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marked trend toward horizontalisation. Glaser and Saunders (2002) give an example:
“Seminars and conferences often bring together experts from various research institutes to discuss a particular subject or an important international event.” (p. 600) Communication between units is on the increase, as well as communication with foreign peers, bringing all the benefits of collaboration and research dynamism. The growth of the university role is contributing to this trend. Nevertheless, Tanner (2002) maintains that “Evolution toward more regular horizontal ties among fellow researchers is proceeding very slowly, and relatively free-wheeling Western-style policy communities are still far off.” (p. 563)
In conclusion, the system of China’s international relations research institutes has been evolving ever since its inception in 1956. The growth and development of the system has built it into a potent force for policy influence. Over time, from humble beginnings as faithful adjuncts to government departments, China’s system of international relations research institutes has diversified, improved, and thus consolidated its influence.
3.2 Classifying China’s International Relations Research Institutes
Modern China’s network of international relations research institutes were originally based on their Soviet counterparts, entrenched entirely within the governmental bureaucracy and devoid of practically any autonomy or academic legitimacy. Since their beginnings, China’s research institutes have been used as advocates for various policy stances, butthe genuine need for useful and objective information is now clearly
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outweighing this former function. Scholars such as Tanner (2002) and Zhu (2009; 2013) identify three generations in the evolution of China’s research institute system.
Nevertheless, despite thesedevelopments, the system of China’s international relations research institutes retains certain evident legacies of its Soviet-based origins.
The main legacy affecting the system is the embedding of research institutes in associated governmental units and departments, maintaining the separation of research institutes according to their departmental affiliation, as opposed to the broad division between government and academia seen in other nations. (Shambaugh, 2002; Tanner, 2002; Zhu, 2013) This is known as ‘stove-piping,’ a term which evokes the rising of smoke through a purely vertical, hierarchical mechanism, involving no interaction with other units. This compartmentalisation of research institutes is largely considered detrimental by outsiders as it prevents horizontal interchange and interaction of academic ideas, which would create a more dynamic and astute research environment.
Tanner (2002) argues that as a result of stove-piping, “Research continues to be compartmentalised, redundant and steeped in the biases of individual bureaucracies.”
(p. 563) However, in terms of analysing policy influence, a compartmentalised, closely affiliated academic structure can give greater insight into which research institutes have greater institutionalised sway in the decision making process.
Official international relations research institutes in China are closely associated with their affiliated government bureaucracy. In fact, Shambaugh states categorically that “All operate within administrative hierarchies under either a State Council ministry, a Central Committee department or one of the general departments of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).” (Shambaugh, 2002: 579) However, other scholars draw more detailed classifications of China’s international relations research institutes in order to
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demonstrate certain key bureaucratic variations. Assessing and classifying research institutes is important because, as Gill and Mulvenon (2002) point out, “The institutional affiliation of a given unit is a highly correlated indicator of the focus and even world-view of a given research organ.” (p. 618)
An instructive division of different institute types is provided by Zhu (2009), and partly mirrors Tanner’s three generations. Zhu corroborates that “China’s official policy research institutes are founded within government agencies.” (p. 337) However, the key word here is ‘official.’ Zhu takes into account the legal categorisation of work units under China’s Civil Law, which includes government agencies, public institutions, enterprises, social groups, and civilian non-profit institutions. ‘Official’ research institutes are, by this definition, those with the legal classification of ‘government agency,’ which fall under the bureaucratic organisation of a government ministry or department. These reflectTanner’s first generation type of institute. Zhu argues that such institutes are so closely affiliated with government departments that their lack of autonomy should exclude them from classification as ‘think tanks’ in the Western sense:
“China’s official policy research institutes function as immediate actors of the government policy process, and not as ‘external brains.’” (p. 337) Significant units which fall into this category include CICIR –China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (中国现代国际关系研究院, Zhongguo xiandai guoji guanxi yanjiuyuan), which is funded by the Ministry of State Security and subordinate to the the Foreign Affairs Office of the CCP Central Committee, itself under the high-level decision making body the FALSG – Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (外事工作领导小组, waishi gongzuo lingdao xiaozu). CICIR is considered by many to be an intelligence unit, with direct access to classified information and direct reporting routes to FALSG. (Shambaugh,
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2002; Glaser and Saunders, 2002; Zhu, 2009) Another key unit is CIIS –China Institute of International Studies (中国国际问题研究所, Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiusuo), which is the Foreign Ministry’s own research arm, and is growing in importance as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs begins to play a greater role in foreign policy decision making.
