本研究旨在實證檢視國內企業其股權結構與對中國大陸直接投資的關聯 性,結果發現,當政府持有股權比例越高時,企業管理當局傾向增加投資中國大 陸的企業家數,顯示政府對企業進行中國大陸投資的監督能力有限。此外,當金 融機構持股比例越高時,管理當局此時受限於金融機構的監督,對中國大陸的投 資行為將較保守,傾向降低對中國大陸投資的比重。另外,當機構投資人持有企 業股權比例越高時,管理當局受限於機構投資人的監督,投資行為亦將漸趨保 守,相對使投資中國大陸的家數減少,同時降低了對企業整體利潤的貢獻程度,
亦即降低了企業對中國大陸投資的依賴程度。
由於國內企業不斷擴大對中國大陸的投資,企業規模隨之擴大,資訊不對稱 與代理問題將油然而生,股東們對於海外的經營績效不易監控,且海外投資因不 同文化、制度、競爭環境及需要整合分散各地的資源,使管理決策變得異常複雜,
且隨著企業國際化程度之加深,監督高階管理者績效將更形困難。此外,鑒於目 前中國大陸的整體經濟制度尚未健全,不透明交易行為仍多,因此本次研究結 果,期盼能提供國內主管機關日後修正對中國大陸投資經貿法規時的參考,以便 能在維持兩岸經貿平衡發展的前提下,同時保障企業投資者的權益,達到雙贏的 目的。
本研究有以下限制,首先,三個迴歸模型,整體解釋能力普遍偏低,且選取 的應變數(轉投資家數、轉投資比率、投資損益/母公司稅前淨利比率),具統計顯 著性者亦較少,可推論這些變數未必能完全衡量國內企業投資中國大陸的行為,
後續研究可針對投資行為的代理變數進行更多的探索。其次,依照目前規定,國 內企業對中國大陸的投資,需申報其投資明細,但由於資料無法複核,且多半由 企業管理當局自行申報,加上涉及商場競爭、欺瞞小股東、逃漏稅捐、以及是否 違反國內管制規定等因素,故資訊的透明度及完整性頗受質疑。因此,在解讀實 證結果時,需留意研究取得的公開資料未必代表真實投資的全貌。第三,本次研 究針對水泥、食品、紡織、塑膠等四種傳統產業進行研究分析,故無法推論其他 產業投資中國大陸的情況。最後,本次研究探討國內企業對中國大陸的投資行 為,因未探討企業對其他國家或地區的投資行為,因此,無法了解對外投資行為 是否受到投資地區不同的文化、社會型態、政治制度等因素而有所差異。
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任務小組教學法在會計教學成效之探討
A Study of the Effect of Task-Group Teaching in Accounting
李杏美
朝陽科技大學財務金融系講師
李柏英
朝陽科技大學財務金融系助理教授
摘要
為因應時代的需要,會計人員本不僅要具備基本的會計知識與技能,還需具 備相當的概念能力、人際能力與溝通能力。傳統的會計教學多以講演法來進行,
這種教學法主要以教師為中心,學生的學習較為被動,也較無暇去發展學生除專 業知識外的其他能力,因此本研究嘗試以建構教學中的的任務小組教學法來進行 會計教學,並比較它與講演教學法在成效上的差異。本研究以朝陽料技大學日間 部財務金融系四年制二年級兩個班級為對象,針對中級會計課程,由同一位教師 隨機分派一班為實驗組,採用任務小組教學法,另一班為對照組,採用講演教學 法,進行為期六週的實驗。實驗的結果顯示:實驗組與對照組在專業知識的測驗 上沒有明顯的差異,但是58%實驗組的學生表示喜歡任務小組教學法,因為在 概念能力、人際能力與溝通能力上得到成長。教師採用任務小組教學法所遭遇的 問題及解決方法也被詳加討論。
關鍵字:任務小組教學法、會計教學成效