中國綠色媒體：反怒江大壩之媒體角色 - 政大學術集成

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(1)NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY MASTER THESIS. China’s Environmental Journalism: Media’s Role in the Anti‐Nujiang Campaign. ‧ 國. 立. 政治大. Lu, Yu‐han 盧郁涵. ‧. Student ID# 98926002 International Master’s Program in Asia‐Pacific Studies 98926002@nccu.edu.tw. al v i. n Ch e n g c h i U. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 學. Advisor: Professor Ching‐Ping Tang (Department of Political Science). 11 JUNE 2012.

(2) ABSTRACT. Media in China are generally categorized as the extensions of propaganda machine for the central government, because despite media commercialization, China maintains heavy‐handed censorship at the whim of political will. However, there are still instances in which journalists are active participants of social movements in China. One recent case in particular is the “Battle to Protect the Nu River,” in which China’s environmental NGOs, scholars, and media formed joint. 政治大 plants on Nujiang. This paper uses John Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model to 立. coalition to fight off the Nu River Project, and stop efforts to build hydropower. ‧ 國. 學. map out the ways in which the Policy Entrepreneurs – environmental journalists – capitalized on tools of the press to influence public opinion and. ‧. decision‐makers in the government, systematically brought the anti‐NRP. sit. y. Nat. campaign up to the policy agenda, and eventually swayed the outcome of the. al. er. io. national policy. Since the beginning of the proposal to build a cascade of 13 dams. v. n. on the World Heritage site of Nujiang in 2003, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao. Ch. engchi. i n U. personally intervened, and twice ordered suspension of the project. Therefore, while the final outcome of the anti‐NRP campaign is still pending, at least China’s environmental journalists have successfully prolonged the usual nine‐year hiatus on a project that was slated for three consecutive Five‐Year Plans.. ii.

(3) ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. From the initial sparkling of interest on the topic, to merging environmental activism with journalism, Professor Tang Ching‐Ping was invaluable to my research process in many ways. Professor Tang was generous with sharing his resources, helped connect key figures of the study to me, and showed me that China’s environmental movement as an on‐going force of social change. I would also like to thank Professor Tsai Chung‐Min of the Political Science Department, for encouraging me to keep digging deeper into the research, and Professor. 政治大. Chien Shiuh‐Shen for pointing out the raison d’être of my thesis. . 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. iii. i n U. v.

(4) List of Graphics. Pictures 1. Jingji Magazine Cover Story 2004/05/20. 2. Zhao, Yongxin. People’s Daily 2003/9/11. 3. Zhao, Yongxin. People’s Daily 2003/9/19. 4. Zhang, Kejia. China Daily Youth 2003/8/19 5. Zhang, Kejia. China Daily Youth 2003/9/5. Figures 1. Anti‐NRP Campaign’s Agenda Setting Process 2. Newspaper Layout Placement with Most Attention. Map 1. Proposed Nujiang Hydropower Plans . 立. 政治大. 2 60 61 64 75. 26 76. 29. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Ch. engchi. iv. i n U. v.

(5) TABLE OF CONTENT. Acknowledgement . iii List of Graphics. iv. CHAPTER I ‐ Introduction . Introduction . 1. Motivation of Study . 3. Background and Context . 5. China’s Contentious Journalists . 8. Research Questions . 10. Research Scope. 11. Research Methods . 12. Organization of Thesis. 12. CHAPTER II – Historical Context and Theoretical Background. Environmental Journalism at its Best. 14. Literature Review . 18. Theoretical Framework. 25. CHAPTER III – Case Study: The Anti‐NRP Campaign. Nujiang Hydropower Project. 28. Problem Stream. 32. Political Stream. 41. Policy Stream . 46 Summary. 51. CHAPTER IV – Environmental Journalists . Policy Entrepreneurs. 53. Advocacy Journalism? Activist Journalism?. 56. Profiles of the Policy Entrepreneurs. 58. Power of Placement: Location, Location, Location . 74. Summary. 76. CHAPTER V – Moments of Triumph. Policy Window. 78. Policy Outcome. 85. CHAPTER VI ‐ Conclusion. Conclusion . 89. Appendix I – Chronology of Events. 98 Bibliography . 105. . 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. v. i n U. v. .

