大. influential actors with access to the widest mechanisms of influence. Literature review. 立. and discourse analysis of the debates voiced by these identified actors will follow,. ‧ 國. 學. highlighting the main areas of concern within China’s relations with the European Union. Although at this stage of preliminary research, a direct ‘cause and effect’ influence. ‧. cannot be empirically proven, this analytical model enables this study to infera link. y. Nat. sit. between the European Union’s policy in practice and the discourse of scholars within. n. al. er. io. European Studies academia, which can be built upon further with subsequent research. The study will be carried out qualitatively.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1.2.4 Scope 1. This research will only consider the structure of China’s foreign policy decision making, and not the content of the foreign policy itself, in addition to mechanisms of academic influence, and not the content of the academic discourse itself – both with the exception of the case study of China’s policy toward the European Union.. 13.

(20) 2. The thesis will also be limited in scope to Chinese scholars’ discourse on the European Union, and China’s foreign policy toward the European Union. One purpose of this study is to provide an insight into Chinese thinking for European audiences, and therefore the European stance towards China is not relevant for the purpose. 3. This thesis is limited to only ‘academic’ research institutes. The conditions and policy relevance of military research institutes fall outside the scope of this thesis. These units exist to serve the purposes of the People’s Liberation Army and thus. 政治大 opposed to through the mechanisms analysed herein. 立. hold sway via the PLA’s own mechanisms of influence on China’s foreign policy, as. ‧ 國. 學. 4. The policy discussed in this thesis refers generally to large-scale, macro-policy as opposed to micro-policy decisions. It is assumed that micro-policy decisions will. y. sit. io. iv l C n hengchi U This research may be limited by a lack of reliable material on both the structure of n. 1.. er. Nat 1.2.5 Limitations a. ‧. follow general macro-policy lines.. China’s foreign policy decision making, long an opaque topic, as well as the mechanisms of influence available to Chinese scholars. There is little literature on these topics in English; however, by collating both English and Chinese language sources, it is possible to draw a fairly clear picture of the operational structure. 2. A further limitation is that whilst China has a growing body of academic work available for public scrutiny, much of China’s politics and decisions occurs behind closed doors and is not made available to the general public, and perhaps the most insightful and influential academic work is delivered via confidential channels. In. 14.

(21) order to address this limitation, this study will consider the discourse of a range of scholars and pick out the most clearly emerging themes and standpoints, in the assumption that these will best reflect the content of internal reports. In this regard, carrying out interviews would be a helpful direction for future research. 3. Finally, this research will be qualitative in nature, which has some inherent limitations. For example, qualitative work has been criticised for lacking measurability and generalisability. However it is argued that this approach is most appropriate for a study into the influence of a specific academic field over policy, in. 政治大. which generalisability is not a key concern.. 學. ‧ 國. 立. 1.2.6Expected Contributions. ‧. Primarily, this research aims to take the first steps to bridging a specific gap in the. Nat. sit. y. literature on the influences behind China’s foreign policy. The research takes as its. n. al. er. io. premise the issue that whilst Chinese academics are beginning to wield real influence. i n U. v. over China’s thinking and manoeuvres on the world stage, outside observers are still a. Ch. engchi. step behind. One of the tasks of Chinese research institutes and major media agencies is in fact to systematically digest the research output of other countries, and even to pass this information to China’s leaders for reference. (Shambaugh, 2008) But the same cannot be said for the opposite direction. Despite their growing influence domestically, Chinese research institutes are overlooked and their work is rarely consulted or reviewed by analysts. But for Chinese scholars, traditional IR theories and insights do not ring true for China’s own conditions and worldview. There is therefore a significant perception gap. 15.

