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2.1 A Brief History of China’s Foreign Policy Decision Making
Modern China’s foreign policy decision making has gone through several stages of evolution since the country was first founded in 1949, the legacy of which have left their mark on foreign policy decision making today. (Robinson and Shambaugh, 1994; Sutter 2013) These stages, each with distinctive differences, include the eras of Mao Zedong (毛泽东), Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), and Jiang Zemin (江泽民), before moving into the leadership of Hu Jintao (胡锦涛)in 2003. Although changes have occurred over time, the role of China’s top leader remains pivotal in terms of foreign policy decision making, and a highly centralised and personalised decision making style prevails.
During the periods of Mao and Deng, foreign policy decision making followed a
‘strong-man model,’ based around the country’s paramount leader. (Wills, 2011) Mao Zedong was China’s paramount leader from 1949 until his death in 1976, and was followed by Deng Xiaoping, who managed to wrest power and install himself securely as the country’s new paramount leader by 1980. During these eras, decision making was characterised by an extreme degree of personalism. (Hamrin, 1994) What’s more, China’s foreign policy during these periods tended to involve one overarching strategy or even ideology laid down by the paramount leader (Marxism-Leninism under Mao, and opening up and peaceful development under Deng), by which all other macro and micro policies were decided. (Lanteigne, 2009) Hamrin (1994) writes, “The paramount leader was usually actively involved in setting guidelines for overall foreign policy… He retained ultimate authority… while delegating pieces of this authority to others.” (p. 83).
Mao had the ultimate say over China’s strategic foreign policy, but during his leadership he delegated to different bureaucratic organs or even individuals. For example, in the 1950s, the International Liaison Department handled policy, but in 1958, the Central
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Foreign Affairs Small Group (中共中央外事小组, Zhonggong zhongyang waishi xiaozu) was created, supervising the new Foreign Affairs Office under the State Council General Office. The Central Foreign Affairs Small Group was headed by Premier Zhou Enlai (周恩 来) and Foreign Minister Chen Yi (陈毅) and contained five other members, and the Foreign Affairs Office was responsible for delegating administrative tasks to appropriate government organs. (Lu, 1997) Despite this initial step towards greater institutionalisation, during the upheaval of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), foreign policy decision making became even more restricted, tending to reside solely in the hands of individuals, such as Premier Zhou Enlai, Mao’s close propaganda supremo Kang Sheng (康生), and Mao himself. Only when the excesses of the Cultural Revolution began to recede in the early 1970s was the role of the Central Foreign Affairs Small Group re-fortified. (Lanteigne, 2009)
During the time of Mao, the range of foreign policy was markedly reduced by China’s ‘leaning to one side’ (一边倒, yibiandao) – an overwhelming partiality to the Soviet Union – followed by an acute isolationist status brought about by the Sino-Soviet Split, and subsequently the radicalism of the Cultural Revolution. (Sutter, 2013) After Deng Xiaoping took power, the direction of China’s foreign affairs changed dramatically, as he began to pursue the policy of Opening Up and Reform, engaging with many new diplomatic partners around the world. (Lampton, 2001) As a result of this expansion,
“Foreign affairs became much less manageable by a tiny elite; co-ordination and delegation of authority became both more necessary and more difficult.” (Hamrin, 1994) In 1985, a decision was made to focus more on foreign economic relations; with this in mind, the Foreign Affairs Office was newly consolidated, subordinate to both the State Council and the CCP Central Committee. This office contained members of various
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important units, including the government, Party, and military, and was the staff office of the Central Foreign Affairs Small Group, now re-named the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) (中央外事工作领导小组, zhongyang waishi gongzuo xiaozu).
FALSG was headed first by Li Xiannian (李先念) from 1981-1988, and later Premier Li Peng (李鹏) from 1988-1993. (Lanteigne, 2009) Despite the re-organisation of these foreign affairs organs, the paramount leader still held sway: “Deng Xiaoping could make almost any foreign policy decision on his own, although he tended… to build consensus through consultation.” (Hamrin, 1994: 83)
Jiang Zemin became President of the PRC in 1993, but the time of paramount leadership was now over; as Lu Ning (1997) points out, after Deng Xiaoping, the subsequent generations of Chinese leadership have lacked “both authority and charisma to dominate foreign policy decision making.” (p. 3)Overall, the Chinese regime sought to actively pursue some degree of decentralisation, as well as democratic centralism (民主 集中制, minzhu jizhong zhi), a form of collective decision making in which decisions are made on the basis of consensus. The foreign policy administrative structure was retained from the end of the Deng era, and further institutionalised; Jiang was installed as leader of the FALSG. (Lu, 1997) Although Jiang Zemin did not keep the same personal
‘monopoly’ over policy as his predecessors, he did put his own personal stamp on foreign policy, characterised by an emphasis on improving relations with neighbouring countries and great powers, as well as far greater interaction with international institutions, most notably acceding to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001.
(Sutter, 2012)
Hu Jintao took over the Presidency in 2003, and by now the structure of the Foreign Affairs Office and the FALSG have been unquestionably institutionalised and
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stabilised. The structure in place today will be discussed in greater detail in section 2.2.
Hu’s guidance offoreign policy seems to have been the continuation and expansion of foreign policy under Jiang, but with far greater focus on previously under-emphasised areas such as Africa, Latin America, and Europe. (Sutter, 2012)