核心代理問題與盈餘管理：董事會結構與外部監督機制之探討

(1)

核心代理問題與盈餘管理：

董事會結構與外部監督機制之探討

張瑞當

國立中山大學

方俊儒

東海大學

曾玉琦

台南科技大學

論文編號：2539 收稿2006 年 3 月 9 日→ 第一次修正 2006 年 7 月 4 日 → 第二次修正 2006 年 8 月 9 日 → 第三次修正 2006 年 8 月29 → 第四次修正 2006 年 9 月 5 日 → 第五次修正 2006 年 9 月 12 日 → 正式接受 2006 年 9 月 21 日近年來國內外企業舞弊案件層出不窮，如何確保投資者的權益免於受到侵害，已逐漸受到各界重視。深究國內陸續爆發之弊案，皆可發現其存在公司主要股東身兼管理者之特性，而產生所謂核心代理之問題。本研究之目的在探討於此特殊股權結構下，是否會引發公司管理當局盈餘管理之行為；同時也探討董事會結構與外部監督機制，對該盈餘管理行為之影響。實證結果顯示，當管理當局擁有之控制權超越其盈餘分配權，而導致控制股東與小股東間的核心代理問題時，公司的盈餘管理行為會增加。此外，本研究更進一步發現該盈餘管理之行為，會隨著董監事股權質押比率的提高而更明顯；但是會隨著法人機構持股比率的增加與董事會規模的擴大而降低。本研究結果可協助釐清管理當局持股和其盈餘操弄行為之關係。關鍵字：核心代理問題、盈餘管理、控制權、盈餘分配權

緒論

從 1997 年的亞洲金融風暴、2001 年的美國大型企業弊案如安隆案(Enron)等，到近期國內博達案的發生，無不嚴重損害投資者的權益。因此，如何透過有效機制的設計與執行，防範管理者侵害資金提供者與其他利害關係人之權益，格外受到投資人、實務界與學術界的重視。深究1998 年以來，國內企業陸續發生的重大弊案，普遍具有公司的控制股東身兼高階管理階層職位之情形。這些控制股東之所以能忽視其他小股東或債權人之利益，置公司經營風險於不顧，和國內公司特殊的股權結構，例如人頭文化、近九成的投

張瑞當為國立中山大學企業管理學系教授，地址：高雄市鼓山區蓮海路 70 號，電話：(07)5252000 轉 4657，E-mail： raychang@mail.nsysu.edu.tw。作者衷心感謝二位匿名評審提出的寶貴意見。資散戶以及家族企業的經營方式，有密切關係(許崇源，2003)。公司股權結構的型態，是影響管理當局與外部人士之間代理問題的重要因素(Joh, 2003; Baek et al., 2004)。傳統代理理論認為在公司經營權與所有權分離下，若管理者持有股權不多時，其基於私利之考量，可能作出不利於公司整體利益最大化之決策，進而損害股東之權益(Jensen and Meckling, 1976)。然而，目前許多文獻卻發現大部分公司的股權，都集中在少數控制股東或管理者手中(La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Lemmon and Lins, 2003)。Claessens et al.(2002)認為當公司股東所持有的股權比率及其所採取的控制手段能有效控制公司時，代理問題的性質將由所有權與經營權之間的權益代理問題(equity agency problem)，轉變為控制股東與小股東間的核心代理問

(2)

題(central agency problem)。核心代理問題的產生，導因於控制股東常藉由金字塔的股權結構(pyramidal ownership structure)或交叉持股(cross-holdings)的方式，來達到控制公司的目的(Bebchuk et al., 2000; Claessen et al., 2002)。在此情況下，控制股東所擁有之經營控制權(control rights)，常常超越其擁有之盈餘分配權(又稱現金流量權(cash flow rights))，由於經營控

制權與盈餘分配權的偏離(股份盈餘偏離差1_{)，使得控}

制股東(管理者)擁有之決策權利(控制權)與其所需承擔之經營風險(盈餘分配權)兩者產生不對稱，一旦控制股東在私利追求的誘因下，便可能犧牲其他小股東之權益 (Johnson et al., 2000; Mitton, 2002; 葉銀華等， 2002; Claessens et al., 2002; Haw et al., 2004)。

