Chapter V: Potential Development of Cross-Strait Relations under the U.S. Rebalance
5.3 The Influence to Cross-Strait Relations and the Potential Developments in the
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5.3 The Influence to Cross-Strait Relations and the Potential Developments in the Future
China has the geographical and historical advantage, in addition, along with its market and economic development, China’s influence in the region expanded rapidly.
At the same time, the U.S. has security allies including Japan, South Korea, The Philippines, Thailand and Australia in the region. Besides enhancing its original strategic relationships with its allies, the U.S. also plans to develop new cooperation with the Indonesia and Vietnam in order to build a strong defense system to thwart China’s expansion of power passed the First Island Chain.
Additionally, the U.S. plays an important role in the process of Cross-Strait interactions. In the strategic relations among the U.S., China and Taiwan, the Sino-U.S. relations have had significant influence on Cross-Strait relations and Sino-U.S.-Taiwan relations. If we want to understand the future potential developments of Cross-Strait relations, we must include the most important variable, which has been U.S.
involvement. For a long period of time, there have been big differences regarding history, religion, culture, values, social system and national interests between the U.S and China. Although there is lack of trust between the U.S. and China, leaders from both sides still actively promote ta policy of engagement and strive to avoid misjudging each other’s intentions. Especially after the U.S.’ Rebalancing of Asia policy, we can expect that following Cross-Strait relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations will change accordingly.
After President Ma was re-elected to a second term as the president, Mainland China focused its Taiwan policy on consolidating mutual political trust and economic development. In addition, they also intended on deepening the recognition of the
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“One China” concept, and enhancing mutual cooperation on trade, culture and educational exchange.
As for the U.S., the Taiwan issue has always been at the core of Sino-U.S.
relationships. The United States and Taiwan enjoy a robust unofficial relationship.
The 1979 U.S.-P.R.C. Joint Communique switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In the Joint Communique, the United States recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, acknowledging the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The Joint Communique also stated that the people of the United States would maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The United States does not support Taiwan independence but maintaining strong, unofficial relations with Taiwan is a major U.S. goal, which is in line with the U.S.’ desire to further peace and stability in Asia. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act provided the legal basis for the unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and embodies the U.S.’ commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining its defensive capability.
The United States insists on peaceful resolutions of Cross-Strait differences, opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, and encourages dialogue to help advance such an outcome.23
However, if we study the U.S.’ Taiwan policy from a historical perspective, it seems like the U.S. tends to constrain China more than engage with them, and Taiwan has garnered more space and flexibility. In the 36 years since the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was passed, Taiwan and the U.S. have signed 147 agreements. In May of
23 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Taiwan.” Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
Washington, D.C., February 12, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm
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2015, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Susan Thornton, stressed how good Taiwan-U.S. relations are, and referred to Taiwan as a
"vital partner" of the U.S. in East Asia. She also emphasized that "the U.S.-Taiwan 'unofficial relationship' has never been better.” Another important indicator for close and friendly Taiwan -U.S. relations was that the U.S. in November of 2012, included Taiwan in its Visa-Waiver Program (VWP), making Taiwan the only nation of 38 countries that enjoy VWP which does not have formal diplomatic ties with the U.S.
As for bilateral economic and trade relations, Taiwan in 2014 vaulted past India and Saudi Arabia to become the 10th largest trading partner of the U.S., while the U.S. has once again outpaced Japan to become Taiwan's second largest trading partner. High-ranking economic and trade officials from the U.S. such as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Charles H. Rivkin and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Robert Holleyman also both visited Taiwan in 2015, which shows that Taiwan-U.S. economic and trade relations are becoming even closer.24 In addition, the U.S. has sold a total of $18.3 billion worth of arms to Taiwan since President Ma Ying-jeou took office seven years ago. In December 16, 2015 the Obama administration announced that it plans to sell $1.83 billion in arms to Taiwan.25
From the examples of the VWP, arms sales, close economic ties and high-ranking officials visits, we can see that the U.S. has been showing goodwill to Taiwan. At the same time, it also indicated that when the Sino-U.S. relations are in a process of constrainment rather than engagement, Taiwan seems to benefit from a more flexible
24 Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), “President Ma meets delegation led by American Veterans National Commander James D. Pidgeon.” Taipei, Taiwan, October 30, 2015.
Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=36062&rmid=2355
25 VOA News, “China Threatens Sanctions Over US Arms Sale to Taiwan,” Voice of America, December 17, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.voanews.com/content/china-issues-angry-protest-over-us-arms-sale-to-taiwan/3106891.html
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U.S. In addition, we can also expect that if the progress between Taiwan and China moves too quickly, it may also compromise U.S.-Taiwan relations in some ways.
Generally speaking, after the U.S.’ Rebalancing of Asia policy, most countries in the Asia-Pacific region including Taiwan, which is an important trade and security partner of the U.S., do not have much space to choose between the U.S. and China.
