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Central Party School’s autonomy from political influence. Instead Liu is more concerned with the functional definition of the institutes in question. Liu considers these academic institutes to constitute a research body with more a more wide-ranging arsenal of disciplinary understanding and increasingly vigorous exchange with other academics.
Institutes in both of these categories are in a position to influence policy making.
Liu maintains that the combination of the two types and their different perspectives provides the opportunity for more balanced and comprehensive policy advice. Like Zhu, Liu also states that the varying functional roles, research tasks, and levels of autonomy of the different categories of research institutes are closely related to their distinct institutional nature and location in the bureaucratic hierarchy. As the following Chapter Four will discuss in detail, the categorisation of a research institute within the bureaucratic hierarchy has a definitive impact on policy influence.
3.3 China’s International Relations Research Institutes: Roles and Functions
In many ways, the role of Chinese international relationsresearch institutes is drawing ever nearer to the generally accepted role of those in the West. The key functions of Chinese institutes are now commonly identified as pursuing genuine academic research and transmitting the findings and conclusions ‘up the ladder’ to provide information for policy decision makers. In addition to this, Chinese research institutes are increasingly expected to engage in Track II diplomacy, which refers to the informal engagement of non-official actors (including but by no means limited to scholars) in communication of
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diplomatic relevance. Dialogue between academics across national borders can allow for the exchange and debate of ideas, as well as bringing opportunities to potentially influence outcomes in a more delicate manner and iron out miscommunications and misinterpretations of official rhetoric. As the advantages of Track II diplomacy garner greater support in Chinese circles, it follows that academics are being given a longer leash to interact with their foreign counterparts. (Zhu, 2013)
Glaser and Saunders (2002) lay out five main roles of foreign policy research institutes in contemporary China. Their first and foremost role is to “provide information, analysis and advice to the leadership.” As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four, there are various ways in which research institutes and their academics can convey information to decision makers. On occasion leaders will directly request information as they require; but there are also many indirect routes to informing the leadership. In fact, according to McGann (2002), “in developing and transitional countries, the basic data needed to make informed decisions often does not exist and must be collected and analysed and put into a form that is usable by parliamentarians and bureaucrats.” China, which classifies itself as a developing nation, is indeed laying increasing emphasis on the need for useful, functional information and ever more regularly seeks it out from informed experts.
Secondly, research institutes “conduct academic research.” Rather than simply acting as suppliers of information for policy makers, scholars also strive to achieve rigorous academic quality in their work. Although this may seem axiomatic, in fact the push for increasing academic legitimacy in Chinese research institutes is only recently gaining ground as significant over and above policy support and advocacy. In fact, as Shambaugh (2002) points out, some renowned research institutes such as CASS
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(Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) and SASS (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences) do not consider policy relevance to be their predominant objective, but rather an occasional complement to the academic work with which they are concerned. As such, these institutes tend to place greater emphasis on theoretical perspectives and less on immediate generalisability and practicality.
Thirdly, Glaser and Saunders explain that Chinese academics “provide domestic education,” both through publications and media appearances, and by delivering lectures and speeches to various audiences in academia, industry, and government. On occasion this is done on behalf of the authorities; Shambaugh (2002) refers to this as
“policy testing/dissemination for the Chinese government.” (p. 576) However, as Tanner (2002) points out, there are now “many profitable venues that are not under the control of their work units.” (p. 562) He considers some prominent academics to be
“speak[ing] only for themselves.” (p. 563) Although this is a relatively secondary role for research institutes, and a very new trend in Chinese academia, these functions are valuable sources of bankrolling. As will be seen in Chapter Four, public prominence is now also one manner in which academics can secure greater likelihood of policy influence.
The fourth identified role of research institutes is to “gather information from foreigners,” and the fifth to “influence foreign views of China.” These two can be seen as related as both are functions of Track II diplomacy. Chinese academics are able to garner further information from their foreign contacts and visits, and are regularly required to report on their insights in order to assist decision makers in need of more subtle perceptions than official diplomacy can feasibly provide. According to Shambaugh (2002) “They often meet foreign specialists and officials and provide a
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steady stream of information and intelligence feedback into the system.” (p. 576) Their unofficial status and their similitude with overseas counterparts give academics a doorway to greater understanding and companionable exchange. In turn, Chinese academics, now a key feature of China’s soft power drive to enhance positive perceptions of China throughout the world, also act as representatives of the nation and are well-positioned to constructively influence foreign views as well as argue the case for the Chinese official stance when necessary. (Shambaugh, 2002) In fact, Chinese academics are occasionally explicitly tasked with passing important but potentially sensitive messages on to counterparts in order to create a secondary communication track and avoid unconcealed and costly misinterpretations, in a process known as
‘signalling.’ Citing in particular the regular flare-ups in the precarious Taiwan-USA-China balance, Glaser and Saunders state that: “The past few years are replete with examples of efforts by Chinese institute researchers to communicate specific messages to the United States and other governments through contacts with foreign scholars.”
