Chapter I: Introduction
1.7 Chapter arrangement
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region, but in this research I cannot cover it all.
According to the New Foreign Policy Actors in China from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), it shows that the foreign policies are not only decided by China’s State Council, but also the Communist Party, The People’s Liberation Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other non-governmental units have great influences.29 Inconsistent ideas about foreign affairs from different units in China and the lack of access to the actual decision makers may cause deviations. In addition, the U.S.’ strategic shift towards the East is still ongoing. Therefore I am only able to expand the research sources from credible sources of literature, secondary data and publication information.
1.7 Chapter Arrangement
There are six chapters in this thesis. The first chapter is instruction, besides explaining the research background, I use the political system theory as the research approach to discuss elements of competition and cooperation between the U.S. and China, and how the Rebalance to Asia Policy may affect Cross-Strait relations. In addition, I use Historical Research, Content Analysis and Comparative Research as the basis of my research methodology. As for my literature review, I apply “the rise of China” to explain the background information, “Balance of Power” and “Power Transition” for the Sino-U.S. relations, and “Informal Alliance Politics” for U.S.- Taiwan relations.
Chapter two discusses the U.S. Rebalance to Asia Policy, in this chapter, besides
29 Linda Jakobson & Dean Knox, New Foreign policy Actors in China (Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI Policy Paper, 2010), pp. 4-16.
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using official announcements and documents, I further pinpoint the goals of this policy and what kind of methods the U.S. used to achieve their strategic goals. The U.S. has been relocating their troops, upgrading military programs, rebalancing force structures, and has increased the frequency of joint military exercises with its allies to enhance cooperation and make mutual security agreements in the region. From the aspect of economics, by promoting the TPP, the U.S. can avoid countries in South East Asia relying on Chin too much economically. In terms of diplomacy, the U.S. cooperated with China in order to combat global terrorism and in its quest to try to solve the issues of Afghanistan and Iraq, and North Korean Iranian nuclear weaponization. In addition, the U.S. has also actively participated in various mutual organizations to increase its influence in the region.
Chapter three approaches the competition and cooperation between the U.S. and the PRC under the Rebalance to Asia Policy. For the most part, China chooses to have a peaceful dialogue while ramping up its military presence at the same time.
Additionally, China sees sovereignty issues, such as the disputes in the East China and South China Seas as part of its national core interest, which also makes it difficult to find compromises on. Economically speaking, China actively promotes the RCEP since China can’t get a favorable position under the U.S. lead TPP.
In chapter four I outline the benefits to Taiwan has enjoyed and Taiwan’s Response to the U.S. Rebalancing Asia Policy. Regarding the military aspects, there is not much room for Taiwan to make adjustments. However, from the aspect of economics, Taiwan relies heavily on exports, hence it is crucial for Taiwan to join Regional economic cooperation such as the TPP and RCEP. As for diplomacy, in order to maximize Taiwan’s interests, its best to maintain mutual relationships with various
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countries including the U.S., China and Japan.
Chapter five analyses Potential Development of Cross-Strait Relations under the U.S. Rebalancing Asia Policy. When Sino-U.S. relations are in a process of constrainment rather than engagement, Taiwan seems to benefit from a more flexible U.S. In the future, we can expect that the U.S. will not be happy to see any tensions in the Taiwan Strait escalate and risk another war. Conversely however, if Cross-Strait relations improve significantly, it may cast doubt and create a sense of insecurity amongst the U.S., Japan and other ASEAN countries. Hence, since Taiwan and China have had more consensus on less sensitive issues, both sides may have more progress on financial and cultural cooperation as well as educational exchange.
My conclusions are found in chapter 6. In the first section are my findings to explain what kind of approach the U.S. has used for its Rebalance to Asia Policy, and whether it reached its strategic goals and furthermore, what kind of response China and Taiwan have had toward this policy. I also explore the impact the Rebalance to Asia Policy has brought to Cross-Strait Relations. In the second section I provide a few suggestions based on my observations of the complexities of U.S., China and Taiwan relations.
