第五章 結論與建議
第三節 研究限制
本研究運用賽局理論模型分析分析以中、美南海競合策略兼論我國 太平島安全，其研究的限制如後：
(一)本研究在模型中皆以假設雙方都是理性的參賽者，所謂理性就是參與 者與對方競爭互動時，雙方在選擇策略時要滿足報酬極大化，都有 其計算方法。但是在一般實際情況，如果雙方訊息並不能完全透明，
也許會有非理性的決策情形出現。因而本研究假定「囚徒困境」、「懦 夫賽局」及「智豬理論」等，雙方在完全訊息下互動，以降低非理 性決策的可能性。
(二)賽局理論中報酬是影響策略選擇重要的因素，賽局參與者是依據報酬 大小的比較來決定其策略選擇，如何客觀的選定各種策略下的報酬，
而能清楚表達實際情況，這是個難題。本研究中賽局理論皆引用過 去學者所推演導出的報酬，而在危機「邊緣策略」所獲得的報酬亦 延續「懦夫賽局」中量化資料，獲得子賽局的均衡。因此，建議後 續研究可使用更精準表達的數字及統計分析。
(三)現今國際局勢詭譎多變，強權政治勢力消長影響南海權力爭奪，各國
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於策略與政策擬定考慮變數甚多，而本研究運用賽局理論謹探討中、
美南海競合策略及我國太平島安全，難免有考量不周延，疏漏之處，
如：應將東協或東協中涉及南海主權爭議的國家，菲律納、越南等 聲索國納入這場博奕賽局中進行分析，故建議未來研究者，可朝此 方向進行更進一步的探討。
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附錄
95
美 「 中 」 南 海 軍 事 外 交 戰 略 競 逐 爭 議 事 件 彙 整 表
（2009 年～2016 年 7 月）
2010.07
2010.07
2010.08 2010.11
2011.06
2011.06
2011.06
2011.07
2013.12
2014.03
2014.04
素。
2010.03
2010.07
2010.07
2010.09
2010.10
2010.10
2011.06
2011.06
2012.07
中共向美表示南
美 「 中 」 南 海 軍 事 外 交 戰 略 競 逐 爭 議 事 件 彙 整 表
（2009 年～2016 年 7 月）
2014.07
2015.03
2015.12
2016.01
2016.02
2016.05
大會議宣布，美國
2014.02
2014.09
2015.07
2016.05
2016.05
2016.06
2016.06
2016.07
海軍司令吳勝利
97
美 「 中 」 南 海 軍 事 外 交 戰 略 競 逐 爭 議 事 件 彙 整 表
（2009 年～2016 年 7 月）
2016.05 洲安全會議上重申 循外交管道解決南 海問題，籲中國大 陸停止填海造陸計 畫。
附錄二
ASEAN DECLARATION ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ASEAN DECLARATION ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA Manila,Philippines, 22 July 1992
WE, the Foreign Minister of the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations;
RECALLING the historic, cultural and social ties that bind our peoples as states adjacent to the South China Sea;
WISHING to promote the spirit of kinship, friendship and harmony among our peoples who share similar Asian traditions and heritage;
DESIROUS of further promoting conditions essential to greater economic cooperation and growth;
RECOGNIZING that we are bound by similar ideals of mutual respect, freedom, sovereignty and jurisdiction of the parties directly concerned;
RECOGNIZING that South China Sea issues involve sensitive questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction of the parties directly concerned;
CONSCIOUS that any adverse developments in the South China Sea directly affect peace and stability in the region.
HEREBY
1. EMPHASIZE the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force;
2. URGE all parties concerned to exercise restraint with view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes;
3. RESOLVE, without prejudicing the sovereignty and jurisdiction of countries having direct interests in the area, to explore the possibility cooperation in the South China Sea relating to the safety of maritime navigation and
communication, protection against pollution of the marine environment,
coordination of search and rescue operations, efforts towards combating piracy and armed robbery as well as collaboration in the campaign against illicit trafficking in drugs;
4. COMMEND all parties concerned to apply the principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the basis for establishing a code of international conduct over the South China Sea;
5. INVITE all parties concerned to subscribe to this Declaration of principles.
Signed in Manila, Philippines, this 22nd day of July, nineteen hundred and ninety-two.
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附錄三 南海爭議－美、中「香格里拉對話」
南海爭議―美、中「香格里拉對話」
（2016.06.03～2016.06.05）
本屆會議美防長卡特，6 月 4 日出席主題《因應複雜的亞洲安全挑戰》的第一
附錄四 2014、2015 年美、中國防預算成長表
資料來源：斯德哥爾摩研究中2015 年報告，本研究整理
1.1 3.7 25.5 7.7 0.7 7.7
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附錄六 What’s New on China’s Artificial Islands in the South China Sea?
The buildup of Fiery Cross Reef is shown from May 31, 2014, to May 1, 2016.
The buildup of Mischief Reef is shown from Jan. 24, 2012, to May 1, 2016
The buildup of Subi Reef is shown from Sept. 5, 2013, to May 1, 2016.
資料來源:TIME 雜誌 WORLD SOUTH CHINA SEA What’s New on China’s Artificial Islands in the South China Sea? Basketball Courts Hannah Beech @hkbeech May 22, 2016
103
排名 姓 名 黨 職 公 職 分 工
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附錄八 美國國防部軍事作戰等級及歷史過程
Readiness
condition Exercise term Description Readiness DEFCON 1 COCKED PISTOL Nuclear war is imminent Maximum readiness
DEFCON 2 FAST PACE Next step to nuclear war
Armed Forces ready to deploy and engage in less than 6 hours
DEFCON 3 ROUND HOUSE
Increase in force readiness above that required for normal
readiness
Air Force ready to mobilize in 15 minutes
DEFCON 4 DOUBLE TAKE Increased intelligence watch and
strengthened security measures Above normal readiness DEFCON 5 FADE OUT Lowest state of readiness Normal readiness
DEFCON 2
Cuban Missile Crisis
During the Cuban Missile Crisis on October 22, 1962, the U.S. Armed Forces (with the exception of United States Army Europe (USAREUR)) were ordered to DEFCON 3. On October 24, Strategic Air Command (SAC) was ordered to DEFCON 2, while the rest of the U.S. Armed Forces remained at DEFCON 3. SAC remained at DEFCON 2 until November.
Gulf War
On January 15, 1991, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared DEFCON 2 in the opening phase of Operation Desert Storm during the Gulf War. US Secretary of State James Bakerhad warned that Iraqi chemical weapon use against coalition forces would result in nuclear retaliation.
DEFCON 3
Yom Kippur War
On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a joint attack on Israel resulting in the Yom Kippur War.
The U.S. became concerned that the Soviet Union might intervene, and on October 25, U.S. forces, including Strategic Air Command, Continental Air Defense Command, European Command and the Sixth Fleet, were placed at DEFCON 3. Over the following days, the various forces reverted to normal status with the Sixth Fleet standing down on November 17.
Operation Paul Bunyan
Following the axe murder incident at Panmunjom on August 18, 1976, readiness levels for American forces in South Korea were increased to DEFCON 3, where they remained throughout Operation Paul Bunyan which followed thereafter.
September 11 attacks
During the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld ordered the increased DEFCON level to 3, and also a stand-by for a possible increase to DEFCON 2. That eventuality, however, did not come to pass.
資料來源： Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms；本研究整理