2.2 China’s Foreign Policy Decision Making
2.2.1 Formal Structures
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stabilised. The structure in place today will be discussed in greater detail in section 2.2.
Hu’s guidance offoreign policy seems to have been the continuation and expansion of foreign policy under Jiang, but with far greater focus on previously under-emphasised areas such as Africa, Latin America, and Europe. (Sutter, 2012)
2.2 China’s Foreign Policy DecisionMaking
2.2.1 Formal Structures
China’s foreign policy structure has been institutionalised since the reform period initiated by Deng Xiaoping. Although the entire process of Chinese foreign policy decision making has never been particularly transparent, and has even been purposefully cloaked in secrecy during certain eras, the basic hierarchy of the structure is now relatively more clear.
Firstly, it is important to note that, as explained by Lu Ning (1997), “Foreign affairs… [has] long been considered one of the most sensitive areas that demand[s] an even higher concentration of decision making power.” (p. 8) In other words, although China’s system in general is now far less centralised and the era of ‘strong-man’
monopolisation of decision making has drawn to a close, foreign policy decision making is of such importance and sensitivity it remains more centralised than other political areas.
It is thus instructive to consider China’s foreign policy decision making in a hierarchical structure. This structure is shown in Figure 1 on page 30. In terms of decision making in China, “With regard to major policy orientation, principles and guidelines, and to implementation planning and supervision, government organs and
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their Party groups have the power to make recommendations. But the decision making power belongs to the Party Centre.” (Zheng et al., 1988, in Lu, 1997) In other words, the central Party authorities maintain ultimate decision making power, at the pinnacle of the hierarchy. This is indeed the case for foreign policy decision making.
In the formal structure of Chinese foreign policy decision making, the ‘Party Centre’ is represented by the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest formal foreign policy decision making body. Under Hu Jintao, the Politburo was made up of nine members, and since the 18th National Congress, the Politburo has consisted of just seven members. The Standing Committee may allow debate over certain issues in the larger Politburo, but with 25 members, the Politburo is too large for efficient decision making.
Although the Politburo Standing Committee retains absolute decision making power, the foreign affairs sector is overseen by the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG). FALSG, also known as the National Security Leading Small Group (国家安全工 作领导小组, guojia anquan gongzuo lingdao xiaozu) is officially classed as a decision making consulting body (决策咨询机构, juece zixun jigou), and is bureaucratically subordinate to the Politburo Standing Committee, the Party’s highest echelon. FALSG also maintains administrative links to the State Council, which commands the Chinese government, as well as the CCP Central Committee Secretariat. (Lu, 1997; Lanteigne, 2009; Rozman, 2013)
FALSG isresponsible for coordinating and supervising all foreign affairs and national security-related work. It is not a not a standing institution; in other words, it has no physical office or fixed staff per se. Instead, the group, made up of important officials in the field of foreign affairs, meets when necessary to supervise foreign affairs
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work, as well as to discuss relevant issues and put forward policy proposals for the Politburo Standing Committee to decide upon if necessary. (Rozman, 2013) However, according to Lu (1997), “As the [FALSG] provides a forum for the top decision makers…
to meet face to face, the policy preferences and recommendations by [FALSG] are likely to have an important impact on the outcome of the final decision. Therefore the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group in fact plays a pivotal role in the decision making process.”
(p. 12) He later expands on this further, explaining that although FALSG is not officially a decision making organ, “Some decisions are in fact made in the [FALSG] meetings. The ratification of these decisions by the central leadership is but a formality. Other times decisions are made by the central leadership based on the recommendation of [FALSG]
with minor modifications.” (p. 108)
The influential sway of FALSG is a direct result of the high-ranking politicians and bureaucrats constituting the group. Always led by a chosen high-level Standing Committee member, FALSG was headed by President and General Secretary Hu Jintao from 2002 to 2013. As Vice-President, Xi Jinping (习近平) was second in command during this time and became the head of FALSG when he ascended to his role as General Secretary and President in 2013. His second in command is now Vice-President Li Yuanchao (李源潮). In addition to Hu and Xi, there were 14 other members during Hu Jintao’s time in command of FALSG. (360.com) Their names and roles at the time are listed below (the positions of each were altered during the Eighteenth National Congress personnel shake-up in 2012-2013): the then director of the Central Committee’s International Liaison Department Wang Jiarui (王家瑞); Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪); Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Qiao Zenghuai (乔 宗淮); Minister of Commerce Chen Deming (陈德铭); Minister of State Security Geng
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Huichang (耿惠昌); Minister of Propaganda Liu Yunshan (刘云山); Minister of National Defence Liang Guanglie (梁光烈) (who was also a member of the Central Military Affairs Commission); Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu (孟建柱); director of the Taiwan Affairs Office Wang Yi (王毅); director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Liao Hui (廖晖); director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office Li Haifeng (李海峰); director of the State Council Information Office Wang Chen (王晨); and director of the PLA General Staff Office General Ma Xiaotian (马晓天). The fourteenth member, State Councillor Dai Bingguo (戴秉国), was the Secretary-General of FALSG (since 2013, that role has been taken over by Yang Jiechi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs during Hu’s presidency). As can be seen, the FALSG members include the Ministers of all the government ministries and offices which are closely linked to foreign affairs, as well as representatives of China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Communist Party is also represented by the director of the International Liaison Department (ILD), the Party’s own foreign affairs organ. This combination of government, Party, and military elite thus forms the central body for supervising foreign affairs work. Together, these sixteen officials constitute the main foreign policy consultants, supervisors, and practitioners in China.