For a long time, the U.S. and Taiwan have maintained close cooperation in many different areas, regardless of the ruling party of the day whether it be the KMT or the DPP. Hence, if there is big change in Cross-Strait relations, it may create doubt and a sense of insecurity among the U.S., Japan and the ASEAN countries. For example, China has been looking for further cooperation with Taiwan with regard to the South China Sea disputes. If Taiwan was to cooperate with China on this matter, the U.S.
would consider it as a specific strategic change which would deviate from its Southeast Asia strategic structure, and possibly the U.S. would distrust Taiwan as its informal ally.
Originally the Presidential Office spokesman Charles Chen said that President Ma Ying-jeou did not rule out visiting Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island) on December, 12 2015, but in the end, only Taiwan’s interior minister visited Itu Aba Island and inaugurated a new wharf and lighthouse there, reasserting Taiwan government’s territorial claims.26 Although the Presidential Office spokesman Charles Chen later explained that due to President Ma having another scheduled event, he was not able to go to the inauguration ceremony on Itu Aba Island. However, the possibility for the President to visit the island in person in the future has not been ruled out. Some journalist concluded that his absence was an outcome of U.S. pressure.27
26 Jeremy Page, “Taiwan Minister Christens Projects on Taiping, Among Spratly Islands,” The Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-minister-christens-projects-on-taiping-among-spratly-islands-1450018669
27 Pei-fang Cai & Zhe-zheng Peng, “U.S.’ pressure? Bad weather? President Ma is not going to Taiping
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As far as Sino-U.S. relations are concerned, currently it is more of a competitive relationship rather than one of cooperation as both countries engagement policies, show that the U.S. and China still distrust each other. The U.S. supports Taiwan and China to ease Cross-Strait tensions and welcome inter-exchange and dialogue. However, the U.S. would not be happy to see Taiwan and China have further strategic cooperation and change the current situation.
After the Ma-Xi Summit, it seems like both Taiwan and China have reaffirmed their intentions to promote the peaceful development of Cross-Strait ties under the 1992 Consensus. Even the opposition party-Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen stated that she would keep “stable” ties with China saying “Maintaining the ‘status quo’ is my primary and most important direction”
regarding her take on Cross-Strait relations.28
In the future, we can expect that the U.S. will not be happy to see that the tension between the Cross-Strait escalate and risk another war when China’s economic is so central to global trade and capital flows. Militarily, the U.S. can no longer expect a swift and certain victory if war broke out in the Taiwan Strait with China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities.29 However, if Cross-Strait relations stagnate without any progress Taiwan will end up like most countries is Southeast Asia that have to balance themselves between two super powers with not a lot of room to maneuver. If the Cross-Strait relations improved significantly, it may also cast doubt and create a
Island,” United Evening News, Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://udn.com/news/story/6656/1368802-美方壓力？天候不佳？馬總統不去太平島
28 Lisa Wang, “Tsai touts energy policies at forum,” Taipei Times, December 23, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/12/23/2003635440
29 Hugh White, “Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?,” The National Interest, May 5, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan-12808
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sense of insecurity amongst the U.S., Japan and other ASEAN countries. Hence, since Taiwan and China have had more consensus on less sensitive issues, it seems like the two sides of the Cross-Straits will continue to have more progress economically, and further financial cooperation, cultural and educational exchange.
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Chapter VI
Conclusion
6.1 Findings
From this research we extrapolate out that under the Rebalancing of Asia policy, the U.S. has not only tended to enhance its military ability and increase its own power to constrain, but also through the expansion of joint military cooperation, increased its allies’ co-fighting ability, reassure its security commitment and try to stabilize the region and avoid any escalations of conflicts and/or potential wars. In addition, through reassuring its commitment to its allies in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. can gain more support and decrease the influence of China.
From the diplomatic aspect, despite sending high-ranking officers to visit countries in the region to deepen the bilateral relations, the U.S. also actively participated in various mutual organizations in the Asia-Pacific region and get involved in regional multiple mechanisms in order to have more cooperation opportunities with various countries. Economically speaking, the U.S. continued to promote the TPP in order to avoid countries in South East Asia having to rely on the RCEP too much. Additionally, in order to speed up economic recovery domestically, the U.S. focused on signing regional, bilateral and multiple FTA’s and open up the market for its featured products.
The U.S. through mutual diplomacy relations, economic and trade cooperation and cultural exchange enhanced its status in the region to maintain its national interests.
Since the 2004 APEC meetings, high-level representatives from China and the U.S.
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meet annually and discuss security and economic issues from bilateral, regional and global perspectives. However, among the commitments made through the bilateral talks, it seems like both sides have only managed to touch upon soft issues such as climate change, anti-terrorism or enhancing mutual trust. Militarily speaking, by emphasizing the idea of "New Concept of Security” and implementing the “Anti-Access/Area-Denial” (AD/AD) and the “The East China Sea ADIZ,” China hopes to lower the U.S.’ influence in The Asia-Pacific region.
In response to the U.S.’ Rebalance to Asia Policy, besides sovereignty issues which are difficult to compromise on, regarding other issues China chose to have a peaceful dialogue while ramping of its military presence at the same time. However, on the dispute in the East China Sea, the U.S. announced that the Senkaku Islands are covered by the Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. security pact, which authorizes the U.S. to protect Japan in the event of an armed attack in the territories under the administration of Japan.
