• 沒有找到結果。

第五章 結論與限制

第二節 研究限制

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經理與非家族總經理的避稅政策有不同影響,可能原因是長期任職的非家族總經 理係受家族控制股東肯定,因此在政策制定上較有發揮空間。

最後,先前文獻除探討過度自信對企業政策之影響,亦有探討過度自信產生 的決策會提高或傷害企業價值。不同於傳統與代理理論,過度自信者若制定提高 企業價值的避稅策略,可能係歸因於專業能力較佳,因此相較於風險趨避者更勇 於租稅規避,對企業有利;若產生傷害企業價值的避稅策略,係歸因於專業能力 不足,導致權衡租稅利益與非稅成本時有過大誤差。因此,後續研究可進一步探 究避稅策略與企業價值的關聯,是否因總經理過度自信而有差異,並透過學歷與 經驗等特質衡量個人能力。

第二節 研究限制

本文使用六項過去研究經常使用的租稅規避指標,然而由於衡量方式的不同,

這六項指標所代表的租稅規避也不同 (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010)。如永久性財 稅差異係反映會造成永久性差異的避稅手段,因此相較於總財稅差異,可能反映 更激進的租稅規避;而帳面有效稅率無法反映遞延稅負的避稅策略,反觀現金有 效稅率僅能反映遞延稅負的策略,卻無法顯示企業的應計稅負。綜合觀之,六項 租稅規避指標所代表的避稅行為不盡相同,然而一大共通點是他們皆無法捕捉使 財稅一致 (book-tax conformity) 的避稅策略。總結來說,本文僅能夠解釋總經理 的過度自信是否使企業在不同的避稅指標下有激進避稅行為,且僅限於不具財稅 一致性的避稅策略,而非整體的避稅行為。此外,本研究採用的三項財稅差異指 標需計算企業課稅所得,惟課稅所得係屬國家機密資訊,因此過程中僅得以企業 於財報公佈的所得稅費用相關訊息推估,可能使三項避稅指標存在偏誤。

由於國內並無資料庫搜集總經理個人執行認股權的行為,因此不易追隨國外 文獻主要判斷過度自信的方法,故採用 Malmendier and Tate (2005) 第三項方法

─依據總經理持股行為判斷,並參考國內過度自信文獻修改為根據總經理任期最 早三年的持股率變動來判定過度自信。惟持股率的消長可能受到其他因素影響,

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如執行企業認股權而取得股份或是企業特別配給總經理股票紅利,非僅歸因於總 經理個人對其經營企業的信心,惟無法進一步取得詳細資訊排除此疑慮,因此本 文過度自信指標存有潛在偏誤。此外,不同個人展現過度自信的方式不盡相同,

單以持股率變動來判斷可能會遺漏許多實質上有過度自信特質的對象,應建立統 整各判斷方式的綜合指標才能使樣本偏誤降低,亦可能進一步衡量過度自信的程 度。

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註1:*、**、***分別為 p 值< 0.1、< 0.05、< 0.01。刮號()內為標準誤,係以公司設定cluster。採用樣本在2005-2015年 度有4,334個觀察值。 係調整總財稅差異中屬於盈餘管理的部份,參照Desai and Dharmapala (2006)以總財稅差異對總應計數做迴歸,以其殘差 項衡量企業的租稅規避活動。總經理過度自信(OC_2)係觀察總經理任職期間最早二至四年持股率變動,若有兩年以上呈

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