Ball et al.(2000)認為公司治理機制是否能有效運作，決定於管理者是否將經營績效允當報導，以至於股東能確實發揮監督效果或行使他們應有的權利。為了確保股份盈餘偏離差所帶來之私人利益不被察覺，與避免外在監督機制(如小股東、分析師及主管當局等) 之介入，或聲譽之受損，控制股東會有透過操弄財務報表之盈餘數字，來掩飾其不當行為之誘因(Haw et al., 2004)。 Haw et al. (2004)發現核心代理問題會導致公司盈餘管理行為之增加，然而該研究是藉由不同國家資料之蒐集與分析所獲得之結果；不同國家的法令或規章制度，或對投資者保障程度的差異，皆會對公司盈餘管理的行為造成影響。為了排除這些因素之影響，本研究探討在國內(同一個國家)相同法律環境或規章制度下，各公司因股份盈餘偏離差所導致之盈餘管理行為。相較於其它國家，國內企業普遍存在控制股東之型態(葉銀華等，2002；許崇源等，2003)，股份盈餘偏離的程度於東亞各國中僅次於泰國及香港2(Fan and Wong, 2002)，再加上國內企業資訊揭露的情況遠落後於其它國家3，因此，國內公司控制股東與其他股東間之核心代理問題，比起其它國家可說更為明顯。在此情況下，國內企業是否會因此種特殊的股權結構，而

1_{在本文中，「控制權超越其盈餘分配權」與「股份盈餘偏} 離差」兩者互用，而「股份盈餘偏離差」為台灣經濟新報社(Taiwan Economic Journal, TEJ)資料庫中之用語。

2_{Fan and Wong(2002)發現東亞七國控制權與盈餘分配權偏}

離程度之平均值為 0.85，而台灣控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度為0.86，可說是屬於偏離程度較高之國家。 3_{根據標準普爾的調查結果，在亞太地區中以新加坡平均 7} 分最佳，台灣在財務資訊方面獲得5 分，而非財務資訊僅獲得2 分，落後其它國家(薛明玲，2002)。有明顯盈餘管理之行為，仍缺乏相關證據。另外，相較於目前文獻，本研究更進一步檢驗因股份盈餘偏離差所導致之盈餘管理行為，是否會因公司董事會結構的不同，例如董監事股權質押比率、董事會規模與外部董監事比率，以及外部監督機制的差異，例如法人機構持股比率與是否委託大型會計師事務所查核其財務報表，而有所不同。實證結果顯示，隨著股份盈餘偏離程度的擴大，公司盈餘管理行為會越明顯。且此盈餘管理之行為，會隨著董監事股權質押比率的增加而更明顯；然而，公司法人機構持股比率的增加與董事會規模的擴大，卻可顯著抑制因股份盈餘偏離差所導致之盈餘管理行為。至於公司是否委託大型會計師事務所查核與外部董監事的比率，則不會顯著改變股份盈餘偏離差所導致之盈餘管理行為。國內企業目前普遍存在控制股東，本研究經由實際資料之蒐集，首次提供因控制權與盈餘分配權偏離所導致盈餘管理行為之證據。此外，本研究也發現董監事股權質押比率、董事會規模與法人機構持股的不同，會顯著影響上述盈餘管理行為之程度。研究結果可提供投資人、報表使用者與主管機關，在制定相關決策時之參考。再則，目前探討管理當局持股和盈餘管理關係之文獻，大部分均引用傳統代理理論之觀點，然而並未發現一致性之結論4。本研究則是將重點置於檢驗管理當局控制權與盈餘分配權(持股比率)的偏離程度，希望透過更精確地衡量管理當局(控制股東)和其他股東間之代理問題，來探討管理當局持股和其盈餘操弄行為之關係。本文共分五節，除第一節為緒論外，第二節為文獻回顧與假說發展，第三節為研究設計，第四節為實證結果與分析，最後則為結論與建議。

文獻回顧與假說發展

企業股權結構與代理問題之關係

4_{如 Warfield et al. (1995) 發現管理當局持股比率越高，較不} 會進行盈餘管理。然而，Yeo et al. (2002)認為管理當局持股比率和盈餘資訊內涵呈非線性關係，亦即管理當局持股比率和盈餘管理行為兩者可能為非線性關係。

(3)