(6) Chapter I ‐ Introduction “Information disclosure is a powerful to achieve environmental protection. Please show more interest in the protection of water resources and write stories on this issue.” – Ma Jun, founding director of Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs.1. May 2004, the cover of China’s Jingji (Economy) Magazine featured four towering figures, with the camera angle capturing them from below, and their heads slightly hilted upward, as if looking off to the distant future.2 (See Picture 1) Instead of famous investors or entrepreneurs, who were the usual faces that. 政治大 spotlight shone on the unassuming leaders of China’s environmental movement. 立. frequently grace the front of this financial‐themed periodical, this time, the. ‧ 國. 學. Underneath the “eyes on the prize” portraits, two lines of bright yellow words read: “THE SOCIAL FORCES BEHIND THE SUSPENSION OF NUJIANG. ‧. CONSTRUCTION PLANS.” In accordance with the “China Agenda 21” white paper. sit. y. Nat. that outlines plans of sustainable development,3 in 2003 Yunnan provincial. al. er. io. government wanted to begin building hydropower plants on the Nujiang, also. v. n. known as the Nu River Project (NRP). What seemed like a sure deal then spiraled. Ch. engchi. i n U. out of control, eventually putting the project on a 9‐year hiatus. “This is the first time ever to have occurred in China,” editor of the magazine wrote, “that voices and activities of civil groups greatly influenced central government’s policy.”4. . 1 Yoshioka, Keiko. “Asahi news: media at the front line of environmental protection battle,” Asahi. News. 20 December 2006. 2 Cao, Haidong and Zhang, Peng. “The Social Forces Behind the Suspension of Nujiang Construction Plans” (Nujiang daba turan gezhi muhou de minjian liliang), Economy (Jingji), 20 May 2004. 3 Yang, Guobin. “Global Environmentalism Hits China,” Yale Global Online Magazine, 4 February 2004. 4 Jingji, 20 May 2004.. 1.

(7) . 政治大. Just what kind of social forces are powerful enough to influence the immutable. 立. Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? Moreover, what kind of social forces were able. ‧ 國. 學. to make an estimated ¥34 billion RMB (approx. US$5.4 billion) worth of annual revenues from the Nujiang hydropower production plans come to a standstill?. ‧. How did the campaign to stop the NRP succeed where others failed? The. Nat. sit. y. answers lie behind the curtains of the pen fight that became known in the media. n. al. er. io. as the “Battle to Protect the Nu River” (Nujiang Bao Wei Zhan). However, in the. i n U. v. Chinese authoritarian regime where freedom of the press is still only a. Ch. engchi. phenomenon, how did environmental journalists champion the cause through the fortress of CCP’s propaganda machine? What kind of uphill battle did they have to engage to in order to bring home the victory?. As part of the famous Three Parallel Rivers, that include Jinsha, Lancang, and Nu rivers, the Nujiang (meaning the Angry River in Chinese) is over 2,000 kilometers long, one of the longest rivers in China. For economic and clean energy development purposes, the Chinese government and hydropower companies have been trying dam this river since 1970s. However, as a result of. 2.

(8) the difficult terrain, coupled with active campaigning by environmental non‐ government organizations (ENGOs), scholars, and environmental journalists, plans to build dams on the Nu River have been stalled until very recently. Efforts both to push for and against the Nu River Project (NRP) have been effectively carried out horizontally and vertically, from grassroots organizing to petitioning the Zhongnanhai. In fact, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao not only once, but twice suspended construction on the NRP, due to growing popular outcry and international concern on the project.. Motivation of Study. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. As in the ancient days, when the protection of a river often meant the last defense of a kingdom under siege, the battle to save the Nujiang was in many. ‧. ways, a last line of defense to a pristine ecological reservation and forced. sit. y. Nat. migration of 500,000 villagers. 5 The warriors, environmental non‐profit. al. er. io. organizations (ENGOs) and State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA),6 took. v. n. on enemies many times stronger than themselves, the well‐oiled machines of. Ch. engchi. i n U. former state‐owned enterprise, hydropower company Huadian and Yunnan provincial government. . The David vs. Goliath plot earned the campaign to stop damming the Nujiang, a glorious title: the most controversial yet most successful case of environmental activism in China. So much so that Yu Xiaogang – leader of Yunnan‐based ENGO . 5 International Rivers Network. “China’s Nu River: Dam Projects Threaten Magnificent World. Heritage Site,” IRN.ORG.. 6 China’s national governing body for environmental protection. It was later elevated to. ministerial status on 15 March 2008, and became the Ministry of Environmental Protection. However, throughout most NRP campaign, it was operating as SEPA, and this paper will refer to the said agency as such.. 3.