(22) between the analysis of China’s own academics and those from elsewhere. Recognising and engaging with the key ideas of China’s most influential academics will enlighten observers of the source of many of the actions and decisions of Chinese policy makers. One major contribution of this thesis is the identification of the most influential actors in, specifically, the European Studies discipline within Chinese academia, as well as an initial overview of the biggest debates in the field. This overview offers translation of Chinese language sources which are inaccessible to many Europeans, but is by no means a comprehensive analysis of all the work of European Studies scholars. Instead,. 政治大. this thesis narrows down the field to the most influential voices.. 立. What’s more, the identification of a model of mechanisms of academic influence. ‧ 國. 學. combined with an understanding of the structure of Chinese academia can be seen as. ‧. apreliminary framework to a more systematic and wide-ranging analysis of policy-. y. Nat. influential research output in any discipline, not just European Studies. Understanding. er. io. sit. through the eyes of Chinese thinkers and policy-makers, and identifying which of these many actors wields greater influence, is imperative for a deeper understanding of China. al. n. v i n C h preoccupying not and its policy manoeuvres – an issue e n g c h i U only academics, but also many. decision-makers and the public in the world today.. In addition, this study will make a contribution to the large body of literature concerning Sino-EU relations. As the European Union is a fairly new consolidated actor in global politics, it has only recently become a topic for research in terms of foreign policy. Furthermore, much of this research is carried out from within the European Union and looking outwards. This research will provide new insights by bringing into account new perspectives and ideas from within Chinese academia.. 16.

(23) The research is valuable and significant as a result of these contributions, and is important because it focuses on relations between two major world powers, both of which carry huge influence around the world both politically and economically. As a result, the current relations between China and the EU, as well as China’s future intentions for relations with the EU, are significant for other powers in the world such as, in particular, the United States, amongst others.. 1.2.7 Thesis Composition. 立. 政治大. Following the introductory Chapter One, this thesis will be divided into Chapters Two to. ‧ 國. 學. Six.. ‧. Chapter Two will outline how Chinese foreign policy is made today. It begins with a brief overview of the history of China’s foreign policy decision making, followed. y. Nat. io. sit. by a detailed explanation of the current decision making structure. Finally, this chapter. n. al. er. introduces the growing role of periphery actors in foreign policy.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Chapter Three will explain the evolution of China’s international relations research institutes, providing a detailed breakdown of the unique Chinese system of research institute classifications. Lastly, Chapter Three lays out the roles and functions of China’s international relation research institutes. Chapter Four will investigate and outline the precise mechanisms of foreign policy influence associated with the world of academia in China, explaining how the output of China’s international relations research institutes and individual academics can be brought to the attention of decision makers. The chapter will first identify classic models of research utilisation, followed by pathways to policy influence in China, and. 17.

(24) then a more specific discussion of factors of influence. The chapter will conclude with an illustrativeestablished example of academic policy influence in action. Chapter Five forms a preliminary exploration of the specific case of Europe to illustrate the insights of Chapters Two, Three and Four. This chapter will begin by outlining China’s current policy towards the European Union, and will then move on to identify the most influential actors in the European Studies field. Next, the chapter is divided into individual sections, each discussing the writings of academics on different issue areas in the European field. The chapter will conclude with a summary of extent of. 政治大. the link between European Studies academia and policy towards the European Union.. 立. Finally, Chapter Six will consolidate the investigations of the previous chapters to. ‧ 國. 學. conclude the study. This chapter will summarise the findings of each preceding chapter. ‧. and argue that, as evidence of the growing influence of China’s academia strengthens,. y. Nat. the study’s conclusions inspire a clear recommendation for interested parties to pay. n. al. er. io. sit. greater attention to the output of China’s academics and research institutes.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 18.

