Informal Mechanisms

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2.2.2 Informal Mechanisms

Chinese foreign policy decision making has moved on from the days of monopolisation of power by one strong-man paramount leader, and yet the legacy of personalistic decision making lives on. Although there is a clear hierarchy of bureaucratic organs and a recognised pattern of decision making which includes coordination, consultation, supervision, delegation, and ratification up and down the ladder, it is impossible to overlook the fact that decision making is still in the hands of individual practitioners.

What’s more, due to the relatively more centralised decision making process in the sector of foreign affairs, there is also more leeway for personalistic decision making. Lu (1997) writes, “The most important characteristics of China’s foreign policy decision making are that it is highly centralised and that in terms of key decisions it is very much personalised.” (p. 76) Despite the ever-increasing institutionalisation of China’s governance and Party, personalism and hierarchy of seniority remain prevalent.

As mentioned previously, China follows the method of democratic centralism when decision making, which calls for majority consensus. However, as Lu (1997) points out, for the most important decisions, consensus alone may not be enough;

unanimity may be required. Furthermore, for some contentious issues, it may not be possible to achieve unanimity or even consensus at first. In these cases, often behind-the-scenes informal consultation and negotiation can lead to the issue being resolved. If the issue cannot be resolved in this way, the final decision falls to the most powerful decision maker. This demonstrates that, crucially, collective decisions are not made by a group of equals. An informal system of personal hierarchy also runs through the decision-making system.

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Firstly, over and above the highest rung of the formal hierarchical structure, at the very apex, is the ‘decision making nucleus.” In essence, this nucleus is led by the most powerful decision maker in China. Lu Ning (1997) considers the most powerful decision maker to be the chairman of the Central Military Affairs Commission (CMAC), as he is backed up by the armed forces. Since Jiang Zemin stepped down as the leader of the CMAC, yielding his position to Hu Jintao, this position has been associated with the presidency. Together with his closest supporters, Hu Jintao thus represents this decision making nucleus, and retains veto power over foreign affairs decisions.

(Rozman, 2013) The decision making nucleus is demonstrative of the mix of institutionalised bureaucracy and personalism prevalent in the Chinese foreign policy decision making structure. Technically speaking, the nucleus is not included in any official account of the structure. The highest official body is the Politburo Standing Committee, but the decision making nucleus nevertheless represents the most influential decision makers within that already select elite of state leaders.

Wittkopf and Jones (2008) identify three different leadership styles adopted by top foreign policy practitioners internationally, including the formalistic model, where leaders rely on institutionalisation to avoid personalism in decision making; and the competitive model, in which leaders actively induce competition between advisers in order to hear a range of opinions. These two models can be considered to be at odds with typical Chinese foreign policy decision making: firstly, although formal structures are in place, it has been identified that the field of foreign policy is so sensitive, it retains greater personalism than most other policy processes. Secondly, the Chinese political system increasingly emphasises consensus and collective leadership, with a watchword of ‘harmony’ currently pervasive. The third and final model is the collegial model, in

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which the top leader aims to promote collective decision making, which matches the Chinese approach. As such, Hu Jintao may be likened to “the hub of a wheel with spokes connecting to individual advisers and agency heads.” (Wittkopf and Jones, 2008: 501) This is an appropriate reflection of the importance of the decision making nucleus in terms of informal mechanisms. Although the formal structure appears somewhat monolithic and technocratic at the outset, informal hierarchies are also at play, with the president at the core.

The informal hierarchical arrangement is not limited to just the decision making nucleus. In addition, a similar pattern can be seen within FALSG itself. Firstly, the officials in the group are ranged between the top three levels of leadership in China: full state leader (正国级, zheng guo ji), deputy state leader (副国级, fu guo ji), and full minister (正部级, zheng bu ji). This creates a hierarchy within the group. But even amongst apparent equals – in terms of rank – there remains a hierarchy of seniority.

According to Norman Stockman (2000), Chinese society is informally based around hierarchies of authority, including within the family and within wider society. The seniority of a person in this hierarchy is derived from a number of factors which are not stated explicitly but rather are implicitly understood. Respect for this order of authority is inlaid into the functioning of Chinese society, and decision making in China can also be seen in terms of this custom. Even amongst formal equals, there is an implicit, intangible understanding of the ‘pecking order’ of authority. As Lu (1997) points out, in general within democratic centralism: ‘When the most authoritative person makes his opinion known, the rest of the members tend to concur… junior members generally would refrain from voicing a different opinion once the opinion of the most authoritative person is known.” (p. 16-17) This is typical of the hierarchy of seniority

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within Chinese society: those with more seniority wield an unspoken authority which tends to be rarely challenged.

Understanding this informal mechanism of hierarchy is crucial when attempting to fathom the process of decision-making in China. Knowledge of the official, formal system is not the full story. The hierarchy within groups of important policy practitioners is also a key to the entire procedure – although it is notoriously difficult for outsiders to clearly construe. Nonetheless, when attempting to understand why a particular policy decision may have been made, it is useful to identify the key decision makers where possible.

Considering the top leaders’ personal preferences is also helpful. According to Wittkopf and Jones (2008), “Decision makers’ inner traits influence how they respond to different situations.” (p. 492) Past experiences and educational background all contribute to a leader’simageand perceptions of the world (Levine, in Shambaugh, 1994); for example, it has been pointed out that the current top decision makers in China, including Hu Jintao, his predecessor Jiang Zemin, and his successor Xi Jinping, have been mostly educated as engineers, thus potentially taking a relatively ‘scientific,’

technocratic view of the world. (Lanteigne, 2009)

Furthermore, and crucially for this research, these informal aspects have an impact for those actors on the periphery of the decision making structure – such as academics.Attempts to sway those lower down the hierarchy will be largely irrelevant if in opposition to those more senior, and unlikely to succeed if the viewpoints espoused are at odds with the preferences of the practitioner in question. (Lu, 1997) Similarly, when analysing the influence of an outsider on policy decisions, identifying with whom this outsider has close relations is an insightful consideration. Those with connections

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to the highest decision makers are far more likely to be able to apply influence, and even more so if their opinions match these practitioners’ preferences. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007)