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to the highest decision makers are far more likely to be able to apply influence, and even more so if their opinions match these practitioners’ preferences. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007)
2.3 Peripheral Actors in Chinese Foreign Policy
In past eras, characterised by far greater centralisation and personalised decision making than now, peripheral actors in Chinese foreign policy decision making could be cast aside as almost entirely irrelevant, with the exception of the People’s Liberation Army, long an influential actor within Chinese politics. (Roy, 1998) However, since the earlier phases of China’s foreign policy decision making, “The number of actors involved in developing China’s foreign policy has grown considerably… with more governmental and non-governmental actors having a real or potential voice in the process.” (Lanteigne, 2009: 20) In other words, not only has the formal system of decision making expanded and institutionalised over time, drawing in more Party and government actors than ever before, non-governmental actors are also on the increase, both in terms of number and also degree of influence.
This evolution is as a result of both reforms within China’s own political and bureaucratic mechanisms, as well as a growing complexity in global affairs, leading to a more diverse and complex backdrop against which policy makers are obliged to navigate. Glaser and Saunders (2002) put it succinctly: “As a consequence of the changed internal and external environment, a larger and more diverse set of Chinese actors now operates in a competitive and pluralistic milieu to analyse international affairs and influence foreign policy.” (p. 598) This is a new trend and it is shaping and
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evolving at present. As Zhu (2009) remarks, “There has been no mature market for consultancy services in policy making until now.”In other words, the demand for foreign policy consultation is now growing, and many actors are now stepping in to supply this service.
Whilst the key decision-makers are governmental and Party bodies, in particular the upper echelons, there is an increasingly diverse range of military and non-governmental actors influencing the creation of foreign policy. Major actors still include the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Central Military Affairs Commission (CMAC), which tend to promote issues of security: “the PLA appears especially sensitive to what may be construed as challenges to Chinese sovereignty or indirect threats to national security.” (Roy, 1998: 72) In addition to its direct role in decision making, denoted by the presence of PLA leadership in FALSG, the PLA plays an additional peripheral role as an ‘interest group’ in its own right, also boasting of several research institutes designed to provide information and analysis. (Gill and Mulvenon, 2002) However, the influence of the PLA is perhaps relatively reduced in comparison to earlier decades (Lanteigne, 2009); a cause of deep consternation for the military.
With the prominent growth of both civil society interest groups and the private business sector in China, the voices of actors such as businesses and NGOs are also being increasingly heard, promoting the interests of the markets as well as civil concerns.(Deng and Wang, 2005; Lai, 2010) Civil society generally tends to influence domestic approaches, with knock-on impacts on foreign policy. And as globalisation turns the world ‘flat’, Chinese enterprises are increasingly involved in international affairs. The concerns of big successful Chinese businesses may also hold sway for foreign policy decision makers. (Lanteigne, 2009; Lai 2010) Although the Chinese
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authorities are particularly sensitive about certain subjects, in particular calls for democratisation or Westernisation, the scope for civil society groups to proffer their viewpoints is on the increase. (Lai, 2010) Even the Chinese public are beginning to garner some influence, particularly through the explosion in internet usage which gives netizens more access to foreign policy actions and a platform to debate ideas and collectively influence the perceptions of the Chinese leadership. (Lanteigne, 2009)
Finally, well-educated academics and analysts are increasingly wielding their influence over China’s foreign policy direction. This is also a relatively new trend in foreign policy decision making; research products by even large academic institutes such as CASS were rejected as largely irrelevant by many analysts of Chinese foreign policy. (Zhu, 2009) Historically speaking, intellectuals have been much-maligned in China, and even up to the era of Deng Xiaoping the leadership demonstrated mistrust of academics. (Lu, 1997) This has shown a marked change in recent years, and it is now important to take into consideration academics’ views and analyses when considering China’s foreign policies. Shambaugh (2002) notes, for example, that “ministerial level officials increasingly turn to their affiliated think tanks for policy research and advice.”
(p. 575) Some academics are better-placed than civil society and business groups to influence foreign policy decisions and perceptions due to their formal affiliations with policy making bodies.