(25) Chapter 2 Practitioners and Decision Making in China’s Foreign Policy China’s foreign policy decision making process involves an interplay between formal, institutionalised bureaucratic structures, informal mechanisms of hierarchy and personal preference, and peripheral actors with a growing voice. When considering any analysis of the dynamics of various factors of influence on Chinese foreign policy, it is. 治政 first imperative to foster a good grounding of the process 大 of decision making. It is 立 therefore important to first examine China’s foreign policy decision making structure ‧ 國. 學. before attempting to assess any influence from external actors.. ‧. This chapter will provide an overview of the processes and key practitioners in. sit. y. Nat. the field of foreign policyin order to better understand the general context of Chinese. n. al. er. io. policy making. The chapter begins with a brief outline of the history and evolution of. i n U. v. China’s foreign policy decision making during the eras of Mao, Deng, Jiang and Hu,. Ch. engchi. providing a backdrop for the understanding of the modern system. The next section looks in greater detail at the system of current foreign policy decision making in China, considering first the hierarchy of formal structures established to not only make policy, but also to consult, implement, and supervise; before moving on to discuss the informal mechanisms which also play a crucial role, working in tandem with formal, institutionalised processes. The final section of the chapter turns to look at the peripheral actors beginning to accumulate influence over foreign policy, including the military, civil society, and academia, revealing that the process of creating foreign policy is not limited to just Party and government structures.. 19.

(26) 2.1 A Brief History of China’s Foreign Policy Decision Making Modern China’s foreign policy decision making has gone through several stages of evolution since the country was first founded in 1949, the legacy of which have left their mark on foreign policy decision making today. (Robinson and Shambaugh, 1994; Sutter 2013) These stages, each with distinctive differences, include the eras of Mao Zedong (毛泽东), Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), and Jiang Zemin (江泽民), before moving into the leadership of Hu Jintao (胡锦涛)in 2003. Although changes have occurred over time, the. 政治大 and a highly centralised and personalised decision making style prevails. 立. role of China’s top leader remains pivotal in terms of foreign policy decision making,. ‧ 國. 學. During the periods of Mao and Deng, foreign policy decision making followed a ‘strong-man model,’ based around the country’s paramount leader. (Wills, 2011) Mao. ‧. Zedong was China’s paramount leader from 1949 until his death in 1976, and was. Nat. sit. y. followed by Deng Xiaoping, who managed to wrest power and install himself securely as. n. al. er. io. the country’s new paramount leader by 1980. During these eras, decision making was. i n U. v. characterised by an extreme degree of personalism. (Hamrin, 1994) What’s more,. Ch. engchi. China’s foreign policy during these periods tended to involve one overarching strategy or even ideology laid down by the paramount leader (Marxism-Leninism under Mao, and opening up and peaceful development under Deng), by which all other macro and micro policies were decided. (Lanteigne, 2009) Hamrin (1994) writes, “The paramount leader was usually actively involved in setting guidelines for overall foreign policy… He retained ultimate authority… while delegating pieces of this authority to others.” (p. 83). Mao had the ultimate say over China’s strategic foreign policy, but during his leadership he delegated to different bureaucratic organs or even individuals. For example, in the 1950s, the International Liaison Department handled policy, but in 1958, the Central. 20.

(27) Foreign Affairs Small Group (中共中央外事小组, Zhonggong zhongyang waishi xiaozu) was created, supervising the new Foreign Affairs Office under the State Council General Office. The Central Foreign Affairs Small Group was headed by Premier Zhou Enlai (周恩来) and Foreign Minister Chen Yi (陈毅) and contained five other members, and the Foreign Affairs Office was responsible for delegating administrative tasks to appropriate government organs. (Lu, 1997) Despite this initial step towards greater institutionalisation, during the upheaval of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), foreign policy decision making became even more. 政治大. restricted, tending to reside solely in the hands of individuals, such as Premier Zhou. 立. Enlai, Mao’s close propaganda supremo Kang Sheng (康生), and Mao himself. Only when. ‧ 國. 學. the excesses of the Cultural Revolution began to recede in the early 1970s was the role of the Central Foreign Affairs Small Group re-fortified. (Lanteigne, 2009). ‧. sit. y. Nat. During the time of Mao, the range of foreign policy was markedly reduced by. io. al. er. China’s ‘leaning to one side’ (一边倒, yibiandao) – an overwhelming partiality to the. n. Soviet Union – followed by an acute isolationist status brought about by the Sino-Soviet. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Split, and subsequently the radicalism of the Cultural Revolution. (Sutter, 2013) After Deng Xiaoping took power, the direction of China’s foreign affairs changed dramatically, as he began to pursue the policy of Opening Up and Reform, engaging with many new diplomatic partners around the world. (Lampton, 2001) As a result of this expansion, “Foreign affairs became much less manageable by a tiny elite; co-ordination and delegation of authority became both more necessary and more difficult.” (Hamrin, 1994) In 1985, a decision was made to focus more on foreign economic relations; with this in mind, the Foreign Affairs Office was newly consolidated, subordinate to both the State Council and the CCP Central Committee. This office contained members of various. 21.