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Chapter II
The U.S Rebalance to Asia Policy
The U.S. uses containment and engagement as its foreign policy towards China, and it adjust these three methods according to its regional/global interest and China’s political affiliation.1 After the 911 incident, the U.S. needed China’s support for its war on terror, especially where China could help mediate nuclear weapon issues of North Korea. At the point when the U.S. adjusted its strategic core to the war on terror, the support they received from China also improve Sino-U.S. relations. However, the cooperation between the U.S. and China is more like a short-term allied relationship.
In the long run, it seems both countries will not reach agreements on major issues such as a resolution to the issues in the South China Sea.
On July 2009, the Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared “the United States is back” during a press conference in Bangkok. Hillary Clinton mentioned the administration of President Obama thinks it's time to show Asian nations that the U.S.
is not distracted by its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and intends to broaden and deepen its partnerships in this region.2 In November 2009, President Obama visited Indonesia, Japan and South Korea. He further visited Australia and attended the East Asia Summit, EAS in November 2011. The frequent visits to Asia showed that the U.S. was interested in a transfer of its strategic goals to include the Asia-Pacific region.3
1 Ya-Zhong Zhang, The U.S.’ China policy: Containment, Communication, Strategic partner (Taipei：
Sheng Zhi, 1999), pp. 19-33.
2 The Associated Press, “U.S. 'is back' is Asia, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declares,” Daily News, July 21, 2009. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/u-s-back-asia-secretary-state-hillary-clinton-declares-article-1.429381
3 Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “Obama Puts His Stamp on Strategy for a Leaner Military,”
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On January 2010, Hillary Clinton once again emphasized that the U.S. is not only back to Asia, but also stated ”we are back to stay.”4 President Obama also emphasized this during a speech to the Australian Parliament saying “In the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in.”5 On October 2011, Hillary Clinton published “America’s Pacific Century,” which announced that the United States stands at a Pivot point and it has moved to fully engage the region’s multilateral institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. This article also emphasized that the intentions of the Pivot to Asia policy is to remain engaged and to lead,6 the purpose is to consistent with its goal of retaining a leading position globally. The six key lines of action include strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening their working relationships with emerging powers, including China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.
The former minister of defense of the United States Leon Panetta declared that the Rebalance to Asia Policy is more focused on engagement with China and increasing its position in the Asia-Pacific region than to contain China; it is about creating a new model in the relationship between the two Pacific Powers.7 The Pivot to Asia policy
The New York Times, Jan. 5, 2012. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/06/us/obama-at-pentagon-to-outline-cuts-and-strategic-shifts.html?_r=0”
4 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities.”
Remarks by Secretary of State, Honolulu, Hawaii, Jan. 12, 2010. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://m.state.gov/md135090.htm
5 Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 2011. “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament.” Canberra, Australia, Nov. 17. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament
6 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” The Foreign Policy, Oct. 11, 2011. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/
7 Luis Ramirez, “Panetta: US Not Trying to Contain China,” Voice of America, September 19, 2012.
Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.voanews.com/content/panetta-us-not-trying-to-‧
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includes military, economic and diplomatic aspects, in this chapter I will analyze the United States’ Asia policy from these three aspects.