(9) Green Watershed – refers to the year 2003 (the year the campaign began) as “Year One” of China’s environmental activism. 7 Though in reality, China’s environmental activism started nearly 30 years prior to the campaign, Nujiang activists’ breakthrough, like all tide‐turning, world‐shaking advances, was the result of collaboration across the social spectrum. . In fact, at the height of the campaign, 56 NGOs8 signed an open letter to support SEPA’s move to implement environmental regulations laws, while as many as 60. 政治大 workshop that educates environmentally friendly reporters on issues pertaining 立 media outlets joined the Green Reporters Salon, 9 which is an organized. ‧ 國. 學. to their interest. According to one rough estimate, the number of reports covering the Nujiang controversy in national‐level news media between August. ‧. 2003 to September 2004 alone, was well above one hundred.10 . sit. y. Nat. al. er. io. Despite the number of groups of NGOs and media outlets working hard to fend. v. n. off the proposition to build dams on one of the two last free‐flowing rivers in. Ch. engchi. i n U. China, their victory came as surprising to the general public, as it was shocking to the very people responsible for this change. Jingji magazine detailed the moment when Wang Yongchen, the leader of the campaign, burst into tears of joy, when she learned over the phone, that Chinese premier Wen Jiabao himself ordered suspension on the construction. . 7 Author’s interview with Yu Xiaogang. 8 Lu, Yiyi. “Environmental Civil Society and Governance in China,” Catham House, August 2005. 9 Tong, Zhifeng. (2009) “The Mechanism of Mobilization and the Development of the Natural. Protection Campaign with the Fight against Dam Construction in Nujiang as an Example,” Open Times, 9, pg. 122. 10 Xue, Ye and Wang, Yongchen. (2006) “Highly Controversial Hydropower Development in Western China,” in Liang Congjie and Yang Dongping (Ed.) 2005: Crisis and Breakthrough of China’s Environment. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press.. 4.

(10) Throughout the fascinating story of the campaign to save China’s “last virgin river,” which became a catch phrase used by environmentalists,11 newspapers, magazines, radio programs, and television programs were unequivocally the primary battlegrounds on which the pro‐ and anti‐dam sides dueled out their differences. In fact, researcher Andrew Mertha goes as far as to say, that, “media coverage was critical; in its absence, it is likely that the NRP would have gone ahead as planned with relatively muted opposition, if any.”12 . Background and Context. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. In order to fully understand the magnitude of the success of anti‐NRP campaign, one must understand the political and social context of that specific period.. sit. y. Nat. Political. ‧. al. er. io. China in the year 2003 had just transferred the central party leadership from. v. n. Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. 2003 was the third year into the execution the 10th. Ch. engchi. i n U. Five‐Year Plan, which contained one of the central policy directives, the Great Western Development Plan. It included an emphasis to develop water resources in the southwestern provinces for power generation, as a way to solve the electricity shortage crisis of power‐hungry economic centers like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong, while elevating the economically backward western. . 11 Wang, Foquan. (2003) “Will China Still Have Virgin Rivers?” (Zhongguo hai hui you chunu jiang. ma) Green Life, 10.. 12 Mertha, Andrew C. (2008) China’s Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change. New York:. Cornell University Press. Pg.145.. 5.

