Chapter III: Competition and Cooperation between the U.S. and the PRC under the
3.1 From the Aspect of National Security
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years the joint military exercises held by the U.S. and ASEAN members have become more frequent. The former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also declared that The South China Sea issue involves the U.S.’ core interests.
When the U.S. is involved in the issue of The South China Sea issue, its standpoint obviously tends to lean towards being on the side of the Southeast Asian countries involved more than on China’s side, hence it creates more unpredictable variables in the region.1 In addition, the U.S. moving its troops to The Asia-Pacific region, plus the buildup of troops in Afghanistan over the years has sandwiched China in a sense and this threatens China’s national security interests. Furthermore, since the U.S. is actively promoting the TPP in order to lower China’s economic influence in the Asia-Pacific, China will have to speed up the progress to finish the negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RECP) to maintain their economic strength. We understand that the Rebalancing of Asia policy also affects China from three aspects including military, economic and diplomacy, in this chapter I will analyze these three aspects.
3.1 From the Aspect of National Security
“Hard power” is a method that a state may use while encountering pressure from other countries. Although hard power is not the only or the best method, it could still be seen as a reliable tool to create the strength for its own national interest. In The Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. deployed the troops from Japan and Korea down to Singapore, in addition, the U.S. enhanced its military cooperation with The Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Pakistan and India. Even with the U.S.’ defense budget
1 Hui-Jun Lo, “The Chinese Factor of the U.S. Returning to Southeast Asia and China’s Strategic Response,” Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 5, 2011, pp. 58-63.
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cuts, the U.S. still plans to deploy 60% of its battle ships in The Pacific Ocean by 2020.
The U.S. strategic transfer increases pressure on China’s sea power, hence we can expect that China will respond to this by adjusting its military defense strategy.
Since there was no platform for interaction between the People’s Liberation Army and the U.S. in the 20th century, both countries couldn’t reach any agreements, nor was there any platform to negotiate on security issues. However, the U.S. and China in the 21st century have become the biggest major economic players in the world. The stability of their respective economies and security between these two countries have a great influence globally. After the APEC meetings were held in Santiago, Chile, in November, 2004, high ranking diplomats between both sides have had regular meetings annually. There were 6 rounds of high-level U.S.-China talks from 2005 to 2008.
Every year the dialogue focuses on several of strategic security issues.
Along with these high-level U.S.-China talks, since 2009, the U.S. and China developed the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) for high-level representatives to meet annually and discuss security and economic issues from bilateral, regional and global perspectives. The first round of annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic talks were held in April 2009, both sides recognized that the Dialogue offers a unique forum to promote understanding, expand common ground, reduce differences, enhance mutual trust, and step up cooperation. In addition, the Dialogue helped to address shared challenges such as the global financial crisis, regional security concerns, global sustainable development, and climate change.2
2 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Press Release on the First Round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.” Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, D.C., July 28, 2009. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126596.htm
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agreements.3 The third U.S.-China Strategic and Economic talks were held in May 2011,where the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to the January 19, 2011 U.S.-China Joint Statement, and in accordance with the Joint Statement, committed to nurture and deepen bilateral strategic trust and work together to build a cooperative partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit. The discussions produced 48 specific outcomes (resolutions), including the establishment of the U.S.-China Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) under the Strategic Track of the S&ED.4The fourth U.S.-China Strategic and Economic talks were held in May 2012, the strategic track of the S&ED has harnessed the U.S.-China bilateral relationship to produce benefits for both sides through a wide range of joint projects and initiatives and expanded avenues for addressing common regional and global challenges such as Iran, North Korea, Sudan-South Sudan, and climate change. The establishment of the Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) at S&ED III had for the first time, provided the United States and China a forum for civilian and military representatives to assemble together to discuss the most strategically sensitive issues in their relationship, such as cyber-security and maritime security.5
3 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Concluding Joint Statements at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.” Remarks by Secretary of State at Great Hall of the People, Beijing, China, May 25, 2010.
Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/05/142207.htm
4 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Press Release on the First Round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.” Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, D.C., July 28, 2009. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126596.htm
5 U.S. Department of State, “The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Rounds I-IV Strategic Track Outcomes.” Office of the Spokesman, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2012. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/189288.htm
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The fifth U.S.-China Strategic and Economic talks were held in July 2013, this time, China committed to open further to foreign investment, including through the Shanghai free trade zone pilot for services and opposed trade protectionism.6 The sixth U.S.-China Strategic and Economic were held in July 2014, and a result the United States and China agreed to establish a joint working group to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies and reaffirmed their commitment to military-to-military relations.7
The Seventh annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic talks were held in June 2015, however this time, under mistrust and acrimony arising from tension over security in cyberspace and at sea. However, the seventh annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic talks came ahead of financial and political strategic talks, which were a precursor to cabinet-level meetings. Officials attended the annual Strategic Security Dialogue, which are the highest-level civilian-military conversations the U.S. and China have each year. Those talks were aimed to “really try to get at those issues which are the most likely to drive strategic mistrust between the U.S. and China,” a senior State Department official said. The official added: “What we’re trying to do is to show that we can effectively manage areas of ongoing differences and work to narrow those differences over time.” In the security talks, the U.S. also raised its concerns regarding China’s behavior in The South China Sea and encouraged diplomatic solutions to resolve tensions among rival claimants.8
6 William J. Burn, “The U.S.-China Closing Statements for U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.” Remarks by Deputy Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., July 11, 2013. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/burns/remarks/2013/211850.htm
7 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue VI Strategic Track Select Outcomes.” Office of the Spokesman, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2014. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/229073.htm
8 Felicia Schwartz and Ian Talley, “U.S.-China Talks Held Under Cloud of Suspicion,” The Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.wsj.com/articles/senior-u-s-chinese-officials-meet-in-washington-shadowed-by-strains-1435003925
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Among the commitments made through the bilateral talks, we can see that both sides only touched upon soft issues such as climate change, anti-terrorism or enhancing mutual trust. However, away from the negotiation table, the unrest concerning The East and South China Seas is still ongoing.
