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world together, against what is seen as the USA’s ruling political and economic hegemony.
5.4 Problems in China-EU Relations
Although relations with the European Union are seen as China’s best bilateral foreign relationship, there are some thorny issues which Chinese analysts see as plaguing the partnership. These include a ban on arms sales, the EU’s refusal to grant China Market Economy Status (MES), and the ongoing human rights dialogue and debate.
The EU has had a long-standing ban on sales of weaponry to China ever since the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989. However, the arms embargo takes the form of a one page, non-legally binding statement issued hurriedly in a critical response to the Chinese government’s actions at Tiananmen, and has since never been given legal basis or altered in any way. In addition, the actual fact of the matter is that individual European Union member states have continued to sell weapons to China in spite of the ban. (Niblett, 2004) In 2005, the European Union prepared to lift the embargo, but in the face of international (mainly US) pressure, the ban remained in place, and the EU has shelved discussion of the issue for the foreseeable future.
For Chinese academics, the European Union’s failure to lift the ban carries great weight. Firstly, the issue is one of the only problems in the relationship and therefore receives a great deal of attention. Aside from this issue, there are very few points of real contention in the China-EU partnership, and many academics argue that this should be ironed out. (Dai, 2005; Feng, 2006; Zhao, 2008; Zhou, 2009)
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Secondly, in the reviewed texts, all academics that mention this subject wrote that the European Union tabled the issue in response to pressure from the USA. (eg.
Chen, 2006; Feng, 2006; Zhao, 2008; Zhou, 2009; Zhou, 2011) For example, Chen Zhimin (2006) states: “The strongest opposition came from the USA’s strategic thinking… the USA and its closest allies within the European Union blocked the rapid decision of the EU regarding the arms embargo.” Feng Zhongping (2006) writes: “The European Union’s about-turn on its decision to lift the embargo was not because it accepted or agreed with the USA’s analysis of the consequences of lifting the ban, but rather because the EU was not willing to run the risk of further worsening relations with the USA in the wake of the Iraq war.” Following on from the discussion of the previous chapter, it is clear to see why this is an unwelcome conclusion for Chinese scholars. Chinese academics are arguing that the European Union hopes to gain independence from the USA to become a world pole in its own right, and that there are strains in the EU-USA relationship which mean that the EU will come to favour China. However, the EU’s bending to American pressure flies in the face of these arguments. Zhou Hong (2009) states rather bitterly: “After spending many years cultivating a partnership of broad and deep strategic cooperation with China, the actions of this ‘strategic partner,’ the European Union, instead proved to the world that the partnership shared with the USA is, in fact, more strategic than the one with China.”
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the very existence of the ban is seen by many as a smack in the face to China. The ban itself is hardly effectual, so retaining the embargo despite this reality is seen as a political decision rather than a practical one.
Analysts also argue that China has undergone a lengthy and steady period of reform and development. The country, particularly human rights, have come a long way since the
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events of Tiananmen which triggered the bans on arms sales 24 years ago, and the embargo is therefore out of date. Keeping the embargo in place despite the developments of China is seen by the Chinese as an insult, which signals that the EU does not maintain mutual respect and equality in this bilateral relationship.(Feng, 2006;
Chen, 2006; Zhao, 2008; Zhou, 2009) The CFAU 50th anniversary conference document (2007) reads: “For Chinese people, the European Union’s refusal to lift the arms embargo is actually a political statement, demonstrating that the EU simply does not see China as an equal cooperative partner.” Chen Zhimin (2006) corroborates this view:
“The European Union has an arms embargo in place for only a few countries, namely China, Zimbabwe and Burma. Even North Korea is not subject to an embargo. Lumping China in with these other embargoed states is evidently inappropriate.”
These points of view are the standpoints taken by most academics discussing the arms embargo. However, it cannot be avoided that from a European perspective, none of these views are particularly helpful or insightful. EU member states disagree amongst themselves about the efficacy and point behind such a ban, and yet it remains in place for a range of reasons. Blustering from China about how unfair the ban is will hardly swing the European Union round to a new point of view.
This attitude is fairly similar when debating the second major issue in China-EU relations: Market Economy Status (MES). The European Union refuses to grant China MES, which would allow greater and freer access to the European markets. Chinese analysts are also angered by this refusal, which once again is seen as an insult to China in spite of its developments and reforms (Feng, 2006; 2009b; Zhao, 2008; Zhou, 2009).
Nations such as Russia have been allowed MES, and Chinese academics argue that the Chinese economy is more marketised than Russia’s at this point.For example, Feng
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(2006): “China often raises the example of Russia to question the European Union’s logic, asking the EU to explain why Russia, still refused entrance into the WTO, has been granted Market Economy Status. … One of the important reasons why the EU has refused to recognise China’s MES is to restrict Chinese imports into European markets through the employment of anti-dumping measures. Granting China MES would greatly reduce the effects of anti-dumping measures.”
As Feng Zhongping correctly acknowledged, one of the key reasons the EU refuses to grant this status to China is as a form of protectionism against an influx of Chinese products which will undercut home-grown offerings to the European market.