Berle and Means(1932)認為大多數公司的所有權與經營權是屬於分離的情況，意即公司股權散佈於眾多小股東，而公司的經營權則是委託專業經理人代為執行。在此前提下，Jensen and Meckling(1976)認為當管理當局持有股權不高時，因公司整體價值和其自身利益較不相關，故當其做經營決策時，一旦個人利益和公司整體利益有所衝突時，可能會選擇並非以公司整體利益與股東財富最大化之投資方案。

然而，自1980 年代以來，許多文獻發現各國公司

的股權結構狀況與Berle and Means (1932)的觀點迥然不同。例如在美國或加拿大，部分大型公司存在股權集中之現象(Warfield et al., 1995; Morck et al., 2000)；而在亞洲或歐洲國家之公司，亦有類似之情形 (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002)。在以 20%的判斷標準決定公司是否存有控制股東時，La Porta et al. (1999)發現在 27 個經濟富裕國家之大型企

業中，有 68.59%的公司存在控制股東介入公司經營決

策之情況。Claessens et al. (2000) 檢驗東亞 9 個國家之

公司，亦發現有 57.1%的公司存有控制股東。同樣地

，Faccio and Lang (2002)以歐洲 13 個主要國家之公司

為觀察對象，發現有 68.45%的公司存有控制股東。在國內方面，Yeh et al.(2001)針對國內上市公司進行調查，同樣在以 20%為判斷標準下，將近 70%的公司存有控制股東。因此，由上述文獻可發現多數國家的公司，其股權結構為集中型態，且都存在著身兼管理者的控制股東。透過金字塔的股權結構或交叉持股的方式，控制股東擁有之控制權經常超越其盈餘分配權(Bebchuk et al., 2000; Claessen et al., 2002)，在決策權利(控制權)與所需承擔之經營風險(盈餘分配權)兩者不對稱的情況下，控制股東會有犧牲其他小股東之權益，以謀求其自身最大利益之動機(Johnson et al., 2000; Mitton, 2002; 葉銀華等，2002) ，例如特權消費 (perquisite consumption)、過多的管理薪酬(excessive managerial pay) 或公司資產的不當侵佔 (appropriation of firm’s assets)等。文獻也發現隨著股份盈餘偏離程度的增加，控制股東和其他小股東間的代理問題會更加明顯，因而控制股東侵佔與損害小股東財富之動機就越強 (Claessens et al., 2002)，而公司整體的績效也會較差 (Lemon and Lins, 2003; Joh 2003; Baek et al., 2004)。

因此，從上述文獻可知，當控制股東的控制權顯著大於盈餘分配權時，代理問題的性質將由所有權與

經營權之間的權益代理問題，轉變為控制股東與小股東間的核心代理問題(La Porta et al., 2002; Claessens et al., 2002)。

核心代理問題與盈餘管理行為之關係

控制股東與小股東間核心代理問題的產生，來自於彼此間利益有所衝突時，控制股東會利用其在公司的影響力，進行追求其本身利益最大化之決策；然而，為追求本身利益最大化，可能會犧牲其他小股東之權益，故此決策對公司整體而言，可能是非利益最大化(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997)。例如，控制股東可以用公司經費購買個人使用之物品，領取公司過多的薪酬與紅利，或是將公司資產以不正當方式移轉至特定人士等。而隨著控制股東握有的控制權與其盈餘分配權偏離程度的擴大(控制權較高或是盈餘分配權較低)，控制股東除了侵佔其他小股東權益之能力及機會增加外(因控制權增加)(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997)，因該侵佔之行為，所獲得的利益也會越大(因控制股東本身具有之盈餘分配權較少，故當公司整體股東的權益受到侵害時，對控制股東的影響並不大；但是控制股東因該侵佔行為所獲得之利益，卻是能排除其他小股東之共享，故公司整體的利益，已被移轉至控制股東個人) ，故當控制股東之控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度越大時，其侵佔小股東的誘因會越強(Haw et al., 2004; Leuz et al., 2003)。然而，若是外在的監督機制，如小股東、股票分析師或是相關主管機關等介入公司的經營活動時，則控制股東因股份盈餘偏離差所帶來之侵佔利益將會受到影響(例如主管機關發現公司控制股東有不當之決策時，會介入關切或予以禁止)。故為確保股份盈餘偏離差所帶來之利益不受到影響，控制股東會盡量避免外在監督機制的介入(Leuz et al., 2003)。然而，當控制股東因追求私利之不當行為，而影響公司的經營績效，進而使得公司盈餘變差時，則小股東或主管機關等外在監督機制便可能會介入公司經營活動。因此為了避免外在監督機制的介入，控制股東便會透過操弄盈餘的方式，以掩飾公司績效不佳的情況5。