Besides setting up a platform for high-level representatives from both sides to meet annually and discuss security and economic issues from bilateral, regional and global perspectives, China believes that by emphasizing the idea of its "New Concept of Security,” implementing the “Anti-Access/Area-Denial” (AD/AD) and the “The East China Sea ADIZ,” it will lower the U.S.’ influence in The Asia-Pacific region.
1) New Concept of Security: Since many countries had concerns toward the rise of China, during the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1999, the former General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Jiang Zemin mentioned that the core of such a new concept of security should be mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.9 In the China's Peaceful Development white paper published in September 6th, 2011, it pointed out that China's overall goal of pursuing peaceful development is to promote development and harmony domestically and pursue cooperation and peace internationally. Through a multitude of cooperative measures implemented to maintain mutual security and prevent war and conflict.10 However, the New Concept of Security clearly was not
9 Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, “Jiang Zemin's speech at the Conference on Disarmament (26 March 1999, Geneva).” March 26, 1999. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/disarmament_armscontrol/unga/t29298.htm
10 Information Office of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China, “Full Text: China's Peaceful Development.” Beijing, September, 2011. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354.htm
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able to handle sovereignty issues such as Taiwan or The East and South China Sea. Hence, the New Concept of Security is more like a slogan than an efficient policy which Chinese leaders use it to win trust and lower the level of hostility from other countries.
2) Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD): the term of “A2/AD“ was first mentioned in Naval Transformation: Background and Issues for Congress by Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in May 2002. In May 2003, the report “Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge,”
pointed out that China has the ability to enforce the A2/AD. In addition, in March, 2007, the report “Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States” pointed out that the principal threat that could possibly defeat U.S. military forces is through the use of an asymmetric approach, such as an anti-access strategy. China always keeps Taiwan in mind while they are developing any tactics against the U.S.11 In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, it mentioned that the U.S. should develop a new Air-Sea battle concept in order to respond the AD/AD strategies.12
3) East China Sea ADIZ (ECS ADIZ): under the pressure from the U.S.’ Air-Sea battle tactics and deployment in the region, China further declared the ECS ADIZ in order to maintain actual control and power over the airspace.
An ADIZ is an area of airspace beyond a country’s sovereign territory within
11 Roger Cliff, Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica: Rand, 2007), pp. 14 -15.
12 Stephen Daggett, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and Implications for National Security Planning,” Congressional Research Service, May 17, 2010. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41250.pdf
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which the country requires the identification, location, and assumes control of any air traffic that flies into the airspace in the interest of its national security. It appears that China designated its ECS ADIZ as part of an effort to challenge Japan’s administration of the disputed Senkaku islands. The ECS ADIZ may also be intended as a means to bolster both China’s own claims to the islands and its justification for opposing U.S. military surveillance activities near its airspace. For the U.S., in addition to criticisms by the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense of the ECS ADIZ saying that it was“destabilizing”and increased the risks of conflict in the region, the United States announced that it “neither recognizes nor accepts China’s declared East China Sea ADIZ. ” As of early 2015, the U.S.
military continues to fly aircraft through the zone without notifying China or responding to requests for identification. However, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), distributed China’s requirements for operating in the ECS ADIZ to commercial airlines as part of its routine dissemination of Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs). As for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan each voiced opposition to China’s designation of the ECS ADIZ, which overlapped with their pre-existing ADIZs, and have continued normal military practices in the zone. South Korea requested that China redraw the boundary to remove this overlap, but Beijing refused the request, prompting Seoul to extend the boundaries of its ADIZ in December 2013. Japan called the PRC’s action an attempt to change the status quo on the Senkaku Islands by coercion. The U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands because they are administered by Japan.13
13 Ibid.
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Generally speaking, we can tell that regarding the response to the U.S.’ Rebalance to Asia Policy, China still chooses to have a peaceful dialogue while ramping of its military presence at the same time. However, China sees the sovereignty issues as the national core interest, making it difficult to compromise on. For example, President Xi Jinping has repeatedly used the term “Core interest” in speeches and emphasizes it with references to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang — specific sovereignty issues that China has always said are internal matters.14 The development of People’s Liberation Army will not only draw the U.S.’ attention, but make competition more intense and bring new risk to the region.