Chapter III: Competition and Cooperation between the U.S. and the PRC under the
4.1 From the Aspect of National Security
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involve itself in disputed regions in Asia such as The East and South China Seas, increase cooperation with India, Vietnam and Myanmar and strengthen its existence in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).1 We understand that the Rebalance to Asia Policy also affects Taiwan militarily, economically and diplomatically. In this chapter I will analyze these three aspects.
4.1
From the Aspect of National Security4.1.1 East China Sea and South China Sea Issues
Generally speaking, the U.S. has traditionally taken a neutral position on The East and South China Sea issues. However, it has had strategic relevance to the U.S. as the Strait of Malacca is the main gate for the U.S. to enter the Indian Ocean.
According to Richard Rousseau, two-way trade makes the China South Sea the busiest sea in the world, linking the regions of Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca. Approximately 60,000 ships pass through it each year, representing almost half of marine transportation worldwide in terms of tonnage. Half of the world’s oil supplies and two-thirds (66 percent) of exported natural gas are transported through the South China Sea as well.2
Hence, in order to maintain its national interests, the U.S. is highly concerned about the safety and freedom of navigation in the region. After the 911 incident, the U.S.
1 Fu-Sheng Zeng, “The U.S. Asia-pacific Rebalance to Asia Policy development analysis,” National Policy Foundation, August 29, 2013. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.npf.org.tw/2/12643?County=%25E8%2587%25BA%25E5%258C%2597%25E5%25B8%
2582&site=
2 Richard Rousseau, “South China Sea: Rising Tensions but No Permanent Solutions on the Horizon,”
Foreign Policy Journal, Sep 16, 2011. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/09/16/south-china-sea-rising-tensions-but-no-permanent-solutions-on-the-horizon/
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used anti-terror as a chance to adjust its strategic deployment, enhance military cooperation with its allies and build multiple safety mechanisms in the region. In 2002, the U.S. signed an anti-terrorism accord with 10 members of ASEAN to strengthen regional security ties and further increase its presence in Southeast Asia. In 2009, the U.S. announced a return to a focus on Asia and began a process of using different methods to balance the influence of China. The South China Sea is the core of Asia-Pacific region and the gate way connecting the Asia-Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. By the U.S. involving itself more in the South China Sea dispute, it has both elevated the issue to a more international status while at the same time, also aims to constrain the development of China’ hegemony in the region. Additionally, it is a cause that can also help the U.S. to maintain leading status and relevance in the region.3
For a long period of time, the U.S. maintained large garrison in East Asia.
According to the BBC, Washington plans to deploy a second Aircraft carrier battle group near the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait to enhance its strategic power on the Pacific Ocean.4 In addition, the U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: An independent Assessment pointed out that currently, the U.S.’ force
posture is heavily tilted toward Northeast Asia towards Korea and Japan, where it focuses primarily on deterring the threat of major conflicts on the Korean peninsula, off Japan, and in the Taiwan Strait. However, as evidenced by recent Chinese activities in the South China Sea and throughout the Pacific islands, the stakes are quickly being raised in Southern and Southeast Asia. To be successful, U.S. strategic rebalancing
3 Murray Hiebert & Jeremiah Magpile, “Comprehensive Partnership Nudges U.S.-Indonesia Relations to New Levels of Cooperation,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, September 28, 2012.
Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://csis.org/publication/comprehensive-partnership-nudges-us-indonesia-relations-new-levels-cooperation
4 BBC News, “U.S. will increase military forces deployed in Asia Pacific to deal with China,” BBC Chinese News, October 4, 2012. Retrieved 10 January 2016, from
http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese_news/2012/10/121004_pentagon_china.shtml
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needs to do more in those areas, while simultaneously working with major allies in Northeast Asia to shore up deterrence capabilities in the wake of emerging anti-access and area denial (AD/AD) threats. Hence, the U.S. navy will adjust its troops and deploy aircraft carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific Ocean, which will make the troop scale in Asia-Pacific region exceed that of Europe’s for the first time.5
A stronger connection with Japan can increase the influence the U.S. has to maintain regional safety. Japan has common interests with the U.S. to keep the region stable and maintain the freedom of navigation. In addition, the U.S. maintains relationships with all other related states in Southeast Asia. At present, the U.S.
