Chapter V: Potential Development of Cross-Strait Relations under the U.S. Rebalance
5.2 Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Policy under President Ma Ying-jeou
5.2.1 President Ma Ying-jeou’s Cross-Strait Policy
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off contact between the SEF and the ARATS. In the year 2000 Taiwan had its first transfer of power between political parties. The new president Chen Shui-bian did not endorse the 1992 Consensus. At the same time, he advocated a policy of "one country on each side" and launched a referendum seeking R.O.C membership in the United Nations. During President Chen's eight-year tenure, the PRC refused to continue institutionalized Cross-Strait negotiations.3
Taiwan's 2008 elections brought another transfer of political power. Four days after President Ma Ying-jeou was elected, on March 26, Hu Jintao and former U.S.
President George W. Bush proposed that "Mainland China and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, which sees both sides a recognizing that there is only one China, but that they agree to differ on its definition." Hence, in May 2008 the SEF and the ARATS announced that they would resume the institutionalized Cross-Strait negotiations based on the 1992 Consensus.
In June, the two sides agreed to commence direct flights and allow Mainland Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, which was a major step in Cross-Strait relations.4
5.2 Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Policy under President Ma Ying-jeou
5.2.1 President Ma Ying-jeou’s Cross-Strait Policy
After President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, he has tried to maintain the status quo based on "no unification, no independence, and no use of force" in the Taiwan Strait under the framework of the R.O.C Constitution and to promote the peaceful development of Cross-Strait ties under the 1992 Consensus. Over the past eight years,
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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the two sides have signed 23 agreements that are related to the livelihood of the public.
These 23 agreements include the three direct links and Cross-Strait direct air transport, tourism between Taiwan and China, food safety, medical and health cooperation, joint crime-fighting, and economic cooperation.5
In addition, President Ma Ying-jeou believes that if Taiwan can shelve its disputes and avoid provoking China, China will in turn through its goodwill, allow for Taiwan to have more international space unencumbered. It seems like for President Ma Ying-jeou, the China policy is more important than its foreign policy. As long as Taiwan accepts the 1992 Consensus, Taiwan and China can work together. Additionally, he also adapted that so-called Flexible Diplomacy and Diplomatic Truce policy which stopped the engagement of vicious diplomatic competition with PRC and avoided
“checkbook diplomacy.” The above-mentioned diplomatic policy also eased doubts of Taiwan being a troublemaker the U.S had. Despite the fact that President Ma Ying-jeou has still emphasized Taiwan’s interpretation of the so-called “One China” as being The Republic of China, which is totally different from PRC’s interpretation.
In the first term of his Presidency, President Ma Ying-jeou focused more on economic aspects of how dialogue with China could present Taiwan with opportunities, especially with regard to opening direct flights between China. Since Taiwan’s economic growth heavily relied on trade with China, and coupled with a strong desire to create a new era of peace and shared prosperity with China, President Ma did his utmost not to provoke China. In an interview to El Sol de Mexico on August 26, 2008, President Ma further mentioned that the two sides of the Taiwan-Strait have a special
5 Ibid.
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relation, but not anything that could be construed as being state to state relations.6 In an interview with CNN on April 30, 2010, President Ma said that Mainland China has been a threat to Taiwan for 60 years, and the reason his government decided to improve relations with Mainland China was to try to reduce the tension across the Taiwan Strait by means other than the military. So it was very important to ease the tensions and to reduce the atmosphere of hostility and the way of achieving it was not just to engage in an arms race.7
Generally speaking, President Ma Ying-jeou thinks that economic integration is the best way to solve political conflicts. Facing the pressure of re-election, President Ma Ying-jeou further stated the idea of “mutual non-recognition of sovereignty, and mutual non-denial of governing authority.” Additionally, he intended to expand on the idea of a peace dividend from solely an economical aspect and shift it into the political realm as well.
In President Ma Ying-jeou’s re-election inauguration speech in 2012, he once again reiterated that the government will pursue the development of Cross-Strait peace under the framework of the R.O.C Constitution, by maintaining the status quo of "no unification, no independence, and no use of force" in accordance with the "1992 Consensus,” whereby each side acknowledges the existence of "one China" but maintains its own interpretation of what that means. In addition, Cross-Strait relations would be promoted under the principles of addressing "easy issues before difficult ones," "urgent matters before non-urgent ones," and "economic matters before
6 Xian-jun Peng, “President Ma: Cross-Strait is not state-to-state relations, it is a special relations.,”
Liberty Times Net, September 4, 2008. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/240207
7 CNN’s Amanpour, “Interview with Taiwan's Preisdent,” CNN, April 30, 2010. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1004/30/ampr.01.html
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political ones."8