(Shambaugh, 2002)
According to Zhu’s argument, focus should be concentrated instead on two other different types of research unit. The first he labels ‘semi-official think tanks.’“Semi-official think tanks are the most important components in the policy research and consultation system outside the Chinese government.” (p. 338) Semi-official think tanks are those formally and legally categorised as ‘public institutions.’ These research institutes maintain certain government connections under their more specific classification as ‘supervised’ or ‘affiliated’ units; they are government-funded and their leadership is government-appointed. As such, they are not entirely free from government influence, hence their designation as ‘semi-official.’ Nevertheless, they are, legally speaking, independent entities, and unlike their fully official counterparts which must only pass information to their affiliated unit, semi-official research institutes are permitted to provide policy guidance to different government and non-government bodies. According to Zhu, this makes semi-official institutes the closest equivalent to the Western concept of ‘think tanks.’ In large part, this type represents Tanner’s second generation. The best-known example is the huge CASS conglomerate– Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (中国社会科学学院, Zhongguo shehui kexue xueyuan) which has over 4000 staff and 50 research centres. (CASS website)
Zhu’s second category is civilian units. This can include organisations associated with enterprises and non-profit agencies, as well as university institutes and
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departments. Civilian research institutes are subject to even less government intervention (although Zhu points out that some are supervised by government departments). The academics of these institutes are perhaps more free to escape the system of stove-piping, creating horizontal linkages through their interaction with other scholars and offering alternative, competitive services in the growing ‘market’ for policy consultation. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007; Zhu, 2013) These institutes generally fall into the third generation, and in terms of foreign policy include the important international relations departments at Qinghua, Beijing, and Shanghai Fudan Universities.
Zhu’s classifications are certainly important, not least because he goes on to draw up a model of academic policy influence with these distinctions forming a key variable. Zhu’s model of influence will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Four, where it will be demonstrated that the bureaucratic distinctions between institution types has a close association with the sources and pathways to influence policy making.
Despite the value of this distinction, Zhu’s dismissal of official international relations research institutes is less beneficial for this study. Zhurejected official units from his own investigation in the hope of considering only those Chinese research institutes that most approached classic Western definitions of ‘think tanks,’ in order to measure which of a range of variables would most affect policy-influencing mechanisms. The bureaucratic proximity of official research institutes to decision making bodies and the implied clear policy influence was seen to negate the validity of including these institutes in the investigation. However, that is certainly not the case for this study, which is not concerned with the legitimacy or ‘purity’ of the definition of ‘think tanks’
per se; what is significant is which institutes most affect policy decisions and directions, and how they do so. As stated previously,Chinese research institutes’ lack of academic
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independence does not detract from the significance of their increasing role and influence on foreign policy decision making.Therefore, the clear policy influence of official research institutes means that the output of such academic bodies will conversely be of even greater interest to those hoping to understand policy stances through the lens of academic influence.
As such, another distinction between categories of research institutes is also of interest. Liu (2005) also defines two different types of research institute. The first is functional department research units (职能部门研究单位, zhineng bumen yanjiu danwei). The second is academic research institutes (学术性研究机构, xueshuxing yanjiu jigou). Functional department research units are basically the equivalent of Zhu’s
‘official research policy research institutes,’ and include those research units which are located within the hierarchical bureaucracy of functional government departments such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of State Security – such as CIIS and CICIR respectively. Liu argues that this type of research institute have rich practical experience and are thus highly capable in their work.
The second type is academic research institutes. This broad category covers both of Zhu’s semi-official and civilian research institutes. However, the denotative emphasis here is that these institutes are more academic in nature than functional department research institutes, which are, as stated, more practical in description. Academic institutes could include university departments and also semi-official institutes such as CASS, and even the Central Party School. This latter example illustrates the difference in emphasis of Zhu and Liu’s classifications: the Central Party School is closely affiliated with the Communist Party and is a direct conduit for the Party’s message as well as a training centre for the Party elite. (Shambaugh, 2008) There need be no debate over the
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Central Party School’s autonomy from political influence. Instead Liu is more concerned with the functional definition of the institutes in question. Liu considers these academic institutes to constitute a research body with more a more wide-ranging arsenal of disciplinary understanding and increasingly vigorous exchange with other academics.
Institutes in both of these categories are in a position to influence policy making.
Liu maintains that the combination of the two types and their different perspectives provides the opportunity for more balanced and comprehensive policy advice. Like Zhu, Liu also states that the varying functional roles, research tasks, and levels of autonomy of the different categories of research institutes are closely related to their distinct institutional nature and location in the bureaucratic hierarchy. As the following Chapter Four will discuss in detail, the categorisation of a research institute within the bureaucratic hierarchy has a definitive impact on policy influence.