(28) important units, including the government, Party, and military, and was the staff office of the Central Foreign Affairs Small Group, now re-named the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) (中央外事工作领导小组, zhongyang waishi gongzuo xiaozu). FALSG was headed first by Li Xiannian (李先念) from 1981-1988, and later Premier Li Peng (李鹏) from 1988-1993. (Lanteigne, 2009) Despite the re-organisation of these foreign affairs organs, the paramount leader still held sway: “Deng Xiaoping could make almost any foreign policy decision on his own, although he tended… to build consensus through consultation.” (Hamrin, 1994: 83). 政治大. Jiang Zemin became President of the PRC in 1993, but the time of paramount. 立. leadership was now over; as Lu Ning (1997) points out, after Deng Xiaoping, the. ‧ 國. 學. subsequent generations of Chinese leadership have lacked “both authority and charisma. ‧. to dominate foreign policy decision making.” (p. 3)Overall, the Chinese regime sought to. sit. y. Nat. actively pursue some degree of decentralisation, as well as democratic centralism (民主. io. al. er. 集中制, minzhu jizhong zhi), a form of collective decision making in which decisions are. n. made on the basis of consensus. The foreign policy administrative structure was. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. retained from the end of the Deng era, and further institutionalised; Jiang was installed as leader of the FALSG. (Lu, 1997) Although Jiang Zemin did not keep the same personal ‘monopoly’ over policy as his predecessors, he did put his own personal stamp on foreign policy, characterised by an emphasis on improving relations with neighbouring countries and great powers, as well as far greater interaction with international institutions, most notably acceding to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. (Sutter, 2012) Hu Jintao took over the Presidency in 2003, and by now the structure of the Foreign Affairs Office and the FALSG have been unquestionably institutionalised and. 22.

(29) stabilised. The structure in place today will be discussed in greater detail in section 2.2. Hu’s guidance offoreign policy seems to have been the continuation and expansion of foreign policy under Jiang, but with far greater focus on previously under-emphasised areas such as Africa, Latin America, and Europe. (Sutter, 2012). 2.2 China’s Foreign Policy DecisionMaking 2.2.1 Formal Structures. 政治大. China’s foreign policy structure has been institutionalised since the reform period. 立. initiated by Deng Xiaoping. Although the entire process of Chinese foreign policy. ‧ 國. 學. decision making has never been particularly transparent, and has even been. ‧. purposefully cloaked in secrecy during certain eras, the basic hierarchy of the structure is now relatively more clear.. sit. y. Nat. io. al. er. Firstly, it is important to note that, as explained by Lu Ning (1997), “Foreign affairs… [has] long been considered one of the most sensitive areas that demand[s] an. n. v i n C h making power.”U(p. 8) In other words, although even higher concentration of decision engchi. China’s system in general is now far less centralised and the era of ‘strong-man’ monopolisation of decision making has drawn to a close, foreign policy decision making is of such importance and sensitivity it remains more centralised than other political areas. It is thus instructive to consider China’s foreign policy decision making in a hierarchical structure. This structure is shown in Figure 1 on page 30. In terms of decision making in China, “With regard to major policy orientation, principles and guidelines, and to implementation planning and supervision, government organs and. 23.