2.1 From the Aspect of Military
In order to constrain China’s military development, the U.S. enhanced its relationship with its allies, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. The U.S. made the South China Sea Code of Conduct and East China Sea Code of Conduct with Japan and related parties involved in the Spratly Islands dispute in ASEAN. At the same time, China continually took a provocative stance regarding the Senkaku Islands and Spratly Islands, which consequently has made relations between U.S. and China more intense.8
The military has always been the focus for an East Asia strategy. Countries in this region trust the U.S.’ security commitment through its military power. Just as the article published by The New York Times on November 16, 2011 states, the U.S. looks to Asia and it sees China everywhere. China has become the number one entity to deal with. In 2010 the Sea-Air Battle Doctrine was announced in order to respond the expansion of China’s military power. In January 2012, President Obama declared the U.S.’ strategic guidelines for Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership known as their Priorities for 21st Century Defense. It is intended as a blueprint for Joint Force operations up until 2020, providing a set of precepts that will help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of forces over subsequent programs and budget cycles, while highlighting some of the strategic risks that may be associated with the proposed
contain-china/1510768.html
8 Guo-Cai Zhao, “Global Hegemony Contains Regional Powers- The U.S. Asia Rebalancing Strategy,”
Straits Review Monthly, Vol. 273, September, 2013. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.haixiainfo.com.tw/273-8899.html#
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strategy."9 This guidelines point out that in order to achieve global security, the U.S.
needs to continually rebalance the Asia-Pacific region. President Obama also reiterated that the U.S. will give more attention to the region even in the face of defense budget cuts.10
Under the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA) the U.S. must cut defense by nearly
$1 trillion over 10 years. However, Iran continues its pursuit of nuclear weapons while expanding its malign influence across the region. And China has stepped up its coercive behavior in Asia, backed by its rapid military modernization. Every year since the Budget Control Act was passed, the world has become more dangerous, and the threats to the nation and to American interests have grown.11 The United States Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter pointed out the strategy guideline mentioned above is declared due to the budget cuts. This strategic guidance specifically pointed out that U.S. needs to rebalance its force structure and investments towards the Asia-Pacific region area where there are several potential challenges to stability, and of course to the Middle East, where challenges persist, and towards advancing capabilities to maintain access and power projection which are relevant globally. However, the budget cuts still bring doubts about whether the Obama administration could turn its strategic core and military force to the Asia-Pacific region in order to reach the purpose of constraining China.
9 Primary Sources, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 5, 2012, Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.cfr.org/defense-strategy/sustaining-us-global-leadership-priorities-21st-century-defense/p26976
10 Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 2012. “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney.” Jan 5. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/05/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-152012
11 John Maccain and Mac Thornberry, “America’s Dangerous Defense Cuts,” The Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.wsj.com/articles/john-mccain-and-mac-thornberry-americas-dangerous-defense-cuts-1425943297
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In fact, representatives from the departments of State, Energy and the Interior; the Agency for International Development; the FBI and the CIA are all assigned to the Pacific Outreach Directorate to assure the plans of the rebalancing strategy could be strictly followed. Furthermore, the U.S. implemented the concept of forward-deployed diplomacy in order to reach into Asia and be involved in several important regional cooperation mechanisms. These all showed that the U.S. has attempted to continue its influence in Asia.
The U.S. Commander of Pacific Air Forces, Herbert J. Carlisle said the tough advocate of sovereignty made by China might lead to a misjudgment of risk. At the same time, it can help Washington D.C. to strengthen relationships with its allies. In the meantime, the U.S. continues to transfer military forces and assets from Europe to Asia.
The new military strategy is focuses on utilizing smaller scale yet higher technology equipment to improve its fighting ability. Reducing the amount of ground forces shows that the U.S. is intent on avoiding large scale military operations, instead, they prefer to equip troops with technologically advanced equipment making them more available and versatile if required. In addition, the U.S.’ new military strategy is focused on how to build a military force which can respond quickly and execute military missions anywhere in the world in order to protect its national interests.
With the challenges of budget cuts, the U.S. has to set priorities in order to use their limited resources as efficiently as possible. At this point, the biggest threat to their security is mainly from the Middle East (Iran, Syria and ISIL) and Asia-Pacific (China). These regions are the new focus for the U.S. Hence even with these budget cuts the U.S. won’t weaken its military power in the above areas. In addition, the U.S.
will enhance military cooperation with the allies to solidify it’s dominate position in
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these regions.