(11) provinces out of poverty.13 Meanwhile, as the world’s fastest growing economy, China became increasingly under criticism for carbon emission, therefore the 10th Five‐Year Plan also implicitly stated that China must explore sustainable methods of energy generation.14 . Hydropower Policy Of course, China’s policy to develop hydropower began much earlier than the Great Western Development Policy. China first began to build dams as part of a. 政治大 to the Congress of the International Commission on Large Dams, that China came 立 national campaign under the Great Leap Forward.15 In 2000, Wen Jiabao boasted. ‧ 國. 學. out on top, as having the highest number of large dams in the world.16 According to Chinese National Committee on Large Dams, by the year 2009 China has more. ‧. than “80,000 large and small scale reservoirs in China, in which 5,340 dams. sit. y. Nat. completed or under construction are higher than 30m.”17 By 2011, dams of all. al. n. 25,000.18. er. io. sizes in China are numbering at over 85,000, of which the large dams exceed. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. This number includes the largest of its kind in the world ‐ Three Gorges Project (TGP). Under Deng Xiaoping’s directive, TGP set out to be constructed despite . 13 National Development and Reform Commission. (2005) “10th Five‐Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development,” (Guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shige wunian jihua). 14 Magee, Darrin. (2006) “Powershed Politics: Yunnan Hydropower under Great Western Development,” China Quarterly, 185, pp.23‐41. 15 Shui, Fui. (1997) “A Profile of Dams in China,” in J. Thibodeau, Q. Dai, P.B. Williams (Ed.) The River Dragon Has Come: Three Gorges Dam and the Fate of China’s Yangtze River and its People, New York: M.E. Sharpe. 16 People’s Daily. “China Tops World in Number of Large Dams,” People’s Daily Online, 19 September 2000. 17 Chinese National Committee on Large Dams. (2009) “Current Activities – Dam Construction in China 2009,” 18 May 2009. 18 Chellaney, Brahma. (2011) “China’s dam frenzy: China remains the world’s biggest dam builder at home and abroad,” India Today, 16 December 2011.. 6.

(12) opposition from experts, who warned of technical problems such as sedimentation and shipping.19 However, throughout the planning process, a well‐known, well‐connected journalist Dai Qing successfully rallied scholars and delegate to the 1992 National People’s Congress, even at one point distributing her self‐published book Yangtze! Yangtze! in an effort to inform the delegates of the potential hazards of the TGP. . Unfortunately, the political atmosphere in the post‐Tiananmen Square. 政治大 Proponents of the TGP capitalized on this political opportunity to label anyone 立. crackdown became intolerable of any deviation from the decided Party policy.. ‧ 國. 學. who held reservations about the hydropower project as advocates of “bourgeois liberalization.”20 In October, Yangtze! Yangtze! was officially banned, and its. ‧. editor Dai Qing was imprisoned.21. y. sit. al. er. io. Social. Nat. v. n. Despite Chinese central government’s effort to crack down on dissent, in the ten‐. Ch. engchi. i n U. year span between the years 1993 to 2003, incidents of social unrest in China increased from 8,700 to 58,000.22 Meaning that even counting only the reported incidents, the number of social unrest grew six times. Researcher Albert Kiedel attributed the mass unrest to China’s transitioning economic model, that despite the country as a whole exhibited impressive GDP growth rates, many rural peasants and workers did not see the economic benefits trickle down. In fact, . 19 He, Shi and Si, Ji. (1989) “The Comeback of the Three Gorges Dam (1989‐1993),” in Dai Qing. (Ed.) Yangtze! Yangtze! 20 Ibid. 21 Williams, Philip. “Great Wall Across the Yangtze: Controversy,” Public Broadcasting Service 22 Keidel, Albert. (2005) The Economic Basis for Social Unrest in China. Presented at the George Washington University’s Third European‐American Dialogue on China: May 26‐27, 2005.. 7.

(13) Kiedel found many of the grievances to have economic basis: from low and unpaid wages, to layoff and unpaid back wage, to loss of worker benefits, fighting for union representation, official corruption, and the list went on. Interestingly, environmental degradation, access to water, and forced migration were also listed as reasons inciting public unrest.23 Yet the unrest does not end with the peasants and workers.. China’s Contentious Journalists. 政治大 government, because China is still an authoritarian regime and exercises 立. Media in China are generally categorized as the mouthpiece for the Chinese. ‧ 國. 學. heavy‐handed censorship. The French‐based non‐governmental organization Reporters Without Borders’ 2010 Press Freedom Index ranked China at #171,. ‧. out of 178 countries;24 while the D.C.‐based international non‐governmental. sit. y. Nat. organization Freedom House’s 2009 Freedom of the Press index ranked China. al. n. er. io. at #181, out of 196 countries.25. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Both international organizations found China’s press freedom to be close to the bottom of all countries surveyed. The life of a reporter in China seems even bleaker when Chinese journalist, He Qinglian described Chinese journalists as “dancing in shackles.”26 Despite the general repressive media atmosphere in China, however, there are still instances in which journalists are active participants of social movements in China. In addition to the ENGOs teaming up . 23 Ibid.. 24 Reporters without Borders. (2011) “Press Freedom Index 2010.” 25 Freedom House. (2011) “Freedom of the Press Index.”. 26 Quoted in Shirk, Susan. (2011) “Changing Media, Changing China,” in S. Shirk. (Ed.) Changing Media, Changing China. New York: Oxford University.. 8.

