4.3 Factors of Policy Influence
4.3.2 Sources of Policy Influence
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they also act as a bridge bringing public discussion to the decision makers, and decision makers’ ideas to the public – thus crossing between levels of influence.
4.3.2 Sources of Policy Influence
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the system of Chinese research institutes has evolved differently to classic Western systems. The distinctions also pass through into sources of influence. Unlike Western (particularly US and UK research institutes), which regularly build up their influence through wealth, resources, and competition, Chinese research institutes draw their influence from distinct conditions such as the Chinese tradition of personal networks or the unique bureaucracy of the Chinese research system. The ways in which academics and research institutes can build up their influence at different levels derive from different sources. Once again Glaser and Saunders (2002) provide some invaluable insights, dividing the sources of policy influence into four: positional, expertise, experiential, and personal, corroborated by Zhu (2009), who offers the comparable delineations of administrative linkages, expert knowledge, and personal ties.
Positional influence is one of the most important sources of influence. Research institutes build up positional influence, and the academics working within these units draw upon this influence to their own advantage. In fact, so important is this source, the leaders of research institutes with high positional influence “have opportunities to influence policy regardless of their qualifications.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: 609) The system of Chinese research institutes was described in detail in Chapter Three.
There are official research institutes, legally classed as ‘government agencies,’ which are administratively under government ministries or departments; semi-official units
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classed as ‘public institutions,’ with some limited affiliation to government bodies; and civilian institutes, which can be university departments or organisations working for industry or non-profit agencies. These classifications are important when evaluating the positional influence of a research institute. “Positional influence can be based…on an organisational relationship with particular policy-making bodies.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: 608) Zhu (2009) explains that these administrative links are important in terms of the pathways to research utilisation available to certain organisations. He argues: “In many cases, a think tank is able to influence policies… mainly because its experts can submit their research reports and ideas to decision makers through administrative linkages.” (p. 341)
Every research institute in the Chinese system answers to a higher authority.
(Shambaugh, 2002; Zhu, 2009; 2013) This may be a government body, as in the case of official and semi-official research institutes, or an enterprise, organisation, or university in the case of civilian research institutes. All institutes in China are assigned bureaucratic rank. (Zhu, 2009) In essence, “The higher the supervising unit’s rank, the better the administrative linkage a think tank can develop.” (Zhu, 2009: 341) When evaluating the positional influence of an academic or a research unit it is therefore instructive to work ‘up the chain,’ identifying the supervising unit and their ranking within official bureaucracy. In fact, Zhu notes that research units are themselves assigned ranks, usually one rank lower than the supervising unit. Official research institutes which are supervised by government departments or ministries directly involved in the policy making process are likely to draw the greatest positional influence by dint of their own rank and their proximity to the policy makers. In addition, as the importance of a government unit waxes and wanes, so does its affiliated research
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arm. Shambaugh (2002) points out that as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gets a greater footing in the policy making process, its associated unit, CIIS, is growing in influence.
The growing influence of CIIS may be beginning to push CICIR, previously the most preeminent policy-influencing research institute, on to the back foot. (Shambaugh, 2002)
Another aspect of positional influence is which pathways are officially open to a unit. “Regulations stipulate which research units can use certain channels to submit papers to the leadership.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: 608) Some units, such as CIIS and CICIR, are permitted to submit reports through confidential channels directly to decision makers, vastly increasing the likelihood of their work being utilised. This work may closely resemble published work, but include details that are judged too sensitive to discuss openly. Other research units – particularly civilian units and university departments – do not have the permission to pass work on through official channels and may have to rely on either unofficial connections or building up their prominence in other ways. That said, even if a research unit is allowed to directly pass on recommendations, this by no means ensures that work will definitely be paid heed by decision makers. It merely vastly increases the chances of the work being noticed, as it is a direct pathway to influence.
One further aspect is access to information. “Positional influence can [also] be based…on access to classified information through institutional channels.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: 608) The position of a research unit within the system dictates its access to information and intelligence. Naturally research units and academics with access to more information are able to draw more accurate and credible analyses than those lacking information. The key example here is CICIR, which, in its position as a research unit funded by the Ministry of State Security, has open access to a wide range
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of classified material which is unavailable to other units. Awareness that certain academics can draw on more information as a consequence of the bureaucratic position of their associated research unit would logically lead decision makers to opt to utilise their research output in preference to the less well-informed. That said, the growth of the internet and the increasing freedom to information in China may be beginning to erode this advantage. (Glaser and Saunders, 2002)
The reputation of the research unit or expert can also be built up via sources of expertise and experience, which together correspond to Zhu’s category of expert knowledge. As he writes, “after cumulated years of education, training, and researching in particular policy fields, many of China’s think tanks are able to attract the attention of officials and prompt them to adopt policy suggestions.” (Zhu, 2009: 340) This source of influence is growing as the emphasis on academic excellence is redoubled within Chinese academia. Those research units and individual academics of high repute in certain policy fields are evidently more likely to be called upon by decision makers to offer expert advice than those of relatively nondescript reputations.