On August 21, 2012 the U.S. Marines and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force held joint military exercises for 37 days. These military exercises were held during the most intense period in the Senkaku Islands dispute. Former Secretary of Defense of United States Leon Panetta mentioned that the U.S. will deploy 60% of their navy ships before 2020 in The Shangri-La Dialogue of 2012 in Singapore. Even before Panetta arrived in Singapore, the U.S. already announced to move their marines from Okinawa to Guam. In addition, the troops in Seoul were moved to the central area of South Korea. All these actions showed that the U.S. was making adjustments to spread their military resources to different areas in order to make their troops more flexible and have quicker access to North East Asia, South East Asia and even the Indian Ocean.12 Furthermore, military diplomacy also comes along with this rebalancing strategy. Besides enhancing their bilateral relationship with Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, the U.S. also built new partnership relationships with Singapore, Vietnam and India.13
Increasing the frequency and scale of military exercises is also a new characteristic that can be observed after the Pivot to Asia strategy was announced. In 2010, more than a half of the joint military exercises lead by the U.S. were held in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2011, the U.S held military exercises in the Asia-Pacific region 172 times. It was as much as once in every two days on average. From June to August 2012, there was a 55 days of joint military exercises (RIMPAC) in Hawaii where 22
12 Editorial, “The U.S. New Asia-Pacific Strategy and China’s Internal contradictions impact regional stability,” Youth Daily News, June 11, 2012, Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://news.gpwb.gov.tw/mobile/news.aspx?ydn=w2u5S9CJZGAXB%2FzPg%2Fq7ahBURwZ%2FxCk oH%2BRnvuMETFzXce8eu8HiRoggTehHrMd1OFGhXbuEnzzeA0viBem0b7Fv%2BAuuu1RdKxtzj%2F w0HbY%3D
13 Ibid.
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different countries had participated,14 with China, at that time, being excluded.
However, China was invited to attend RIMPAC for the first time until 2014.
Along with China’s rise, the competition between the U.S. and China has of course become more intense. The key factors of the intensification includes a lack of mutual trust and the fears of nuclear weapon capabilities. Aside from business and trade relations between the U.S. and China becoming more stable, issues such as international security, internet security and China’s human rights record are still thorny issues that persist. Secondly, China has limited ability to build nuclear weapons while at the same time China has concerns about the U.S. to increasing its nuclear submarine presence in the Pacific Ocean. In addition, U.S. constant observations from the U.S.’ superior reconnaissance satellites also compromises China’s ability to scale-up their nuclear program without detection if they chose to do so.15
Although both the U.S. and China now understand that it is crucial for both to develop relations between the major powers, when they deal with important international strategic issues, they still can’t get rid of the suspicions they have of each other. For example, President Obama tends to refer to China as a peaceful contributor in Asia-Pacific region. However, the General Secretary of the Central Committeeof the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping believes that the major barrier of the high level talks between the U.S. and China is the uncertainty of the U.S.’ intention toward China. In addition, the Rebalance to Asia Policy constrains China from economic, diplomatic, and military expansion. The strategic assessment 2012 pointed out that
14 Commandeer, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “RIMPAC 2012- About the Exercise.” June 29, 2012. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.cpf.navy.mil/rimpac/2012/about/
15 Editorial, “Doubt in Sino-U.S. exacerbated, Taiwan need to be more flexible,” Want Daily, July 13, 2013, Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.want-daily.com/portal.php?mod=view&aid=80449
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China needs to put efforts on increasing its mutual understanding and trust with other countries.16
Generally speaking, most Asia-Pacific countries hope that the U.S. and China can have a healthy competitive and cooperative relationship based on mutual trust. However, as Chinese hackers constantly threaten the U.S.’ internet security and Chinese leaders still consider the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia and potential threats to it hard to see both sides overcoming their stances even with high level talks.
From the perspective of any East Asia allies, there are two key points regarding the Rebalance to Asia Policy. Firstly, maintaining relationships with the original allies,
From the perspective of any East Asia allies, there are two key points regarding the Rebalance to Asia Policy. Firstly, maintaining relationships with the original allies,