(30) their Party groups have the power to make recommendations. But the decision making power belongs to the Party Centre.” (Zheng et al., 1988, in Lu, 1997) In other words, the central Party authorities maintain ultimate decision making power, at the pinnacle of the hierarchy. This is indeed the case for foreign policy decision making. In the formal structure of Chinese foreign policy decision making, the ‘Party Centre’ is represented by the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest formal foreign policy decision making body. Under Hu Jintao, the Politburo was made up of nine members, and since the 18th National Congress, the Politburo has consisted of just seven. 政治大. members. The Standing Committee may allow debate over certain issues in the larger. 立. Politburo, but with 25 members, the Politburo is too large for efficient decision making.. ‧ 國. 學. Although the Politburo Standing Committee retains absolute decision making. ‧. power, the foreign affairs sector is overseen by the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group. sit. y. Nat. (FALSG). FALSG, also known as the National Security Leading Small Group (国家安全工. io. al. er. 作领导小组, guojia anquan gongzuo lingdao xiaozu) is officially classed as a decision. v. n. making consulting body (决策咨询机构, juece zixun jigou), and is bureaucratically. Ch. engchi. i n U. subordinate to the Politburo Standing Committee, the Party’s highest echelon. FALSG also maintains administrative links to the State Council, which commands the Chinese government, as well as the CCP Central Committee Secretariat. (Lu, 1997; Lanteigne, 2009; Rozman, 2013) FALSG isresponsible for coordinating and supervising all foreign affairs and national security-related work. It is not a not a standing institution; in other words, it has no physical office or fixed staff per se. Instead, the group, made up of important officials in the field of foreign affairs, meets when necessary to supervise foreign affairs. 24.

(31) work, as well as to discuss relevant issues and put forward policy proposals for the Politburo Standing Committee to decide upon if necessary. (Rozman, 2013) However, according to Lu (1997), “As the [FALSG] provides a forum for the top decision makers… to meet face to face, the policy preferences and recommendations by [FALSG] are likely to have an important impact on the outcome of the final decision. Therefore the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group in fact plays a pivotal role in the decision making process.” (p. 12) He later expands on this further, explaining that although FALSG is not officially a decision making organ, “Some decisions are in fact made in the [FALSG] meetings. The. 政治大 decisions are made by the central leadership based on the recommendation of [FALSG] 立. ratification of these decisions by the central leadership is but a formality. Other times. ‧ 國. 學. with minor modifications.” (p. 108). The influential sway of FALSG is a direct result of the high-ranking politicians. ‧. and bureaucrats constituting the group. Always led by a chosen high-level Standing. y. Nat. sit. Committee member, FALSG was headed by President and General Secretary Hu Jintao. n. al. er. io. from 2002 to 2013. As Vice-President, Xi Jinping (习近平) was second in command. Ch. i n U. v. during this time and became the head of FALSG when he ascended to his role as General. engchi. Secretary and President in 2013. His second in command is now Vice-President Li Yuanchao (李源潮). In addition to Hu and Xi, there were 14 other members during Hu Jintao’s time in command of FALSG. (360.com) Their names and roles at the time are listed below (the positions of each were altered during the Eighteenth National Congress personnel shake-up in 2012-2013): the then director of the Central Committee’s International Liaison Department Wang Jiarui (王家瑞); Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪); Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Qiao Zenghuai (乔宗淮); Minister of Commerce Chen Deming (陈德铭); Minister of State Security Geng. 25.