continues to keep its military relationships with the Philippines and Thailand, and it has also, signed military treaties with Indonesia and Malaysia. The U.S. not only focuses on fulfilling those Southeast Asia states’ national interests, but also provides military equipment, technology and information. In recent history, the U.S. has maintained a somewhat neutral position regarding the South China Sea dispute, but as part of its Rebalance to Asia Policy, the U.S. has gradually changed its position of neutrality to one of high concern and has actively put the dispute in the international spotlight which is very undesirable for China. China is concerned that as the South China Sea dispute garners more and more international attention, it will be forced to solve the issues according to international legal processes and may even have to concede its claims on the region to other countries such as Japan, Vietnam, The Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia who also have claims of their own on the region which so far, it has ignored and wants to avoid at any cost. In addition, through the U.S. Rebalance to Asia Policy, the U.S. may directly and indirectly influence the solution of the South China Sea
5 David J. Berteau & Michael J. Green, U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An independent Assessment (Washington D.C: Center For Strategic & International Studies, 2012), p.5.
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dispute.
4.1.2 U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan
A report titled China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment points out that the rise of China has had a great impact on the
Japan-U.S. alliance and the security of the region. For the coming 15 to 20 years, the potential challenge is how China will attempt to expel U.S. forces out of Asia. China may not have to resort to military action but instead China may gradually have more of an influence on how the dispute is resolved with its increasing military and elevation to a truly global superpower status.6
If we look at recent events China has used its naval power, to break the limitation of the first island chain and expand its influence further to eastern shores of Taiwan, which not only will threaten Japan strategically, but also threatens Taiwan in the sense that China’s encroachment increases its range of attack on Taiwan. Hence, Taiwan has had to make adjustments to it defense strategy and deployment. The U.S.’ Rebalance to Asia Policy requires alliances and partnerships. The U.S. expanded military cooperation with The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia Singapore and other Oceania states. However, Taiwan has not been involved in any of the military cooperation or exercises, therefore, it seems like Taiwan’s geostrategic position is not as important as it was before.
Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region have increased their responsibility to
6 Michael D. Swaine, Mike M. Mochizuki, Michael L. Brown, Paul S. Giarra, Douglas H. Paal, Rachel Esplin Odell, Raymond Lu, Oliver Palmer, Xu Ren, China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013)
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maintain security in the region and the U.S. has also had a hand in helping enhance its allies’ ability to share in the responsibility. As for Taiwan, The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) guides U.S. policy in making available to Taiwan defense articles and defense services for its “self-defense.” U.S. leadership and credibility regarding the “Rebalance”
to Asia requires decisive, urgent action regarding Taiwan. That policy should include tangible follow-up actions to support Taiwan, maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific, and help Taiwan avoid coercion and conflict. Since President Ma Ying-jeou took office seven years ago, the U.S. has sold a total of $18.3 billion worth of arms to Taiwan.7
On December 16, 2015 the U.S. government announced that it will sell about $1.83 billion worth of military equipment to Taiwan, the first new sale in more than four years, although the sale is likely to cause a rift in Washington’s relationship with Beijing.
The Chinese government could cancel some upcoming military exchanges with the U.S., as it has done in the past. China could also try to punish U.S. defense firms that are involved with the arms sales through sanctions, however, the involvement of such firms in Chinese government business is limited. The Project 2049 Institute, an Asia-focused think tank in Washington found that the Chinese retaliatory measures are temporary and the two sides always go back to business as usual.8
7 Shirley Kan, “Time for the US to Get Clear on Taiwan Arms Sales,” The Diplomat, July 10, 2015.
Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/time-for-the-us-to-get-clear-on-taiwan-arms-sales/
8 Josh Rogin, “U.S. Preparing New Arms Sales to Taiwan,” Bloomberg View, November 25, 2015.
Retrieved 10 January 2016, from http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-25/u-s-preparing-new-arms-sales-to-taiwan
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