(Glaser and Saunders, 2002: 606) In short, in addition to providing policy makers with information and advice, and educating the public, academics also act as messengers and communicators outside of official channels, aiding policy makers in another, more subtle dimension. However, “Signalling constitutes a very small percentage of their interactions.” (Tanner, 2002: 572)
Interestingly, a Chinese language source summarises the role of Chinese research institutes somewhat differently. In an editorial for Contemporary World journal (当代世 界, Dangdai Shijie), Liu Wanzhen (2005) also outlines five responsibilities of Chinese international relations research institutes. The primary role given is indeed the provision of quality information to assist policy makers. This corroboration indicates
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that this is undoubtedly the foremost broad function of Chinese research institutes.
However, Liu then goes on to provide four additional, more specific responsibilities.
Firstly, the Chinese government has denoted the first two decades of the 21st century as an ‘important period of strategic opportunity’ (重要战略机遇期, zhongyao zhanlüe jiyu qi); the role of research institutes is to carry out progressive, strategic-minded research to fulfil the needs of this period. This reveals a far more targeted, purposive research stance than reflected in outside analyses of Chinese international relations research institutes. Similarly, research institutes are expected to support the development of strategic thinking (战略思维, zhanlüe siwei) and theoretical thinking (理论思维, lilun siwei), which are seen as the prerequisite for the strategic policy making favoured by the Chinese government. Thirdly, research institutes are tasked with providing guidance and explaining the advantages and disadvantages of different policy tactics and manoeuvres, again an essential component of strategic policy making. That these closely related functions are divided into three and considered individually demonstrates a clear predilection for the significance of comprehensive and overarching strategy and a reflection on the role of academia in ensuring a strategically conceived foreign policy. The final role that Liu points to is the academic analysis of major and profound questions within the field of international relations. Examples given include ideological trends, basic global contradictions, and leftist movements, as well as multi-polarisation in the international political system and developments and impacts of economic globalisation.
In conclusion, whilst the role of Chinese international relations research institutes can be framed in different ways, there is no doubt that amongst more secondary functions, the predominant responsibility of contemporary Chinese research
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institutes is to provide information, analysis, and advice to policy makers, and to assist with the formation of a strategically calculated foreign policy. Unlike other actors with far more blatant biases, such as civil society interest groups or the PLA, research institutes are now increasingly expected to offer objective and practically-applicable insights. Nevertheless, the potential of research units to retain academic autonomy, as well as to wrest policy influence, are dictated in great part by the design and development of the system in which they are located, in particular by both institutionalised and informal affiliations.
This chapter has provided a comprehensive overview of the evolution of China’s international relations research institutes. From 1956 until the present day, the development of China’s research institutes can be divided into three generational styles, all of which remain in operation today. Taken together, these three types of research institute and their staff constitute China’s current international relations academia.
Administratively, China’s research institutes may be official, semi-official, or civilian, depending on their location within the overall bureaucracy of the system and the proximity of their connection to government bodies. China’s international relations research institutes have many roles, but their foremost function is to provide policy-relevant information, as well as advice, analysis, and recommendations to China’s foreign policy decision makers. And as the world of academia in China continues to evolve and grow, the policy influence available to academics marches in parallel.
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Chapter 4
Mechanisms of Academic Influence on China’s Foreign Policy
As shown in Chapter Three, China’s international relations academia is continuing to evolve and it is now collectively growing into a potent force for policy influence.
Decision makers are increasingly relying on the research of experts and academics to inform their policy choices. However, the output of Chinese international relations academia is vast and varied. How do some academics get noticed and influence policy decisions ahead of their peers? Glaser and Saunders (2002) astutely argue that
“understanding the sources of policy influence and the pathways through which influence is exercised is important to help identify which analysts and think tanks are most influential and where their influence is felt within the Chinese system.” Chapter Four will therefore outline the precise mechanisms of foreign policy influence associated with the world of academia in China, explaining how the output of China’s international relations research institutes and individual academics can be brought to the attention of decision makers. This chapter will firstly provide a classic model of research utilisation in policy making, taking into account Chinese utilisation preferences, in order to reveal some of the ways in which research output can theoretically be employed in the policy making process. Secondly, this chapter will move on to consider some of the concrete pathways to policy influence available to Chinese academics in practice. Next, this chapter will go into further detail on factors of influence. This section will be split into three: levels of influence; sources of influence; and differentiated sources. Differences in the bureaucratic structure of China’s research institutes mean
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that academics draw their influence at different levels and from different sources.
Finally, the chapter will conclude with a well-known illustrative example of academic policy influence in action.