(32) Huichang (耿惠昌); Minister of Propaganda Liu Yunshan (刘云山); Minister of National Defence Liang Guanglie (梁光烈) (who was also a member of the Central Military Affairs Commission); Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu (孟建柱); director of the Taiwan Affairs Office Wang Yi (王毅); director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Liao Hui (廖晖); director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office Li Haifeng (李海峰); director of the State Council Information Office Wang Chen (王晨); and director of the PLA General Staff Office General Ma Xiaotian (马晓天). The fourteenth member, State Councillor Dai Bingguo (戴秉国), was the Secretary-General of FALSG (since 2013, that. 政治大 role has been taken over by Yang Jiechi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs during Hu’s 立. presidency). As can be seen, the FALSG members include the Ministers of all the. ‧ 國. 學. government ministries and offices which are closely linked to foreign affairs, as well as. ‧. representatives of China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Communist. sit. y. Nat. Party is also represented by the director of the International Liaison Department (ILD),. io. al. er. the Party’s own foreign affairs organ. This combination of government, Party, and military elite thus forms the central body for supervising foreign affairs work. Together,. n. v i n C U consultants, supervisors, and these sixteen officials constitute thehmain e n foreign g c h ipolicy practitioners in China. The next rung down on the ladder is the Foreign Affairs Office, which is the executive ‘working office’ for FALSG. Lu (1997) describes the Foreign Affairs Office as the ‘CPU’ of FALSG, liaising “between the decision makers and the implementing organs in the Party, government and military systems.” (p. 12) All decisions from above are passed down through this Office, which is responsible for delegating tasks to the appropriate units for implementation. In turn, recommendations, queries, and decisions beyond the scope of these units are passed upwards through the Foreign Affairs Office. 26.

(33) to be handled by the higher decision making body. FALSG and the Foreign Affairs Office are thus charged with policy coordination and delegation, supervision, and consultation. Below these two in the hierarchy are ministerial level (部级, bu ji) units responsible for implementing FALSG’s decisions within their own sector, as well as recommending policy directions when necessary and appropriate. (Lu, 1997) These units are roughly equivalent to the ministries and offices represented by their leaders in the FALSG: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Ministry of Commerce (MofCOM), Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Propaganda, Ministry of National Defence,. 政治大. Ministry of Public Security, Taiwan Affairs Office, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office,. 立. Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, and the State Council Information Office (which is. ‧ 國. 學. responsible for propaganda directed overseas). In addition, the Central Committee International Liaison Department (ILD) represents the Party. The ILD, formerly in. ‧. charge of relations with other Communist parties, is now mainly responsible for. y. Nat. io. sit. handling visiting dignitaries and retaining links with other political parties, and has. n. al. er. therefore weakened in importance since the time of Mao. On behalf of the military, the. Ch. i n U. v. PLA General Staff Department is also involved in the structure, as well as the PLA. engchi. General Political Department. They are joined by units which supply information and research, such as Xinhua News Agencyand the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) – the only academic institution at ministerial level – as well as the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND), which is administratively under the government Ministry of Industry and Information, and represents the Chinese defence industry. These ministries and offices are not responsible for making large scale, macro foreign policy decisions, but rather for implementing the decisions of the FALSG or. 27.

(34) Politburo Standing Committee, conveyed to them by the Foreign Affairs Office. (Lanteigne, 2009) The ministries and offices, in much the same way as the overall political structure, delegate further down the chain to the relevant sections and divisions under their jurisdiction. In the opposite direction, ministries also send their recommendations and queries back ‘up the ladder,’ once again through the Foreign Affairs Office up to the higher rung of decision makers. The minister is the chief executive of each ministry, and is therefore responsible for delegating. In this sense, small scale policy implementation decisions are indeed made at this level; this is the. 政治大 collective decision making is favoured, the minister may call a conference in order to 立 responsibility of the minister. Under the concept of democratic centralism, where. ‧ 國. 學. make these decisions. Lower level officials are charged with day-to-day affairs only, but even these micro decisions may be sent ‘up the ladder’ to the minister to ratify the. ‧. decision. (Lanteigne, 2009) Ministries also have regional offices in provinces and. sit. y. Nat. municipalities, which deal with foreign affairs on an ever yet reduced scale.. n. al. er. io. Most of the ministries thus implement decisions made by the FALSG, delegated. i n U. v. to them by the Foreign Affairs Office. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) has a. Ch. engchi. slightly more central role, and is considered to be consistently growing in influence in recent years (Shambaugh, 2002; Lanteigne, 2009, Wills, 2011). MoFA is “charged with interpreting and often substantiating policy decisions made by the country’s leadership.” (Lanteigne, 2009: 26) With round-the-clock surveillance of international news, MoFA also supplies important publications to the higher leadership, providing briefings and analysis of current world affairs. MoFA’s responsible unit, the Information Department, thus “in a significant way influences the perception of the decision makers in the ministerial and central leadership.” (Lu, 1997: 27). 28.

