4.3 Factors of Policy Influence
4.3.3 Differentiated Sources of Influence
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4.3.3 Differentiated Sources of Influence
When measuring the influence of different categories of research unit, Naughton (2002) argues that as the system of academia develops, although “open competition may be creating pressure for stronger, higher quality… analysis,” the greater independence of civilian institutes “may well have come at the price of decreased policy influence” when compared to official and semi-official units. However, following empirical analysis, Zhu (2009) conversely concluded that statistically, “Civilian think tanks are about as influential as semi-official think tanks in… total influence.” (p. 348) As such, one of the most important things to draw from the review of sources of policy influences is that different sources take precedence for different types of research institute, and for individual academics themselves.In short, the levels of influence of different types of institute are basically equal, but sourced differently.
Positional influence is clearly an extremely effective source of influence – for those institutes which possess it. Official and semi-official research institutes clearly benefit from this source of influence, due to their bureaucratic affiliations with government bodies. Lu (1997) explains the relative influence of theseunits thus:
“bureaucracy-affiliated institutions have better access – a) to processed, often confidential information generated through the bureaucratic system… and b) to top decision-makers through the well-established bureaucratic channels.” (p. 131) Academics in these institutes are able to convey their research output to policy decision makers directly through official channels, can access more extensive sources of information, and gain respect by proxy as a result of the bureaucratic rank of the institute itself. In other words, it is the research institute itself which has built up
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positional influence; individual academics in these units are then able to use it to their advantage.
However, civilian research institutes and their academics admittedly cannot draw on positional influence in this way. Civilian research institutes cannot access classified information easily or make use of official channels to connect directly with decision makers. According to Zhu (2009), “There is a prevalent opinion in society that civilian think tanks are at a disadvantage when they try to influence the government.” (p.
347) Further to this, Glaser and Medeiros (2007) also emphasise that outside research on the relationship between research institutes and foreign policy used to focus solely on official units, as “Debates were for the most part initiated and concluded within such circles.” (p. 307) This stemmed from the fact that civilian research institutes lack positional influence overall. However, now, the importance of semi-official and civilian research institutes is growing, and cannot be ignored. In particular, lack of positional influence does not mean that individual academics from civilian research institutes categorically wield less influence than their counterparts in official and semi-official institutes. Instead, these academics must draw on other sources of influence, namely their expert knowledge and personal networks. “Semi-official think tanks are… more able to influence policies through administrative linkages, while civilian think tanks demonstrate their influence through the efforts of individual researchers.” (Zhu, 2009:
343) As Glaser and Medeiros (2007) argue, “New foreign policy ideas and strategies can be injected from outside the formal central government bureaucracy, albeit by actors who have channels to the leadership and extensive knowledge of the right buttons to push within the Party and government systems.” (p. 309)
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What’s more, it may be that academics from civilian research institutes are actually able to draw far greater influence than those in official and semi-official research institutes at the public and peer levels of influence. For instance, one identified drawback of the Chinese research system is the serious stove-piping, in which different research units do not interact much with one another. However, this problem of stove-piping is more severe amongst official units, which are hindered in any effort to create horizontal links by the compartmentalisation and regulation of the system. (Zhu, 2009;
2013) More and more horizontal linkages are being built up, but as Shambaugh (2002) points out, “this contact remains informal and personal rather than institutionalised.” (p.
580) That is to say, those able to overstep the traditional bureaucratic strictures and engage more flexibly in personal interaction are those able to draw the benefits of increased horizontal collaboration. It is scholars in civilian units who are best placed to take advantage of the growing trend of horizontalisation and thus build up more links amongst peers, as well as improve their research output through exchange of ideas.
(Glaser and Saunders, 2002; Glaser and Medeiros, 2007) In addition, academics in civilian research units may be more free to engage in contact with both domestic and foreign media, and air their views through sensationalist statements and publications, thus building up their public prestige. Academics in official units are traditionally far more closely guarded in the statement of their ideas in public (though there are trends of change in this regard).(Tanner, 2002)
In an empirical study designed to identify which variables affected the influence of Chinese research institutes, Zhu (2009) carried out regression analysis to pinpoint which combination of factors would boost influence. Using research institute executive directors to represent the institutes as a whole, he discovered that the variables of
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personal networks and expert knowledge had statistically significant effects on the overall level of influence of research institutes of all classifications. Greater personal networks with decision makers increased influence specifically at this level. In terms of expert knowledge, educational background did have a somewhat positive effect on overall influence levels; experience overseas, in itself, did not have any clear impact.
Nonetheless, time abroad increased the extent of personal networks, thus generating an indirect impact.
The study also concludes that the wealth and size of research institutes seems less relevant than it would be for ‘think tanks’ in a Western system. In fact, the study concluded that although civilian research institutes were seen to be ‘disadvantaged’ in terms of size and funding, this simply did not make a difference to their overall influence. Zhu explains that [unlike in Western countries], “In contemporary mainland China, where there is no mature market for consultancy services on policy making and no sufficiently free environment for policy idea discussions, the relationship between money and influence might not be close.” (p. 356)
Most importantly, the regression analysis concluded that, when controlling for other mitigating variables, personal networks and expert knowledge both had a statistically more significant effect on the influence of civilian research institutes than semi-official ones. On the other hand, the administrative links of semi-official institutes had a greater impact than the links of civilian institutes. As such, “semi-official think tanks are consequently more able to influence policies through administrative linkages, while civilian think tanks demonstrate their influence through the efforts of individual researchers.” (Zhu, 2009: 342-3) This indicates quantitatively that China’s research institutes, and therefore their associated academics, draw their policy influence from a
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combination of different sources. An academic’s manner of leverage will depend on which approach is more advantageous to him, a consideration largely dictated by where the academic is located within the overall system of research institutes in China. As Glaser and Saunders (2002) summarise, although positional influence retains its great importance, within the evolving system of international relations academia, “Analysts with policy expertise, national reputations or personal connections with policy makers can exercise policy influence even when working outside traditionally influential research institutes.”(p. 614)
There remains one final point to make. The influence academics may come to wield over policy influence is rarely accidental. Academics that are keen to have their views heard deliberately leverage their sources of influence to their favour, making use of their personal contacts or administrative links in particular. (Weiss, 1979; Glaser and Medeiros, 2007) What’s more, “Scholars increasingly take the initiative to propose conducting research on subject areas they judge to be important for Chinese policy makers.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: 605). Glaser and Medeiros (2007) argue that while these ‘interventions’ have been relatively common within the field of economics, this is a fairly new trend in the field of foreign policy. This trend can be expected to continue to grow over time. China’s academics are not passive analysts without agenda of their own. Many indeed hope that their research will help shape the future direction of China’s foreign policy, and work hard to make that happen.