(14) with green reporters for environmental activism, there have been other instances in which reporters stood up for the 1980s pro‐democracy movement, as well as protesting against censorship in the 21st century China. . China Daily during Tiananmen Square During the 1989 democracy movement, journalists at the state press China Daily went against the official stance and sided with the students, with wide coverage of the protests in detailed pieces strategically placed in the front‐and‐. 政治大 democracy movement, staff from the state newspaper even marched alongside 立. center layout of the newspaper.27 At the height of journalists’ support of the. ‧ 國. 學. the students under the banner of China Daily, a photograph of which subsequently appeared in the newspaper on May 18, 1989.28 After the tanks. ‧. rolled into Tiananmen Square, CCP’s Propaganda Department swiftly replaced. sit. y. Nat. the two top editors,29 and China Daily returned to daily state‐sanctioned. al. er. io. functions. Yet those audacious though brief days of journalists risking their. v. n. jobs and pension for what they believed in, will forever go down in history as. Ch. engchi. i n U. what Liu Binyan refers to as the only days of press freedom in China.30 . Beijing News Strike Beijing News (新京報), a top‐selling tabloid in Beijing known for its explosive stories on official corruption and misconduct, came under fire in December 2005,. . 27 Tan, Frank. (1990) “The People’s Daily: Politics and Popular Will – Journalistic Defiance in. China During the Spring of 1989,” Pacific Affairs, 63:2, pp. 151‐169. 28 Ibid., 156‐7. 29 Ibid., 167. 30 Ibid., 153.. 9.

(15) when its editor Yang Bin and his two deputies were removed.31 Replacement of editors for political purposes is not uncommon in China, but for the first time, it was met by a work strike. About 100 workers at Beijing News, which is a quarter of its 400 editorial staff walked out following the removal of their senior editor Mr. Yang, and workers circulated a petition to denounce his firing.32 In response, the newspaper reportedly threatened dismissal of anyone who participated, and the strike was subsequently reduced to several dozen participants, yet the paper output also shrank from its usual 80 pages to 32 pages the following day.33. Research Questions. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Given the bleak outcome of the anti‐TGP campaign and others, how did the anti‐ NRP environmental activists succeed where others failed? What strategies did. ‧. they develop to their advantage? To find out these answers would undoubtedly. sit. y. Nat. help to advance future environmental protection campaigns, if not also. al. er. io. contribute to the greater democratization movement in China. This paper. v. n. intends to highlight media’s role in the Nujiang controversy, and explore how. Ch. engchi. i n U. key leaders capitalized on their double‐identity as active reporters, to dissuade the public and government officials from granting permission to dam the Nujiang. . China National Radio (CNR) reporter Wang Yongchen, who doubles as the director of ENGO Green Earth Volunteers (GEV), and China Youth Daily (CYD) senior reporter Zhang Kejia championed the anti‐NRP cause through their . 31 Lague, David. (2005) “In Rare Move, Journalists Strike Paper in Beijing,” International Herald. Tribune, 31 December 2005. 32 Gill, Chris. (2005) “Beijing’s paper’s staff strike after editor’s removal,” The Guardian, 31 December 2005. 33 Ibid.. 10.