This source of influence can be reinforced by the circulation of research in respected publications. In addition to the China Core Journals Index (中文核心期刊, Zhongwen Hexin Qikan), which covers all journal subjects,China has its own social sciences index known as the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index (CSSCI).2This is the domestic equivalent tothe global Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), and functions by assigning a rank to academic journals based on impact factor.Institutes issuing high ranking publications, or academics with work accepted by higher ranked publications,
2 See Appendix II on page 150 for a full list of the 39 journals in the Politics category, in ranking order. The Politics category includes International Relations and individual Area Studies (such as European Studies or American Studies) as well as Politics and Public Administration, and is therefore the category relevant
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are able to build up their academic merit. (Glaser and Saunders, 2002; Zhu, 2009) In addition to this institutionalised form of academic merit, there are also more informal ways of building up this influence, such as media exposure as an ‘expert pundit,’ though it must be noted that the media tends to prefer sensationalist viewpoints which catch their audience’s attention. (Tanner, 2002)
In addition to the expertise reflected in the publication of research, academics and research institutes can also draw upon experiential influence. In the case of entire institutes, this can include the historical significance of the unit in question – Zhu (2009) remarks that “generally speaking, the longer the history of an institute, the greater its influence.” (p. 347) Once again CICIR and CIIS are ahead in the rankings in this regard, as two of China’s oldest research institutes. The cumulative experience of the researchers employed by an institute, in particular the leadership, also contributes to this source of influence. For individual academics, “As the Chinese foreign policy system becomes more professionalised, university degrees, foreign travel or study, and personal connections with foreign experts are becoming increasingly important credentials.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: 613) Experience of studying abroad and networks of foreign counterparts, as well as an outstanding educational background at respected universities, are not enough to create influence on their own, but can bolster the respect an academic receives within the system. Further to this, experience of policy consultation in the past, or even previous work in diplomatic or government roles, are other ways in which an academic can boost experiential influence. Finally, the influence of those who have already spent a long period in an influential role continues to redouble over time.
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One source of policy influence which is particularly ‘Chinese’– or distinct from Western – in nature is that of personal ties. Personal ties (关系, guanxi) penetrate every aspect and walk of life in China, creating an informal and unofficial system of influence on a personal scale in the academic context. As Glaser and Saunders (2002) point out,
“Personal relationships are arguably the most important source of policy influence in the Chinese system and also the hardest to document.” (p. 612)
In fact, so important are personal ties that often promotion to high positions can be secured by the command of an extensive personal network; the personal ties of research institutes’ leaders are the main source of the personal influence of the institutes themselves: “Deputy or executive directors of large think tanks are sometimes deliberately chosen to expand the organisation’s expertise and policy networks as a whole.” (Zhu, 2009: 356) Shambaugh (2002) also notes that the influence of Chinese international relations research institutes varies “as a result of the relative personal influence and connections (guanxi) of institute directors or occasionally individual staff members.” (p. 581)
These personal relationships can be built up into very complex systems, and therefore do not necessarily entail a direct link between an academic and a policy maker, although these associations do exist. Essentially, the larger an academic’s network the greater the likelihood that their work will reach a decision maker. Personal networks may span the levels of influence: the most influential academics may have personal affiliations with decision makers in government, their peers in academia, and others in the public sphere, such as the media or publishing world. In terms of personal networks, it is not only the number of contacts that one can call on that matters, but also whether these contacts have any position of influence of their own. (Gold et al., 2002)
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However, it follows that the larger a personal network, the more opportunity to build influence through personal ties. Personal relationships can infiltrate any of the identified models and pathways of research utilisation. Those with close personal relationships to other influential actors may be directly sought out by contacts in preference over others, or may be able to push their own agenda either directly or indirectly through other contacts who can ‘pull strings’ when necessary. Shambaugh (2002) points out that “connections often enable a think tank to circumvent normal bureaucratic channels and processes.” (p. 581)
These ties can be built in any number of ways. For example, former colleagues or schoolmates, students with teachers, employees with superiors, family members, and shared experiences may all lead to the creation of ties. (Stockman, 2000) However, the extensive nature of guanxi poses certain problems when analysing the influence garnered from this source. Although it is occasionally possible to identify implied or possible ties by considering the biographical information of those concerned, this is by no means watertight. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007) What’s more, this approach cannot trace the convoluted nature of guanxi as ties are also built through mutual introduction by other contacts. (Gold et al., 2002) Awareness of the existence of this factor when evaluating influence is important. For example, in his empirical study of policy influence, Zhu (2009) acknowledged this difficulty and chose to use self-reported evidence of the extent of personal networks to overcome this obstacle, whilst simultaneously admitting that this was empirically weak.