Chinese scholars have recognised this but do not seem to recognise this reasoning as excusable; the European Union should recognise China’s unequivocal and objective right to be seen as a market economy. Although it is understandable why the Chinese may feel affronted by this decision, the rigid attitude shown by scholars towards the EU’s own decisions and its own interests appears fairly hypocritical to outsiders when compared to China’s own insistence on non-interference and sovereign power – including on global economic issues which affect the domestic economy, such as the appreciation of the Chinese renminbi. Chinese European Studies scholars place total blame on the European Union for this ‘transgression’ – not an attitude which will sit well with European policy makers in negotiations.
The third issue is human rights. It is well-known that China clashes over human rights in almost all its relationships with Western countries. This is largely because many Western powers and citizens have adopted the idea of universal human rights, arguing that intervention in another country’s internal affairs is justifiable for the sake of upholding these fundamental rights. Many diplomats feel it is their duty, and the
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expectation of their electorate, to bring up the issue of human rights with China at every opportunity. (Chan, 2006) Chinese thinkers, on the other hand, argue that human rights are viewed differently in China. A common refrain is that in the years of recent development, the Chinese government has granted millions the right to a full stomach, and a roof over their heads, and that these rights are more fundamental than any other.
The Chinese also argue that the process of securing human rights for every citizen is a slow process, which took hundreds of years in the West and will not happen overnight in China.
The CFAU 50th anniversary conference summaryargues at length: “In reality, the human rights problem in Sino-European relations is rooted in the fact that, after undergoing several hundred years of ruthless industrial exploitation and countless aggressive wars, the now-flourishing Europe has already forgotten its painful past.
European people indulge themselves in the superiority of their own cultures and systems, and do not empathise with China’s history, transformation, and current conditions. In the absence of this empathy, the advances of the past few decades of Sino-European dialogue have been very limited. There are a few factors leading to this situation: firstly, to the Chinese, only too aware of the events of the Opium War and the ransacking of the Summer Palace, the European criticism of China’s human rights record smacks of hypocrisy. Secondly, in the eighteen years since the [arms sale] ban, Chinese human rights conditions have undergone sweeping changes – and Europeans are not unaware of this fact.”
Specifically in terms of the EU, there is no doubt that China considers the European approach to human rights far less meddlesome than that of the United States.
(Zhao, 2008; Chen, 2010) Nevertheless, the EU and many individual member states do
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bring up the issue with China regularly, especially in relation to Tibet. In particular, many former Communist states of Eastern Europe continue to eye China warily and push the European Union to respond to the issue of human rights. (Shambaugh, 2008a) Some Chinese analysts even infer that many of the problems that occur between China and Europe can be put down to Europeans taking an unfair attitude on the basis of their conclusions about China’s human rights record. This in itself is seen as an affront to China, which should not go ignored. Once again, there is no suggestion of any blame on the part of China, only that the EU’s push for human rights does not harmonise with China’s firm policy of non-interference. The Chinese resent any interference in what they see as unequivocally their internal affairs.(Feng, 2009a; Zhou, 2011)
Scholars offer thinly veiled criticisms of the EU’s interference: Zhu Liqun (2007) argues, “China focuses on equal treatment for both sides and mutual respect, in particular respect for differences in values and belief systems; thus requiring a spirit of equality. Europe instead focuses on influencing and regulating China, placing greatest emphasis on equality in terms of responsibility, duty, and benefit, and essentially pursuing China’s emulation of the European Union.” CFAU’s 50th anniversary conference summary argues: “[Another] problem is that the two sides differ on the point of ‘non-interference in internal affairs.’ China emphasises the diverse nature of different national development models as well as mutual respect for different cultures, thus steadfastly adhering to the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. But Europe instead believes that the promotion of values is the true meaning of diplomacy, and that it is acceptable to engage in swift and strong interference when necessary.”
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In conclusion, the analyses of Chinese European Studies scholars towards these three problem areas are in total consensus: the blame is on Europe. This thesis posits that, to a certain degree, Chinese policy practitioners are influenced by the views and advice of academics. It is also clear that little progress is being made on many of the sticking points in the China-EU relationship – arms sales, Market Economy Status, or human rights. The arms embargo has been in place for twenty-four years; the EU has put off discussion of China’s MES until at least 2015, when China will receive WTO MES;
human rights continues to be an issue brought up in reference to China almost without cease. Here a significant point can be argued: to an outside eye, nothing constructive is mentioned in almost all Chinese academic articles about these problem areas. Or to put it another way, the European Union decision makers will not be swayed by the arguments of Chinese scholars; they are largely repeating the same points, claiming unfairness and lack of empathy; and universally blaming the European Union wholly unilaterally for all the problems in the relationship. Whilst these claims may have some basis in truth, they are not helpful for negotiation. If, therefore, nothing constructive can be found in the literature, it is highly believable that Chinese policy practitioners have no foundation upon which to build when attempting to broach these issues with the EU.
Without clear-headed, logical, and two-sided analyses of the issues at hand, as well as valid solutions or approaches to the problems, by expert European Studies academics, then policy practitioners are in even less of a position to construct viable and balanced tactics, and move past these constant problems.