國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
yanjiu), edited by Fudan Centre for European Studies and CSEUS. However, this publication is for internal circulation only and is not open to the public. (Dai, 2008)
In terms of publications which are not European Studies exclusive, but still regularly include topics related to the EU, one of the most well-known is Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系, Xiandai guoji guanxi), edited by CICIR and published monthly. (CICIR website) Another is CIIS’s International Studies (国际问题研 究, Guoji wenti yanjiu), published on a bi-monthly basis. (CIIS website) In addition to their specialist European Studies journals, CASS also edit the renowned World Economics and Politics journal (世界经济与政治, Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi), a bi-monthly publication, which features articles about the European Union. (CASS Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP) website) Finally, another notable publication is Foreign Affairs Review (外交评论, Waijiao pinglun), edited by the China Foreign Affairs University and released every two months. (CFAU ESC website)
Whilst articles containing references to the EU appear in a range of different publications, European Studies scholars aim to submit their work to these major journals. Those wishing to review the more influential writings of Chinese European Studies academics should thus begin with these publications.
5.3 Europe and China on the Global Stage
This and the subsequent two sections take a look at what Chinese scholars of European Studies have been discussing vis-à-visthree different major issue areas, which may ultimately affect decision making practitioners’ outlook on Europe and subsequently
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
influence policy. Only research published after the year 2000 is taken into account;
although the turn of the millennium is a neat but fairly arbitrary cut-off point, it is also considered that examining research work from more than three years before the publication of China’s European Union policy paper in 2003 may well decrease the likelihood of a link between the research and the subsequent policy stance.
The first issue area is Europe and China on the global stage; that is to say, how Chinese scholars consider the role of Europe globally, and what this might mean for China’s own position. Firstly, in accordance with Shambaugh’s observation that Chinese analyses of Europe derive from their own standpoint on world affairs, which leads to a
‘cognitive dissonance’ in their conclusions – European Studies scholars often conclude what they already hope to be the case about Europe – it is first instructive to outline what this established standpoint may be.
In short, there are some key and unbending tenets of China’s foreign policy: non-hegemony, multipolarity, multilateralism, economic globalisation, and non-interference.
(Hu Jintao’s Political Reports to the 17th and 18th NCCPC) The official Chinese stance is that no country should be allowed world hegemony. ‘Unofficially,’ this is targeted at what many in China see as a USA-dominated world order. Rather than a unipolar or bipolar world, which Chinese international relations academia has roundly rejected as unstable and unbeneficial for the world as a whole, multi-polarity is largely seen as the most stable system for the world – in particularly a triangular, tri-polar system. China also praises the proliferation of multilateral institutions in global affairs, and considers multilateralism the core of responsible global governance. In terms of globalisation, China’s foreign policy stance is pro-economic interdependence, but not at the cost of sovereign power over the domestic economy and protectionism when necessary. For
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
China, economic interdependence is not the Anglo-Saxon free market model, but the opportunity for mutual benefit and growth backed by the right to guard the state from rampant free markets. Finally, China takes a particularly firm stance on sovereignty and non-interference, believing that all political decisions are internal affairs of a state and therefore not open to question by outside actors. Despite support for multilateralism, globalisation, and global institutions, Chinese leaders reiterate time and time again that nothing trumps state sovereignty, and no other states may interfere in another state’s domestic affairs. (Lanteigne, 2009)
With this in mind, China’s European Studies scholars often weave these key principles into their analyses. In terms of multi-polarity, academics make no secret of the fact that two of these poles would be the USA and China itself. The third pole, however, is more up for question. Scholars of the European Union regularly argue that the European Union would make the ideal ‘third pole’ in this Chinese vision of world affairs. (Song, 2001; Dang, 2008; Zhao, 2008; Zhu, 2008b; Feng, 2009c; Zhou, 2009;
Chen, 2010) For example, Chen Zhimin (2010) states unequivocally: “In today’s rapidly multipolarising international relations, China, the USA, and Europe, represented by the European Union, are becoming the three major power centres of the global political economy.”
The summary of a conference organised by CFAU to celebrate the 50th anniversary of China-EU relations argues: “Currently, the conditions are in place for a China-EU-US ‘great power coordination.’ The first is the adjustment of US-EU relations, particularly concerning the problems of Iran and the Near and Middle East; the second is that major security and economic problems are appearing which need the three-way coordination of China, the US and the EU, such as Iranian and North Korean
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
nuclearisation, Middle Eastern conflict, problems with global finance and resources, international terrorism and so forth; the third is the need to enhance mutual trust between China, the US and the EU. A China-EU-US ‘new strategic triangle’ itself can become a platform for the three stakeholders to build consensus and a sense of cost-sharing, construct norms of major power behaviour, and correct the USA’s tendency towards unilateralism.”
From a more historic perspective, Zhou Hong (2009) explains that: “China recognised that Europe, a continent regaining its former important status in the international system after abolishing the old tradition of colonialism, was a potential force to balance out the Soviet Union and United States. In the future multipolar global structure, the European Community would be an independent centre of economic and political power, and also possibly a central force for the promotion of world peace.”