The next rung down on the ladder is the Foreign Affairs Office, which is the executive ‘working office’ for FALSG. Lu (1997) describes the Foreign Affairs Office as the ‘CPU’ of FALSG, liaising “between the decision makers and the implementing organs in the Party, government and military systems.” (p. 12) All decisions from above are passed down through this Office, which is responsible for delegating tasks to the appropriate units for implementation. In turn, recommendations, queries, and decisions beyond the scope of these units are passed upwards through the Foreign Affairs Office
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to be handled by the higher decision making body. FALSG and the Foreign Affairs Office are thus charged with policy coordination and delegation, supervision, and consultation.
Below these two in the hierarchy are ministerial level (部级, bu ji) units responsible for implementing FALSG’s decisions within their own sector, as well as recommending policy directions when necessary and appropriate. (Lu, 1997) These units are roughly equivalent to the ministries and offices represented by their leaders in the FALSG: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Ministry of Commerce (MofCOM), Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Propaganda, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Public Security, Taiwan Affairs Office, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, and the State Council Information Office (which is responsible for propaganda directed overseas). In addition, the Central Committee International Liaison Department (ILD) represents the Party. The ILD, formerly in charge of relations with other Communist parties, is now mainly responsible for handling visiting dignitaries and retaining links with other political parties, and has therefore weakened in importance since the time of Mao. On behalf of the military, the PLA General Staff Department is also involved in the structure, as well as the PLA General Political Department. They are joined by units which supply information and research, such as Xinhua News Agencyand the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) – the only academic institution at ministerial level – as well as the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND), which is administratively under the government Ministry of Industry and Information, and represents the Chinese defence industry.
These ministries and offices are not responsible for making large scale, macro foreign policy decisions, but rather for implementing the decisions of the FALSG or
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Politburo Standing Committee, conveyed to them by the Foreign Affairs Office.
(Lanteigne, 2009) The ministries and offices, in much the same way as the overall political structure, delegate further down the chain to the relevant sections and divisions under their jurisdiction. In the opposite direction, ministries also send their recommendations and queries back ‘up the ladder,’ once again through the Foreign Affairs Office up to the higher rung of decision makers. The minister is the chief executive of each ministry, and is therefore responsible for delegating. In this sense, small scale policy implementation decisions are indeed made at this level; this is the responsibility of the minister. Under the concept of democratic centralism, where collective decision making is favoured, the minister may call a conference in order to make these decisions. Lower level officials are charged with day-to-day affairs only, but even these micro decisions may be sent ‘up the ladder’ to the minister to ratify the decision. (Lanteigne, 2009) Ministries also have regional offices in provinces and municipalities, which deal with foreign affairs on an ever yet reduced scale.
Most of the ministries thus implement decisions made by the FALSG, delegated to them by the Foreign Affairs Office. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) has a slightly more central role, and is considered to be consistently growing in influence in recent years (Shambaugh, 2002; Lanteigne, 2009, Wills, 2011). MoFA is “charged with interpreting and often substantiating policy decisions made by the country’s leadership.”
(Lanteigne, 2009: 26) With round-the-clock surveillance of international news, MoFA also supplies important publications to the higher leadership, providing briefings and analysis of current world affairs. MoFA’s responsible unit, the Information Department, thus “in a significant way influences the perception of the decision makers in the ministerial and central leadership.” (Lu, 1997: 27)
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The final rung on the hierarchy are the official research and study institutes attached to these ministerial ranking units. (Lu, 1997) Affiliated academic institutes are one rung lower in bureaucratic ranking, putting them at bureau ranking (局级, ju ji).
(Zhu, 2009) This includes CIIS (China Institute for International Studies) and the China Foreign Affairs University, affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and CICIR (China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations). In the military sector can be found CIISS (China Institute for International Strategic Studies) and FISS (Foundation for International Strategic Studies) both under the PLA General Staff Department; and the Centre of Peace and Development, associated with the PLA’s General Political Department.Being part of the military structure, these are classified at division level, equivalent to bureau level. (Gill and Mulvenon, 2002) These academic and research units are evidently not decision making bodies, but do play their part in the decision making process, by sending research products and recommendations up the ladder, where they may ultimately influence the decisions made by the highest rung of the hierarchy. This practice will be discussed in great depth through Chapters Three and Four.
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Figure 1: China’s Foreign Policy Decision Making Structure
Ministry ofState Security
CICIR
CFAU CIIS
CASS PLA General Political Department
Ministry of Propaganda
SASTIND
Xinhua News Agency PLA General Staff Department
International Liaison Department Ministry of Commerce
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Overseas Chinese Affairs Office
HK and Macao Affairs Office
Taiwan Affairs Office
State Council
Foreign Affairs Office Foreign Affairs Leading Small
Group (FALSG) Politburo Standing Committee
Ministry of Public Security Ministry of National Defence
Central Politburo
CIISS Centre for Peace
& Development Central Secretariat
State Council Administration Office Central Committee Department Administrative Link Direct Supervision