(35) The final rung on the hierarchy are the official research and study institutes attached to these ministerial ranking units. (Lu, 1997) Affiliated academic institutes are one rung lower in bureaucratic ranking, putting them at bureau ranking (局级, ju ji). (Zhu, 2009) This includes CIIS (China Institute for International Studies) and the China Foreign Affairs University, affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and CICIR (China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations). In the military sector can be found CIISS (China Institute for International Strategic Studies) and FISS (Foundation for International Strategic Studies) both under the PLA General Staff Department; and. 政治大 Department.Being part of the 立military structure, these are classified at division level,. the Centre of Peace and Development, associated with the PLA’s General Political. ‧ 國. 學. equivalent to bureau level. (Gill and Mulvenon, 2002) These academic and research units are evidently not decision making bodies, but do play their part in the decision. ‧. making process, by sending research products and recommendations up the ladder,. sit. y. Nat. where they may ultimately influence the decisions made by the highest rung of the. al. n. Four.. er. io. hierarchy. This practice will be discussed in great depth through Chapters Three and. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 29.

(36) Figure 1: China’s Foreign Policy Decision Making Structure Politburo Standing Committee Central Politburo. 政治大. Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG). State Council. 立. Central Secretariat. Foreign Affairs Office. PLA General Staff Department. CICIR. Centre for Peace & Development. CIISS. International Liaison Department. v. SASTIND. sit. er. i n U. Ministry of Propaganda. engchi. Ministry of National Defence. Ministry ofState Security. y. CIIS. Ministry of Public Security. Ch. PLA General Political Department. CFAU. Ministry of Commerce. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. HK and Macao Affairs Office. Taiwan Affairs Office. n. CASS. io. Xinhua News Agency. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. al. Direct Supervision. State Council Institution. State Council Administration Office. Central Committee Department. Administrative Link. State Council Ministry. People’s Liberation Army. Funding Link. Diagram source: compiled by author.. 30.

(37) 2.2.2 Informal Mechanisms Chinese foreign policy decision making has moved on from the days of monopolisation of power by one strong-man paramount leader, and yet the legacy of personalistic decision making lives on. Although there is a clear hierarchy of bureaucratic organs and a recognised pattern of decision making which includes coordination, consultation, supervision, delegation, and ratification up and down the ladder, it is impossible to overlook the fact that decision making is still in the hands of individual practitioners. What’s more, due to the relatively more centralised decision making process in the. 政治大. sector of foreign affairs, there is also more leeway for personalistic decision making. Lu. 立. (1997) writes, “The most important characteristics of China’s foreign policy decision. ‧ 國. 學. making are that it is highly centralised and that in terms of key decisions it is very much. ‧. personalised.” (p. 76) Despite the ever-increasing institutionalisation of China’s governance and Party, personalism and hierarchy of seniority remain prevalent.. sit. y. Nat. io. al. er. As mentioned previously, China follows the method of democratic centralism. n. when decision making, which calls for majority consensus. However, as Lu (1997). Ch. engchi. i n U. v. points out, for the most important decisions, consensus alone may not be enough; unanimity may be required. Furthermore, for some contentious issues, it may not be possible to achieve unanimity or even consensus at first. In these cases, often behindthe-scenes informal consultation and negotiation can lead to the issue being resolved. If the issue cannot be resolved in this way, the final decision falls to the most powerful decision maker. This demonstrates that, crucially, collective decisions are not made by a group of equals. An informal system of personal hierarchy also runs through the decision-making system.. 31.