5_{由於大部份的報表使用者，僅較會注意財報最後總盈餘數} 字是否符合預期，而較不會仔細分析總盈餘數字的各組成部份，因此，管理者可透過各種盈餘管理之方式，例如減少研發或廣告支出、暫停新的投資計畫，提前認列下個年度的收入等，將總盈餘數字操弄至符合投資者預期，即可能達成掩飾其績效不佳的目的。

(4)

表8 股份盈餘偏離差對裁決性應計項目絕對值影響之迴歸分析(排除 1997 年樣本) (續)

ABSDA(ABSDAROA)=β0＋β1SIZE＋β2LEV＋β3CFO＋β4ABSTA＋β5ELEC＋β6DEV＋β7PLE＋β8DEV*PLE＋β9BOA＋

β10DEV*BOA＋β11OUT＋β12DEV*OUT＋β13INS＋β14DEV*INS＋β15AUD＋β16DEV*AUD＋εit ABSDA ABSDAROA 自變數預期符號估計係數 t 值 p 值 VIF 估計係數 t 值 p 值 VIF 截距項 0.029 4.079 .000 0.028 3.657 .000 SIZE － -0.004 -4.377 .000 1.533 -0.003 -3.067 .002 1.533 LEV ？ 0.006 2.019 .044 1.166 0.001 0.366 .715 1.166 CFO － -0.026 -5.031 .000 1.070 -0.026 -4.739 .000 1.070 ABSTA ＋ 0.824 126.8 .000 1.040 0.761 109.3 .000 1.040 ELEC ？ 0.001 0.825 .410 1.155 0.001 1.186 .236 1.155 DEV ＋ 0.032 2.421 .016 7.225 0.036 2.564 .010 7.225 PLE ＋ -0.001 -0.435 .663 1.405 -0.001 -0.750 .453 1.405 DEV*PLE ＋ 0.050 2.226 .026 1.716 0.057 2.376 .018 1.716 BOA ？ -0.001 -1.565 .118 1.419 -0.001 -1.018 .309 1.419 DEV*BOA ？ -0.004 -2.788 .005 1.275 -0.005 -3.391 .001 1.275 OUT － 0.001 0.157 .875 1.474 -0.001 -0.600 .548 1.474 DEV*OUT － 0.018 0.724 .469 4.256 0.018 0.679 .497 4.256 INS － 0.006 2.661 .008 1.583 0.004 1.606 .108 1.583 DEV*INS － -0.037 -2.394 .017 3.448 -0.037 -2.222 .026 3.448 AUD － -0.001 -1.025 .305 1.240 -0.001 -1.370 .171 1.240 DEV*AUD － -0.020 -1.878 .060 3.337 -0.017 -1.547 .122 3.337 樣本公司年 5008 5008 F 值 1066.71 (p<0.000) 792.08 (p<0.000) 調整後 R2 _0.773 _0.717 各變數之定義如表2

參考文獻

李建然，陳政芳，2004。審計客戶重要性與盈餘管理：以五大事務所組別為觀察標的，會計評論，第三十八期，59-80。柯承恩，2000。我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議-上，會計研究月刊，第173 期，75-81。高蘭芬，邱正仁，2002。董監事股權質押對會計盈餘與股票報酬相關性之影響，臺大管理論叢，第十三卷第一期，127-162。許崇源，李怡宗，林宛瑩，鄭桂蕙，2003。控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量-上，貨幣觀測與信用評等，第四十二卷，15-31。楊朝旭，吳幸蓁，2003。總經理薪酬績效敏感性、績效門檻與盈餘管理關聯性之研究，會計評論，第三十六期，55-87。葉銀華，李存修，柯承恩，2002。公司治理與評等系統，台北：商智文化出版。薛明玲，2002。資訊透明度與企業競爭力，會計研究月刊，第二○○期，14-15。

Abbott, L. J., Y. Park and S. Parker, 2000. The Effects of Audit Committee Activity and Independence on Corporate Fraud, Managerial Finance, 26(11), 55-67.

