Chapter III: Competition and Cooperation between the U.S. and the PRC under the
3.3 From the Aspect of Diplomacy
3.3.2 East China Sea and South China Sea Issues
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slogan it would send the wrong signal to any American allies in Asia and potentially weaken the dominant U.S. position in the region; but rejecting the slogan outright would make cooperation with China on a wide range of issues very difficult, if not impossible.
This dilemma is rooted in conflicting interpretations by the U.S. and China of the slogan’s meaning. What China wants to achieve with the slogan is to increase its status and influence, while the U.S. views a “new type of major power relations” as finding solutions to global problems.
How can China and the U.S. narrow their interpretations of what a “new type of major power relations” actually means? Assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau suggested that first, the U.S. must acknowledge China’s growing influence by gradually sharing power with China. For China, it should be clear that the U.S. will remain a superpower for many years to come, and thus it is unwise to challenge the U.S. directly or attempt to force the U.S. out of Asia. This also means that China should continue to respect U.S. hegemony in Asia while also seeking to increase its own influence. China will probably not be able to comprehensively compete against the U.S. until the 2040s, even though China’s overall GDP might surpass U.S. GDP at an earlier time.21
3.3.2 East China Sea and South China Sea Issues
The East China Sea is one of the last unexplored high-potential resource areas. But the development of oil and gas in the area has been prevented for decades by conflicting claims to boundaries by China, Taiwan and Japan. Competition between China and
21 Ding-Ding Chen, “Defining a ‘New Type of Major Power Relations’,” The Diplomat, November 8, 2014. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/defining-a-new-type-of-major-power-relations/
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Japan for gas resources in the East China Sea is intensifying and damaging improved relations. The conflicts between the U.S. and China are mainly caused by the issue of the sovereignty of The Senkaku Islands. Although the U.S. is not directly claiming sovereignty of the islands, its American ally Japan, has compelled the U.S. to respond clearly on this issue. By the U.S. showing its support for Japan publicly, China in turn, has responded with a tougher and more aggressive approach towards dealing with issues in The East China Sea.
Figure 3.2:Location of Senkaku Islands
Source: BBC http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-19264633
Based on the principle of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Japan expanded it claim to the waters under the jurisdiction of The Senkaku Islands in 1996. However, Japan’s boundry has overlapped with the boundaries of Taiwan and China and it has received protests regarding it. In September 2010, a fishing boat registered in China had a collision
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with a Japan Coast Guard vessel. The captain of the boat was arrested by the Japanese Coast Guard and China showed high concern about this incident.22 Since then both China and Japan had several protests lead by civilians. In September 2012, Japan confirmed that it intended to purchase the disputed Senkaku islands. "This is just the ownership of land, which is part of Japan's territory, moving from private ownership to the state, and should not cause any problem for other countries," Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura said. China immediately denounced the plan as illegal and warned it will affect ties.23 In August 2012, a group of 14 pro-China activists had sailed from Hong Kong and landed on The Senkaku islands but were later arrested by Japanese police. It was the first time non-Japanese nationals had landed on the disputed islands since 2004.24 Tensions between China and Japan have been rumbling since this incident and 50 cities in China occurred protested against Japan. Due to the conflicts regarding The Senkaku islands, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe won the election and diplomatic policies (toward China) turned tough.
In September 2010, the former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea are covered by the Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. security pact. The article authorizes the U.S. to protect Japan in the event of an armed attack “in the territories under the administration of Japan.” The former U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said that the U.S. encourages dialogue and hopes that the issue can be resolved soon since relations between Japan
22 Justin McCurry, “Japan-China row escalates over fishing boat collision,” The Guardian, December 20, 2010. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/09/japan-china-fishing-boat-collision
23 BBC News, “Japan confirms disputed islands purchase plan,” BBC News, September 10, 2012.
Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19540469
24 BBC News, “Japan arrests pro-China activist swimmers in island row,” BBC News, August 15, 2012.
Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-19264633
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and China are vitally important to regional stability.”25
In November 2013, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, including the The Senkaku Islands. Beijing threatened to use its military to enforce the ADIZ. Washington condemned this declaration as a provocative act that it exacerbated tensions in the region and increased the risks of a military clash. In April 2014, during his trip to Japan, President Obama publicly affirmed the long-standing U.S. policy that its bilateral security treaty with Japan applies to the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands as well. President Obama stated
“let me reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, and Article 5 of the bilateral security treaty covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands.”26
As for the South China Sea, instead of interfering directly via military or political power, the U.S. tends to make public remarks while its allies’ speak. The U.S. ally, The Philippines took the step to cooperate with the U.S. on the South China Sea issues.