Hence China further declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea and increased the risks of a military clash. Additionally, the South China Sea dispute also has become both a military and international issue. Efforts to manage and contain tensions in the South China Sea are involving players beyond the territorial claimants— including China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
As for economic aspect, there are 7 countries that are both members of TPP and RCEP. After five years of talks, the TPP negotiators reached a deal on October 5, 2015 which is ahead of the process of the RCEP negotiations, hence China will focus on speed up the process of RCEP negotiations in order to maintain its competiveness.
On the diplomatic aspect, the former President Hu Jintao proposed to develop a new type of great power relations which can be mutually beneficial and through cooperation
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is a win-win situation.
For Taiwan, The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) guides U.S. policy in making available to Taiwan, defense articles and defense services for its “self-defense.”
Militarily speaking, there is much room for Taiwan to make adjustments under the U.S.’
Rebalance to Asia Policy. For the most part, Taiwan is only able the follow the arms sale policies agreed upon with the U.S. to enhance its defense capabilities. On December 16, 2015, the U.S. government announced that it will sell about $1.83 billion worth of military equipment to Taiwan, which is the first new sale of military hardware in more than four years. As far as the aspect of diplomacy is concerned, since Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, China has a big influence on restraining Taiwan’s international presence. Taiwan may have to maintain stable and friendly Cross-Straits relations in order to have any opportunity to breakthrough improve its status internationally. Economically, Taiwan relies heavily on exports, additionally, as global economies continue to fluctuate, it is more important that Taiwan can continue to use China to stabilize and even boost its GDP and also actively join Regional economic cooperation efforts such as the TPP and the RCEP.
In addition, diplomatically, being between the two super powers, it is very important for Taiwan to show its value. When the U.S. and China are competing with each other, they will both try to attract states to stand on their side. For Taiwan’s interests, its best to maintain mutual relationships with various countries, including the U.S., China and Japan to balance the competition and cooperation between the U.S. and China.
Currently the Sino-U.S. relations is more of a competitive relationship rather than one of cooperation as both countries engagement policies show that the U.S. and China still distrust each other. The U.S. supports Taiwan and China to ease Cross-Strait
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tensions and welcome more inter-exchange and dialogue. However, the U.S. would not be happy to see Taiwan and China to have further strategic cooperation and change the current situation. In the future, we can expect that Taiwan will end up like most countries is Southeast Asia as having to balance themselves between the two super powers with not a lot of room to maneuver. In addition, since Taiwan and China have had more consensus on less sensitive issues, it seems like the two sides of the Cross-Straits will continue to have more progress economically, and further financial cooperation, cultural and educational exchange.
Generally speaking, the Obama administration will focus on fulfilling its Rebalance to Asia policy, including to support FTA’s, combating global terrorism and deepening cooperative efforts with its allies in the Asia Pacific region. In addition, the U.S. will still try to play an important role in regional affairs, not only on economic issues, but also on security issues as well. Through the Rebalance to Asia policy, by connecting South East Asian countries, the U.S. continues to adjust its strategic deployment in order to expand its influence in the region and secure its national interests.
As the impact to the Cross-Strait relations under the U.S. Rebalance to Asia policy, the U.S. has given both China and Taiwan strategic reassurances. For China, in a meeting regarding the Taiwan issue, with Xi Jinping at the White House in September 2015, President Obama reaffirmed the One-China policy based on the Three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. For Taiwan, the Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Susan Thornton, has referred to Taiwan as a vital partner for the United States in Asia. In addition, President Obama recognized Taiwan’s efforts in the global fight against terrorism by addressing Taiwan as a member of a global coalition to counter the Islamic State. During his speech at
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the East Asia summit in Kuala Lumpur, he also named Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and South Korea as partners in the US’ anti-terrorism efforts. However he did not mention China, which implied that the U.S.
doesn’t see China as its ally on this matter.
The impact on diplomacy the U.S. Rebalance to Asia policy has had on Cross-Strait has been beneficial and has fostered more peace and stability in the region. For example, based on the East China Sea Peace Initiative, Taiwan signed a fisheries agreement with Japan in 2013 and successfully resolved the East China Sea fishing dispute. Based on the success of East China Sea Peace Initiative, on May 26, 2015 Taiwan further proposed the South China Sea Peace Initiative and signed a maritime law enforcement cooperation agreement with the Philippines on November 5, 2015.
Both agreements have helped ease the fisheries disputes in the region, particularly in the overlapping areas of exclusive economic zones. The East China Sea and South China Sea Peace Initiatives have created a vision of "Peace in the Three Seas" that extends from the Taiwan Strait to the East China Sea and from there, into the South China Sea.
The U.S. Rebalance to Asia policy has impacted the economies and trade of countries in the region, Taiwan has signed two FTAs with Singapore and New Zealand.
The U.S. Rebalance to Asia policy has impacted the economies and trade of countries in the region, Taiwan has signed two FTAs with Singapore and New Zealand.