(38) Firstly, over and above the highest rung of the formal hierarchical structure, at the very apex, is the ‘decision making nucleus.” In essence, this nucleus is led by the most powerful decision maker in China. Lu Ning (1997) considers the most powerful decision maker to be the chairman of the Central Military Affairs Commission (CMAC), as he is backed up by the armed forces. Since Jiang Zemin stepped down as the leader of the CMAC, yielding his position to Hu Jintao, this position has been associated with the presidency. Together with his closest supporters, Hu Jintao thus represents this decision making nucleus, and retains veto power over foreign affairs decisions.. 政治大 institutionalised bureaucracy and personalism prevalent in the Chinese foreign policy 立. (Rozman, 2013) The decision making nucleus is demonstrative of the mix of. ‧ 國. 學. decision making structure. Technically speaking, the nucleus is not included in any official account of the structure. The highest official body is the Politburo Standing. ‧. Committee, but the decision making nucleus nevertheless represents the most. sit. y. Nat. influential decision makers within that already select elite of state leaders.. n. al. er. io. Wittkopf and Jones (2008) identify three different leadership styles adopted by. i n U. v. top foreign policy practitioners internationally, including the formalistic model, where. Ch. engchi. leaders rely on institutionalisation to avoid personalism in decision making; and the competitive model, in which leaders actively induce competition between advisers in order to hear a range of opinions. These two models can be considered to be at odds with typical Chinese foreign policy decision making: firstly, although formal structures are in place, it has been identified that the field of foreign policy is so sensitive, it retains greater personalism than most other policy processes. Secondly, the Chinese political system increasingly emphasises consensus and collective leadership, with a watchword of ‘harmony’ currently pervasive. The third and final model is the collegial model, in. 32.

(39) which the top leader aims to promote collective decision making, which matches the Chinese approach. As such, Hu Jintao may be likened to “the hub of a wheel with spokes connecting to individual advisers and agency heads.” (Wittkopf and Jones, 2008: 501) This is an appropriate reflection of the importance of the decision making nucleus in terms of informal mechanisms. Although the formal structure appears somewhat monolithic and technocratic at the outset, informal hierarchies are also at play, with the president at the core. The informal hierarchical arrangement is not limited to just the decision making. 政治大. nucleus. In addition, a similar pattern can be seen within FALSG itself. Firstly, the. 立. officials in the group are ranged between the top three levels of leadership in China: full. ‧ 國. 學. state leader (正国级, zheng guo ji), deputy state leader (副国级, fu guo ji), and full. ‧. minister (正部级, zheng bu ji). This creates a hierarchy within the group. But even amongst apparent equals – in terms of rank – there remains a hierarchy of seniority.. y. Nat. io. sit. According to Norman Stockman (2000), Chinese society is informally based around. al. er. hierarchies of authority, including within the family and within wider society. The. n. v i n C h is derived from U seniority of a person in this hierarchy a number of factors which are not engchi. stated explicitly but rather are implicitly understood. Respect for this order of authority is inlaid into the functioning of Chinese society, and decision making in China can also. be seen in terms of this custom. Even amongst formal equals, there is an implicit, intangible understanding of the ‘pecking order’ of authority. As Lu (1997) points out, in general within democratic centralism: ‘When the most authoritative person makes his opinion known, the rest of the members tend to concur… junior members generally would refrain from voicing a different opinion once the opinion of the most authoritative person is known.” (p. 16-17) This is typical of the hierarchy of seniority. 33.