Ashbaugh, H, R. LaFond and B.W. Mayhew, 2003. Do Nonaudit Services Compromise Auditor Independence? Further Evidence, The Accounting

Review, 78(3), 611-639.

(5)

Security Price Reactions to the Laventhol and Horwath Bankruptcy, Journal of Accounting

Research, 33(2), 385-395.

Baek, J., J. Kang and S. P. Kyung, 2004. Corporate Governance and Firm value: Evidence from Korean Financial Crisis, Journal of Financial Economics, 71(2), 265-313.

Ball, R., S. P. Kothari and A. Robin, 2000. The Effect of Institutional Factors on Properties on Accounting Earnings: International Evidence, Journal of

Accounting and Economics, 29(1), 1-51.

Balsam, S., J. Krishnan and J. S. Yang, 2003. Auditor Industry Specialization and Earnings Quality,

Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 22(2),

71-97.

Bartov, E., F. A. Gul and J. S. Tsui, 2000. Discretionary Accruals Models and Audit Qualifications, Journal

of Accounting and Economics, 30(3), 421-452.

Bathala, C. and K. P. Moon, 1994. Managerial Ownership, Debt Policy, and the Impact of Institutional Holdings: An Agency Theory Perspective, Financial

Management, 23(3), 38-50.

Beasley, M. S., 1996. An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, The

Accounting Review, 71(4), 443-465.

Beatty, R. P., 1989. Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings, The Accounting Review, 64(4), 693-709.

Bebchuk, L., R. Kraakam and G. Triantis, 2000. Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual Class Equity: the Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights. In Concentrated Corporate

Ownership edited by R.K. Morck. Chicago: National

Bureau of Economic Research, 295-318.

Becker, C. L., M. L. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo and K. R. Subramanyam, 1998. The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management, Contemporary Accounting

Research, 15(1), 1-21.

Berle, A. and G. Means, 1932. The Modern Corporation

and Private Property, New York: Macmillan.

Bradshaw, M. T., S. A. Richardson and R. G. Sloan, 2001.

Do Analysts and Auditors Use Information in Accruals? Journal of Accounting Research, 39(1), 45-74.

Bushee, B. J., 1998. The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior,

The Accounting Review, 73(3), 305-333.

Chiou, J. R., T. C. Hsiung and L. F. Kao, 2002. A Study of the Relationship Between Financial Distress and Collateralized Shares, Taiwan Accounting Review, 3(3), 79-111.

Chtourou, S. M., J. Bedard and L. Courteau, 2001.

Corporate Governance and Earnings Management,

working paper. University Laval Canada.

Claessens, S., S. Djankov and H. P. Lang, 2000. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1/2), 81-112.

Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. P. H. Fan and L. H. P. Lang, 2002. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholders, Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2741-2771.

Cohen, J., P. Cohen, S. G. West and L. S. Aiken, 2003.

Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation on Analysis for the Behavior Sciences, N.J.: Lawrence

Erlbaum Associates.

Dalton, D. R., J. L. Johnson and A. E. Ellstrand, 1999. Number of Directors and Financial Performance: a Metal Analysis, Academy of Management Journal, 42(6), 674-686.

Das, S. and H. Zhang, 2003. Round-up in Reported EPS, Behavioral Thresholds, and Earnings Management,

Journal of Accounting and Economics, 35(1),

31-50

DeAngelo, L. E., 1981. Auditor Size and Audit Quality,

Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3(3),

183-199.

Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan and A. P. Sweeney, 1995. Detecting Earnings Management, The Accounting

Review, 70(2), 193-225.

Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan and A. P. Sweeney, 1996. Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement

(6)

Actions by the SEC, Contemporary Accounting

Research, 13(1), 1-36.

DeFond, M. L. and J. Jiambalvo, 1994. Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation of Accruals, Journal of

Accounting and Economics, 17(1-2), 145-176.

DeFond, M. L. and K. Subramanya, 1998. Auditor Changes and Discretionary Accruals, Journal of

Eisenberg, T., S. Sundgren and M. T. Wells, 1998. Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms, Journal of Financial Economics, 48(1), 35-54.

El-Gazzar, S. M., 1998. Predisclosure Information and Institutional Ownership: A Cross Sectional Examination of Market Revaluations During Earnings Announcement Periods, The Accounting

Review, 73(1), 119-129.

Faccio, M. and L. H. P. Lang, 2002. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations,

Journal of Financial Economics, 65(3), 365-395.

