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Chapter V: Potential Development of Cross-Strait Relations under the U.S. Rebalance

5.2 Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Policy under President Ma Ying-jeou

5.2.3 Ma-Xi Summit

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Regarding the critics of free trade agreements, the students worried that the CSSTA, as a consequence of capitalist globalization, would endanger the livelihood of the middle and lower classes with a rather strong sense of “relative deprivation.” From 2010 to 2011, Taiwan had a short period of economic recovery; but the living conditions of most people did not improve because of unequal distribution.

In general, the KMT believed that in order to maintain economic growth, Taiwan must have close ties with China. Although one of the main reasons that caused the Sunflower Movement was due to the overall mistrust of China, other the domestic issues such as the widening of the wealth gap, low salaries, high housing prices and confusion with regards to Taiwan’s national identity were also issues the students protested to draw attention from the public.

5.2.3 Ma-Xi Summit

On November 7, 2015 the leaders of China and Taiwan met for the first time since the formerly bitter Cold War foes split amid civil war 66 years ago, and though no concrete agreement resulted, both hailed the meeting as a sign of a new stability in relations. After the meeting, President Ma Ying-jeou had a press conference to report the achievements of the meeting. Firstly, the meeting consolidated the 1992 Consensus and maintained peace across the Taiwan Strait. President Ma mentioned that Taiwan will continue to consolidate the 1992 Consensus of “one China, respective interpretations” as the basis for relations. In addition, Taiwan’s interpretation does not involve two Chinas; one China, one Taiwan; or Taiwan independence, as the Republic of China Constitution does not allow it.13

13 Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), “Opening remarks by President Ma at an international press conference following meeting with mainland Chinese leader Xi Jinping in

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Secondly, the meeting reduced hostility and was a further step towards peaceful resolution of disputes. President Ma made special mention of the frustrations the Taiwanese have had when participating in NGO activities, as well as the interventions the Taiwanese government has faced when taking part in regional economic integration and other international activities. President Ma also stated that many people in Taiwan are concerned about Mainland China’s military deployments against Taiwan.14

Thirdly, the expansion of Cross-Strait exchanges and its mutual benefits. President Ma also reiterated Taiwan’s interest in participating in regional economic integration. President Xi in response, expressed a willingness to discuss this issue and welcomed Taiwan’s participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Mainland China’s “one belt, one road” initiative.15

Fourthly, the establishment of a Cross-Strait hotline. President Ma mentioned that a hotline should be set up between the Mainland Affairs Council Minister and the Taiwan Affairs Office Minister, so that they could then exchange views on important or urgent issues. President. Xi stated that this matter would be promptly dealt with.16

The Cross-Strait leaders meeting attracted considerable attention, although some people thought that the Ma-Xi Summit was more symbolic than substance, however, this meeting still reached several historical achievements:

1) A milestone in relations between China and Taiwan: the meeting was the first between Taiwanese and Chinese leaders since 1949 and authorities in China

Singapore.” Singapore. November 7, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=36085&rmid=2355

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

predicted it would be a “major historic milestone” in the development of Cross-Strait relations. In addition, the meeting in Singapore was certainly not a low-key meeting fitted into a side conversation or as an ancillary part of some larger event. Instead, the meeting was officially acknowledged by the PRC, complete with photographs, which occurred at a third-party venue, in a foreign country.17

2) Cross-Straits relations move towards stability: the Ma-Xi Summit should also be seen as an effort to consolidate the gains made over the past seven years, as well as to put in place a framework for further development following Taiwan's elections in January. Whoever is elected Taiwan's leader, and in all likelihood, it will be the Democratic Progressive Party candidate Tsai Ing-wen the meeting made it much more difficult to roll back the bridges that have been built across the Taiwan Strait.18

3) The upgrade Taiwan’s international status and drawing attention from the international community: the Ma-Xi Summit allowed a Taiwanese president to give an international press conference outside Taipei, something that hadn’t occurred in years and which placed Taiwan squarely at the center of international politics. This was certainly a success for President Ma, who agreed to meet the press after the meeting.19 In addition, after the Summit,

17 Wendell Minnick, “Analysis: Was Ma-Xi Meeting a Historic Summit or Farewell Dinner?,”

DefenseNews, November 15, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asia-pacific/2015/11/13/analysis-ma-xi-meeting-historic-summit-farewell-dinner/75694816/

18 David Shambaugh, “Xi-Ma summit sends pointed message that cross-strait relations are now too strong to roll back,” South China Morning Post, November 10, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1877422/xi-ma-summit-sends-pointed-message-cross-strait-relations

19 Michael Cole, ” The Ma-Xi Summit: Democracy is Thicker than Blood,” The National Interest, November 9, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ma-‧

Indonesian President Joko Widodo included Taiwan among the areas of focus for a new official tasked with drawing more investment from overseas.

Meanwhile, the chairman of Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory Commission, Tseng Ming-chung, has been invited on trips to Vietnam and Indonesia -- the first such trips by the top markets regulator. Tseng Ming-chung also added that “Non-political allies are now more willing to engage in communication after they witnessed the leaders’ summit in Singapore.”20

4) The PRC shows goodwill to Taiwan: expecting the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Tsai Ing-wen to be Ma’s successor as president may be the main concern that motivated President Xi to set the extraordinary precedent of arranging such a meeting between Taiwan and China. Though they addressed each other only as “Mister,” that political fiction did not hide the reality of Xi’s flattery of Taiwan.21 Additionally, President Xi made a big stride forward by welcoming Taiwan to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the

"One Belt, One Road" initiative. By participating, Taiwan would not only be able to work closely with the mainland but also get to know the other participants that come from Asia and other parts of the world.22

xi-summit-democracy-thicker-blood-14293

20 Adela Lin & Debra Mao, “From Facebook to Trade, Taiwan Sees Warmer Welcome After Xi Meet,”

Bloomberg Business, November 27, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-26/from-facebook-to-trade-taiwan-sees-warmer-welcome-after-xi-meet

21 Robert A. Manning, “Deciphering the big China-Taiwan meeting,” The National Interest, November 13, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://nationalinterest.org/feature/deciphering-the-big-china-taiwan-meeting-14311

22 Cheong-Leen Hilton, “Cross-strait relations set to strengthen, no matter who wins the Taiwanese presidential elections,” South China Morning Post, November 20, 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from

http://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/1880795/cross-strait-relations-set-strengthen-no-matter-who-wins-taiwanese

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5.3 The Influence to Cross-Strait Relations and the Potential