As Lanteigne (2009) summarises, “As China further assumes its place in the international system, the number of non-governmental actors, including individuals and groups, who are involved with, influence or are knowledgeable of foreign policy has continued to grow.” (p. 28) Although these actors are on the rapid increase, as Glaser and Medeiros (2009) point out, they began at a very low base. As such, despite this
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growth, external, non-governmental actors may currently wield less influence than their counterparts in other countries. In particular, civil society interest groups remain marginal. However, the military, enterprise, and academia are now beginning to really make their presence felt. In order to truly understand the Chinese foreign policy decision making process as a whole, it is no longer possible to overlook these peripheral actors and the part they play in the entire decision making process. An in-depth look at different peripheral actors is invaluable for a better understanding of the dynamics of China’s foreign policy.
This chapter has given an overview of China’s foreign policy decision making. After the PRC was established in 1949, decision making in all fields has followed an evolutionary path from high centralisation and personalism to a greater degree of decentralisation and institutionalisation. In terms of institutionalisation, foreign policy is created within a hierarchical structure; the CCP Politburo Standing Committee is at the pinnacle, followed by the FALSG (Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group). Although the Politburo Standing Committee retains the ultimate decision making power, whereas FALSG is technically classified as a policy consultation organ, it is in fact FALSG which is mainly responsible for foreign policy decision making, as well as delegating tasks such as implementation and micro policy making through its ‘CPU’ – the Foreign Affairs Office.
Tasks are implemented to the many ministries and offices which have an impact or interest in foreign affairs, including such important bodies as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and the Ministry of Commerce (MofCOM). In turn these organs pass on information and recommendations to decision makers through the Foreign Affairs
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Office. As such, when analysing the dynamics of foreign policy decision making, taking note of this ‘up the ladder’ and ‘down the ladder’ institutional arrangement is crucial.
Nevertheless, although these formal, institutionalised structures have been put in place in foreign policy decision making, this sensitive field still remains one of the most personalist and centralised within political decision making. During the time of Mao and Deng, the paramount leader was able to make policy decisions almost single-handedly; whilst this era is over, the informal hierarchy of seniority prevalent in the Chinese culture and engrained into the bureaucracy means that, despite institutionalisation, ‘juniors’ in the hierarchy will generally defer to senior decision makers. At the apex of this informal hierarchy is the decision making nucleus, revolving around the president Hu Jintao. Thus, in addition to understanding the formal structure, analysis of foreign policy influences and dynamics involves taking into account the effect of this personalism and hierarchy.
Finally, this chapter has outlined how Chinese foreign policy decision making is becoming more diversified, with an increasing number of external actors now playing their part in the overall dynamics. These players include the military, civil society, and academia. The specific role of academia will be discussed in great detail in the subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 3
China’s Evolving International Relations Academia
Amongst the growing number of actors beginning to exert influence on the formulation and exercise of China’s foreign policy, one of the most notable groups hails from the world of academia. In this research, ‘international relations academia’hereafter refers collectively to research institutes, colloquially referred to as think tanks (思想库, sixiang ku, or 智库, zhiku)1 and relevant university departments, as well as individual academics pursuing research in fields associated with international relations, all of which may wield certain clout in terms of the policymaking process. This chapter will first explain the evolution of China’s international relations academia, describing how the system has passed through several phases since its beginnings, and highlighting the differences between the Chinese system and its Western equivalents. Next, a more detailed breakdown of the system is provided, detailing the different classifications of research institute in China. Finally, this chapter lays out the roles and functions of China’s international relations research institutes, demonstrating that providing the leadership with information and policy advice is the key function of these contemporary institutions.
1 Although the common term ‘think tank’ is widely used by many scholars in both Chinese and English language research, some of whom are cited herein, this thesis deliberately favours the more neutral
‘research institute’ (except, unavoidably, in citations). This is because certain connotations are attached to the role and nature of the ‘think tank’ in Anglophone countries, which do not necessarily ring true for their Chinese counterparts. This key difference is discussed in greater detail on pages 45-46, and drawn