Fama, E. F. and J. D. MacBeth, 1973. Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Test, Journal of Political

Economy, 81(3), 607-636.

Fan, J. P. H. and T. J. Wong, 2002. Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia, Journal of Accounting and

Economics, 33(3), 401-425.

Fields, T. D., T. Z. Lys and L. Vincent, 2001. Empirical Research on Accounting Choice, Journal of

Accounting and Economics, 31(1-3), 255-307.

Francis, J., K. Schipper and L. Vincent, 2005. Earnings and Dividends Informativeness When Cash Flow Rights are Separated From Voting Rights, Journal of

Frankel, R. M., M. F. Johnson and K. K. Nelson, 2002. The Relationship Between Auditors’ Fees for Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management, The

Accounting Review, 77(4), 71-105.

Haw, I. M., B. Hu, L. S. Hwang and W. Wu, 2004. Ultimate Ownership, Income Management, and Legal and Extra-Legal Institutions, Journal of

Accounting Research, 42(2), 423-462.

Hirst, D., K. Jackson and L. Koonce, 2003. Improving Financial Reports by Revealing the Accuracy of Prior Estimates, Contemporary Accounting

Research, 20(1), 165-193.

Hunton, J., R. Libby and C. Mazza, 2006. Financial Reporting Transparency and Earnings Management,

The Accounting Review, 81(1), 135-157.

Jensen, M. C. 1993, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control System, The

Journal of Finance, (3), 831-880.

Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial

Economics, 3(4), 305-360.

Joh, S. W., 2003. Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence form Korea before the Economic Crisis, Journal of Financial Economics, 68(2), 287-322.

Johnson, S., P. Boone, A. Breach and E. Friedman, 2000. Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis,

Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1/2), 141-186.

Kao, L., J. R. Chiou and A. Chen, 2004. The Agency Problem, Firm Performance and Monitoring Mechanisms: the Evidence from Collateralized Shares in Taiwan, Corporate Governance: An

International Review, 12(3), 389-402.

Klein, A., 2002. Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management, Journal

of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 375-400.

Kothari, S. P, A. J. Leone and C. E. Wasley, 2005. Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measures, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(1), 163-197.

Krishnan, G. V., 2003. Does Big 6 Auditor Industry Expertise Constrain Earnings Management?

Accounting Horizons, 17(supplement), 1-16.

La Porta R, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 2002. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1147-1170. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, 1999.

Corporate Ownership around the World, Journal of

(7)

Lemmon, M. L. and K. V. Lins, 2003. Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence form the East Asian Financial Crisis,

Journal of Finance, 58(4), 1445-1468.

Leuz, C, D. Nanda and P. D. Wysocki, 2003. Earnings Management and Investor Protection: an International Comparison, Journal of Financial

Economics, 69(3), 505-527.

Lobo, G. and J. Zhou, 2001. Disclosure Quality and Earnings Management, Asia-Pacific Journal of

Lundholm, R., 1999. Reporting on the Past: A New Approach to Improving Accounting today,

Accounting Horizons, 13(4), 315-322.

MacDonald, E., 1997. More Accounting Firms are Dumping Risk Clients, Wall Street Journal, (April 25).

Mitton, T., 2002. A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the East Asian Financial Crisis, Journal of Financial Economics, 64(2), 215-241.

Morck, R. K., D.A. Stangeland and B. Yeung, 2000. Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth: the Canadian Disease? In Concentrated

Corporate Ownership edited by R.K. Morck.

Chicago: National Bureau of Economic Research, 319-371.

Palmrose, Z-V., 1988. An Analysis of Auditor Litigation and Audit Service Quality, The Accounting Review, 63(1), 55-73.

Park, M. S. and T. Park, 2004. Insider Sales and Earnings Management, Journal of Accounting and Public

Policy, 23(5), 381-411.

Peasnell, K. V., P. F. Pope and S. Young, 2005. Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals? Journal of

Business Finance and Accounting, 32(7/8),

1311-1346.

Pedhazur, E. J., 1997. Multiple Regression in Behavioral

Research: Explanation and Prediction, TX:

Harcourt Brace College Publisher.

Reynolds, J. K. and J. R. Francis, 2000. Does Size Matter? The Influence of Large Clients on Office-Level Auditor Reporting Decisions, Journal of

Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny, 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-783.

Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R, 1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 461-488.

Teoh, S. H., I. Welch and T. J. Wong, 1998. Earnings Management and the Underperformance of Seasoned Equity Offerings, Journal of Financial Economics, 50(1), 63-99.

Vafeas, N., 2000. Board Structure and the Informativeness of Earnings, Journal of Accounting and Public

Policy, 19(2), 139-160.

Warfield, T. D., J. J. Wild and K. L. Wild, 1995. Managerial Ownership, Accounting Choices, and Informativeness of Earnings, Journal of Accounting

and Economics, 20(1), 61-91.

Xie, B., W. N. Davidson and P. J. Dadalt, 2003. Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: the Role of the Board and the Audit Committee, Journal of

Corporate Finance, 9(3), 295-316.

Yeh, Y. H., T. S. Lee and T. Woidtke, 2001. Family Control and Corporate Governance: Evidence form Taiwan, International Review of Finance, 2, 21-48. Yeo, G. H. H., P. M. S. Tan, K. W. Ho and S. S. Chen,

2002. Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Earnings, Journal of Business

Finance and Accounting, 29(7/8), 1023-1046.

Yermack, D., 1996. Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, Journal

(8)

附錄

一

本文參考Teoh et al. (1998)的估計方式，流動裁決性應計項目計算如下： CAit = (△CASSETit －△CASHit) － (△CLit －△LDit) 1 t i, it i TA CA − = β0 (

TA

ii,t 1

1

− ) ＋β1

(

i,t 1

)

it i

TA

∆SALE

− ＋ εit (C) NDCAit =

βˆ

0 ( 1 t i, i

TA

−

1

) ＋

βˆ

1

(

)

1 t i, it it i

TA

∆AR

∆SALE

− − (D) DCAit = 1 t i, it i TA CA − － NDCAit (E) CAit = 樣本公司i 在 t 年與 t-1 年間的總流動性應計項目 △CASSETit = 樣本公司i 在 t 年與 t-1 年間的總流動資產變動量 △CASHit = 樣本公司i 在 t 年與 t-1 年間的現金及約當現金的總變動量 △CLit = 樣本公司i 在 t 年與 t-1 年間的總流動負債變動量 △LDit = 樣本公司i 在 t 年與 t-1 年間的長期負債當年到期部分變動量 ΔSALEit = 樣本公司i 在 t 年與 t-1 年間的總銷貨收入變動量 ΔARit = 樣本公司i 在 t 年與 t-1 年間的應收帳款變動量 TAi, t-1 = 樣本公司i 在 t-1 年的總資產 NDCAit為樣本公司i 在 t 年的流動非裁決性應計項目，DCAit為樣本公司i 在 t 年的流動裁決性應計項目。同樣地，本研究也使用產業合併的方式，將合併後同產業樣本公司的資料，透過方程式(C)來作估計，可得估計係數

βˆ

0及

βˆ

1，將此係數帶入方程式(D)，即可得出每家樣本公司的非流動裁決性應計項目(NDCA)，最後由方程式(E)可得出流動裁決性應計項目。同樣地，在考慮 ROA 後的流動裁決性應計項目(DCAROA)，則是在透過 (C)式估計與(D)式計算 NDCAROA 時，均納入 ROA 該變數。

(9)

張瑞當為國立中山大學企管系教授，美國南伊利諾大學會計博士，目前主要研究興趣為審計與公司治理相關議題，研究論文曾發表於 Information & Management、Total Quality Management & Business Excellence、Taiwan Accounting Review、會計評論、管理評論與中山管理評論等。

Ruey-Dang Chang is a professor at the Department of Business Management, National Sun Yat-sen University. He holds a

Ph.D. degree from Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. His current research interests include auditing and corporate governance. His research papers have been published in Information & Management, Total Quality Management & Business Excellence, Taiwan Accounting Review, International Journal of Accounting Studies, Management Review and Sun Yat-sen Management Review.

