一、 研究建議
本研究 CSR 績效以出具報告書、獲獎與獲獎總分進行衡量，尚無法完 全捕捉企業在 CSR 活動的績效。CSR 活動包含數各面向，如環境保護、社 會參與、勞工人權、利害關係人權益保障、推動公司治理等。基於資源有限 與資源依賴的觀點，公司將積極尋求所缺之關鍵資源，予以補充。因此，未 來研究可進一步探討忙碌董事與 CSR 各面向之關聯，了解董事兼職對於 CSR 各面向是否均產生名譽效果及資源依賴情形；其中又以那些面向資源依賴情 形最高，名譽效果最高。預期將能更精確的提供企業資訊，擇適任者進入董 事會，協助推動 CSR 該面向事務，以達事半功倍之效。
此外，可進一步分析董事兼職數增加對 CSR 的影響，本研究參考過去 學者及我國法令規定，定義董事兼職數大於 2(含本公司則總任職數為 3)為忙 碌董事，未來可進一步探討董事兼職數增加至某個數量時，對 CSR 之影響 是否由聲譽效果反轉為忙碌效果，對企業 CSR 產生不利的影響，亦可透過 實證找出反轉值，以利企業更具體因應兼職董事之聘任。
二、研究限制
衡量 CSR 績效與董事忙碌情形之變數甚多，本研究未能一一納入，進 行實證，將可能導致實證結果不夠完整，為本研究限制之一。又本研究資料 部分取自 TEJ 資料庫，其資料庫之資料品質及正確性並非本研究所能控制，
若該資料庫之資料存在缺漏或錯誤，將會影響實證結果。
55
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網站參考資料
愛迪達廢魚網球鞋，可至 CSRone 永續報告平台 2015 年國際案例網站查詢，
http://www.csronereporting.com/topic_2224。
Levi 減少產品水足跡，可至 CSRone 永續報告平台 2016 年國際案例網站查詢，
http://www.csronereporting.com/topic_2622。
台達電子工業股份有限公司企業社會責任，可至該公司 CSR 網站查詢，
http://www.deltaww.com/about/csr_features_ch.aspx?secID=5&pid=6&tid=0&hl=
zh-TW。
台灣積體電路製造股份有限公司企業社會責任，可至該公司 CSR 網站查詢，
http://www.tsmc.com.tw/chinese/csr/index.htm。
台灣積體電路製造股份有限公司 2016 年董事簡歷，可至該公司網站查詢，
http://www.tsmc.com.tw/chinese/investorRelations/board_of_directors.htm。
中國鋼鐵股份有限公司 2016 年董事簡歷，可至該公司網站查詢，