It can clearly be seen from scholars’ wording that an almost universal consensus is that Europe itself also wishes to become a third pole (this is an example of possible cognitive dissonance on the part of Chinese scholars). Zhao Huaipu (2008) writes that:
“China and Europe are two major world forces; the development of their mutual relations not only accords with the fundamental interest of both sides, but also promotes the trend of global multipolarisation. This is a fundamental consensus between the two sides, constituting an important political foundation of the Sino-European strategic partnership.”
In the eyes of these academics, the EU-US-China triangle will thus bring about the multipolar world order that the Chinese authorities wish to see.Although to outsiders, this is still merely conjecture, there is no doubt that it is the resounding collective
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
opinion in the Chinese European Studies field, and thus the opinion most likely to reach the top leadership.
Importantly, the rise of the European Union is seen in positive terms by Chinese European Studies scholars. This is due to many reasons: firstly, academics consider Sino-EU relations to be flourishing, and the China-EU strategic partnership to be an important aspect of China’s overall foreign relations. China and Europe are considered to be free from direct conflicts of interest, and thus ideal strategic partners. (Song, 2001;
Dang, 2008; Zhou 2009) Scholars also argue that together, China and the EU represent a strong force for global peace and cooperation. For example, Zhu Liqun (2008b) states:
“China increasingly sees the European Union as an independent power, an important component in the development of global multipolarisation. China attaches great significance to the progress of the China-EU strategic partnership, and has repeatedly reiterated that China and the European Union are important contemporary forces for the promotion of development and maintenance of peace in the world. Comprehensive development of the long, stable and mutually beneficial cooperative relations with the EU and its member states is an important facet of China’s foreign policy.”
Secondly, many believe that China and the EU share close views on multilateralism, mutual benefit, and dialogue and communication. (Feng, 2007c; Dang, 2008; Chen et al., 2012) The EU is itself a multilateral institution, and the EU engages with other global and regional institutions with its watchword of ‘effective multilateralism,’ which is seen to match China’s approach to foreign relations. Zhu Liqun (2007) analyses: “In general, in terms of normative principles, China emphasises equality, mutual benefit, and win-win; the EU emphasises contact, influence, and equality. The two have many points in common, but also have different foci. In terms of
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
similarities, both China and the EU attach great importance to dialogue and communication: China emphasises dispute settlement through peaceful negotiation; the European Union also has a preference for multilateralism, dialogue, and mediation.”
Thirdly, some scholars, such as Zhu Liqun (2008a) even believe that the EU’s preference for multilateralism will help constrain the USA: “Europe’s multilateralism stands in stark contrast to the USA’s unilateralism, leading to the international community’s expectation that Europe will check and balance the USA’s power. The EU is thus a unique new type of power, whose culture of peaceful cooperation constitutes a constructive influence on the international system.”
Fourthly, European Studies scholars place great emphasis on the differences in the EU and the USA’s approaches to China. The European Union is seen to be more practical and less ideological than the USA, and therefore more willing to compromise with China despite fundamental differences which are thorns in the side of Sino-US relations, such as human rights and currency appreciation. (Dang, 2008; Chen, 2010) The EU’s approach is often contrasted with the USA’s heavy-handedness. Song Xinning (2001): “The main difference between the EU and the USA’s policies towards China is one of form. In the United States, some people place more emphasis on the conflict within Sino-US relations, seeing China as the USA’s potential future enemy. In Europe, because no obvious conflicts exist within Sino-European relations, more people are focused on mutual cooperation.” He expands on this further: “It can be seen from the EU’s recent China policy paper that there is a major difference in the China policies of the European Union and the new Bush administration: [the European approach] places a far greater emphasis on cooperation with China in all fields, as opposed to competition.
Although the EU’s policy towards China differs from the USA’s nominally, rather than
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
fundamentally, it still places certain constraints on the USA, demonstrating the increasing autonomy of the EU’s foreign relations and foreign policy. Specifically, the EU’s emphasis on cooperation in its China policy derives from… the broad common interests of China and the European Union.” Zhou Hong (2009) agrees that Europe recognises the opportunities offered by China-EU relations: “US-EU relations cannot replace China-EU relations. The European Union’s established policy is still committed to the improvement and strengthening of relations with China. As far as the European Union is concerned, the more lively, dynamic China develops, the more opportunities the EU stands to gain.”
Finally, in contrast to the positive relations of China and the EU, Chinese analysts see the US-EU relationship to be rapidly faltering as tensions grow over issues such as the war on terror and gradual mutual alienation since the end of the Cold War. (Chen, 2007; 2008; Zhao, 2008) In short, the weakening of the US-EU relationship, the constant rivalry of the Sino-US relationship, and the increasing strengthening of the Sino-EU relationship lead to a multi-faceted approach to reducing US hegemony on the world stage – both China and the EU are building up independence from US interference and intervention, and can assist each other in doing so by constructing a steady, mutually beneficial partnership.
These views are reflected in Chinese foreign policy towards the EU, as witnessed by the European Union policy paper. One key insight is that the paper makes reference to Chinese European cooperation as being the driving force between “the establishment of a new international political and economic order.” (EU Policy Paper) This statement is a clear reflection of academics’ stance that the EU and China can forge a multipolar
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
world together, against what is seen as the USA’s ruling political and economic hegemony.