方俊儒為東海大學會計系助理教授，國立中山大學企管博士（會計組），研究興趣為審計與公司治理相關議題，學術論文曾發表於會計評論、交大管理學報與Review of Business Research。

Chun-Ju Fang is an assistant professor at the Department of Accounting, Tunghai University. He holds a Ph.D degree

from National Sun Yat-sen University. He is interested in auditing and corporate governance issues. His papers have been published in International Journal of Accounting Studies, Chiao Ta Management Review and Review of Business Research. 曾玉琦為台南科技大學財金系講師，現為國立成功大學會計研究所博士候選人，主要研究興趣為審計與公司治理相關議題，研究論文曾發表於中山管理評論與Review of Business Research。

Yee-Chy Tseng is an instructor at the Department of Finance, Tainan University of Technology and is a Ph.D. Candidate at

the Department of Accounting, National Cheng Kung University. Her research interests include auditing and corporate governance. She has published papers in Sun Yat-sen Management Review and Review of Business Research.

(10)

Central Agency Problem and Earnings Management:

An Investigation of Board Structure and External

Monitoring Mechanism

Ruey-Dang Chang

National Sun Yat-sen University

Chun-Ju Fang

Tunghai

University

Yee-Chy Tseng

Tainan University of Technology

Paper No.: 2539

Received March 9, 2006 → First Received July 4, 2006 → Second Received August 9, 2006 → Third Received August 29, 2006 → Fourth Received September 5, 2006 → Fifth Received September 12, 2006 → Accepted September 21, 2006

The almost continuous and well-publicized major financial scandals of public companies in recent years in many countries, including Taiwan and the U.S., have greatly raised concerns on the inadequacy of protecting investors and other stakeholders. Many countries have since introduced legislations and installed new monitoring bodies to improve financial reporting quality and enhance protections of stakeholders. Thus, improving financial reporting quality and eliminating earnings management is an important and yet very challenging issue.

A common characteristic shared by many public companies involved in financial scandals is that many major shareholders of firms involved in financial scandals also hold management positions in the same company. The failure to separate business ownership and management control when there are other shareholders creates a “central agency problem” between the major and the minority shareholders. This problem is much more serious in Taiwan than in other countries because it is common for the companies in Taiwan to gain control rights of another public company through cross-holdings. The less than desired information transparency of companies in Taiwan makes the central agency problem even worse. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the central agency problem is a significant factor in earnings management behavior. In addition, this study also examines two other factors that have been documented to have significant effects on earnings management behavior: structure of the board of directors and external monitoring mechanism.

The study collects research data from 1996 to 2004 of the public companies from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database and uses the discretionary accruals as the proxy for earnings management. Corporate governance data are also obtained from TEJ to estimate the control rights, cash flow rights, and their differences. The empirical results indicate that when managers of the companies have more control rights than cash flow rights, which results in a central agency problem, managers are more likely to manage earnings. Such behavior is likely conducted for managers’ self-interests and at the expenses of the companies and other minority shareholders. The results also show that firms engage in more earnings management as the collateralized shares of board members increase, possibly a result of the personal funds of the board members being affected by the stock price of the companies. The results also show that as the shares controlled by institutional investors increase and as the size of the board of the directors increases, managers engage in less earnings management behavior. One explanation is that institutional investors own, usually, more shares than an individual shareholder and, therefore, have incentives to monitor the operating activities of the companies. Furthermore, institutions have the resources and abilities to carry out effective monitoring of the management. With activities of the firm being

(11)

monitored closely by institutional shareholders, managers’ earnings management behavior will be inhibited or contained. Finally, as the size of the board increases, the board is likely to have more members with different professional backgrounds and experiences. Thus, a large board can better monitor managers than a small board and thus contain managers’ earnings management behavior.

Unlike the traditional agency problem between managers and outside shareholders that was first exposed in Berle and Means (1932) and has since been examined extensively in the literature, this study examines the central agency problem. The existing literature has attempted to employ the traditional agency theory to account for the behavior of earnings management and yielded inconsistent results. This study focuses on the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights in examining companies’ earnings management behavior. Through this effort, results of the study help us better understand the relationship between the central agency problem and earnings management. This study represents a first attempt to examine empirical evidence on the relationship between the central agency problem and earnings management of the companies in Taiwan. The results obtained here should be of interest to investors, financial statement users, regulators, and the government.

Key words: Central Agency Problem, Earnings Management, Control Rights, Cash Flow Rights

Ruey-Dang Chang is a professor at the Department of Business Management, National Sun Yat-sen University, 70 Lien-Hai Rd., Kaohsiung 804 Taiwan, Tel: 886-7-5252000 ext. 4657, Fax: 886-7-5254657, E-mail: raychang@mail.nsysu.edu.tw.