In 2001, The Philippines renamed The South China Sea the "West Philippine Sea" and removed some Chinese sea markers in disputed waters and the Filipinos also claimed that the proposal was symbolic. It was meant to show to the world that their claims to the Spratly Islands are legitimate.27 In 2012, The Philippines encountered conflicts on the waters off of Huangyan Island and China refused to deal with the issue through
25 The Japan Times, “Clinton: Senkakus subject to security pact,” The Japan Times, September 25, 1010. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/09/25/national/clinton-senkakus-subject-to-security-pact/#.Vni-iPl97GI
26 Bruce Klingner, “Amid Chinese Aggression, Obama Affirms U.S. Defense of Japan’s Senkaku Islands,”
The Daily Signal, April 24, 2014. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://dailysignal.com/2014/04/24/amid-chinese-aggression-obama-affirms-u-s-defense-japans-senkaku-islands/
27 Javad Heydarian, “The West Philippine Sea?,” The Diplomat, December 15, 2011. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2011/12/the-west-philippine-sea/
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diplomatic and economic sanctions against The Philippines.28 The new Chinese map, which was first published January 2012 by China's state mapping authority featured 10 dash lines instead of nine dash lines to mark out a huge swath of the South China Sea in a tongue-shaped encirclement as Chinese territory. Nine dashes in the new Chinese map are in the South China Sea and a tenth dash has been placed near Taiwan.The Philippines has sought international arbitration and asked a tribunal formed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to declare China's massive territorial claim as illegal and invalid.29 As for China, the response from the U.S. is far more important than from The Philippines. After the U.S.
announced its Rebalance to Asia Policy, the U.S. has deepened its military and diplomatic cooperation relations with countries in The South East Asia. China considers that there are three reasons for the U.S. expansion of its influence in the region.
Firstly, Taiwan also claims sovereignty over The South China Sea, therefore the U.S.
can use it as an excuse to be involved with the Taiwan issue. Secondly, by increasing the influence in the western Pacific Ocean, it will secure American’s ships to pass through the area. Thirdly, by constraining the expansion of China, the U.S. can strategically surround China with a chain of islands making it more difficult for China to step further into The South China Sea and becoming a future super power.30
28 Hui Wu, “Tribunals Cannot Solve the Huangyan Island Issue.” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, May 22, 2012. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://ph.chineseembassy.org/eng/xwfb/t935929.htm
29 Michaela Del Callar, “China's new '10-dash line map' eats into Philippine territory,” GMA News Online, July 26, 2013. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/319303/news/nation/china-s-new-10-dash-line-map-eats-into-philippine-territory
30 Fu-Kuo Liu, “The Implications to Asia Pacific Region under the U.S. military strategic adjustment ,”
International Situation and China Development Assessment report ( Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Cheng Chi University, 2011), p.4.
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Chapter IV
The Benefits to Taiwan and Taiwan’s Response to the U.S.
Rebalance to Asia Policy
As I mentioned earlier, the content of the U.S.’ Rebalance to Asia Policy includes political diplomacy, military and economic aspects. Regarding the military aspects, there is not much room for Taiwan to make adjustments. For the most part, Taiwan is only able the follow the arms sale policies agreed upon with the U.S. to enhance its defense capabilities. As far the aspect of diplomacy is concerned, since Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, China has a big influence on restraining Taiwan’s international presence. Taiwan may have to maintain stable and friendly Cross-Straits relations in order to have any opportunity to breakthrough improve its status internationally. Economically, as global economies continue to fluctuate, it is more important that Taiwan can continue to use China to stabilize and even boost its GDP.
Moreover, even after signing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010 which was designed to further solidify economic relations between the two countries, a stable economic environment is not yet guaranteed as the negotiation process is still ongoing. In fact, it’s imperative that the negotiation process is sped up to try to negate the effects of the Free Trade Agreements (FTA’s) signed between Korea and China which will indeed have adverse economic effects on Taiwan’s economy.
Additionally Taiwan also needs to find its way into the TPP and RCEP to further maintain its competitiveness.
The Rebalance to Asia Policy of President Obama’s second term aimed to enhance U.S. relationships with its allies including Japan, Australia and South Korea, actively
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involve itself in disputed regions in Asia such as The East and South China Seas, increase cooperation with India, Vietnam and Myanmar and strengthen its existence in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).1 We understand that the Rebalance to Asia Policy also affects Taiwan militarily, economically and diplomatically. In this chapter I will analyze these three aspects.