(16) respective places of employment. In addition, Wang organized other journalists into series of workshops called the Green Reporters Salon, while Zhang launched a whole section of online newspaper, the Green Net, getting more media‐savvy youth involved. Then there is Zhao Yongxin, an environmental reporter for the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda machine – People’s Daily. Though a member of ENGO Friends of Nature (FoN), Zhao is not involved in environmental activism to the same degree as Wang or Zhang, but he was among the first to cover the NRP story, also the journalist who exposed the illegal construction at. 政治大. Beijing’s Old Summer Palace, the Yuanmingyuan Park.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. It is people like them, reporters who despite working for state‐controlled media, still had the courage to openly take a stand, to oppose the central government’s. ‧. policy to tap all water resources in China, that prompted the massive wave of. sit. y. Nat. media campaign against damming the Nujiang. Therefore, the basis of my. al. er. io. hypothesis comes from the human factor: the environmental journalists, without. v. n. whose active participation, China’s ENGOs would never have advanced that far. . Ch. engchi. i n U. Research Scope In the interest of maintaining focus on the topic, I will limit the study scope to print media, particularly state‐controlled newspapers and commercial magazines. Though for the purpose of presenting a complete story, I will mention television and radio programs in passing.. 11.

(17) Research Methods For starters, I combed through published books, journal articles, and academic papers by other scholars and students who have already studied the topic of Nujiang controversy, to get a sense of the chronological occurrence of the events. Then I researched on the Internet, the Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database, and National Chengchi University’s (NCCU) Institute of International Relations’ (IIR) library newspaper archive, for digital and print copies of news report entries, as well as magazine articles written by. 政治大 Green Watershed attended. and about the subject environmental journalists. In addition to existing literature, when Dr. Yu Xiaogang of. 立. NCCU’s Public. ‧ 國. 學. Administrations Academic Seminar on 31 March 2012, I was fortunate enough to be granted a face‐to‐face interview with him. My interview with Zhang Kejia was. ‧. conducted via email correspondence.. sit. y. Nat. al. er. io. Organization of Thesis. v. n. Chapter One outlines the research motivation and scope, plus a brief background. Ch. engchi. i n U. on past instances in which Chinese journalists cross the line of state censorship. In Chapter Two, I shall re‐visit published books, scholarly journals, and academic papers that present various insights into the phenomenon of environmental journalism in China. I will also introduce the paper’s theoretical framework, Multiple Streams Model. In Chapter Three, I will provide the background of NRP, then set the stage for the problem stream, which is where the proponents and opponents stand on the issue; the political stream will explain the political atmosphere of the country at the time; then the policy stream is where I lay out the tools with which the environmental journalists and SEPA used to build up the. 12.

(18) crescendo of anti‐NRP campaign’s triumph. Chapter Four will feature the profiles of policy entrepreneurs, the game‐changers in the story, and look at how they put their weapons to use. Chapter Five provides a view into the policy windows, and how those opportunities develop into the policy output. In Chapter Six, I will conclude my findings. The appendix of the paper is a timeline of memorable events; this additional piece is an effort to build a more complete picture of the anti‐Nujiang campaign.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 13. i n U. v.

(19) Chapter II – Historical Context and Theoretical Background “Non‐government does not equal anti‐government. To be non‐governmental is to keep an independent voice. For one thing, to be the assistant of the government and for another thing to be the watchdog of the government.” – Liao Xiaoyi,1 founder of Global Village of Beijing.. Environmental Journalism at its Best China’s environmental journalism did not spontaneously burst onto the scene in 2003 with the anti‐NRP campaign. Below are three cases that offer glimpses of how China’s ENGOs skillfully teamed up with environmental journalists to. 政治大 as memorable, and definitely equally as important in the history of China’s path 立 amazing results. Though these campaigns are smaller in scale, but arguably just. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. toward establishing a genuine, independent environmental movement.. Tibetan Antelope. sit. y. Nat. As the first social group to register as China’s environmental non‐government. al. er. io. organization in 1994, Friends of Nature’s (FoN) founder and president Liang. v. n. Congjie risked his own life to save Tibetan antelopes from poachers, because his. Ch. engchi. i n U. outcry for the endangered animals brought onto himself death threats from the poachers.2 The near‐extinct Tibetan antelopes, only found on the Qinghai‐Tibet Plateau, are targeted for their hides that are turned into expensive shahtoosh shawls.3 For a shawl that costs up to US$40,000 each, approximately 20,000. . 1 Yi, Yi. “Growing from Grassroots: Environmental NGOs are having a growing impact on. development,” Beijing Review, 7 April 2004.. 2 Poole, Teresa. “China’s ‘friends of nature’ join the Tibetan antelope on the list of endangered. species,” The Independent, 22 November 1998. 3 Lowe, Justin. (1998) “Global fashion threatens rare Tibetan antelope,” Earth Island Journal, Fall 1998.. 14.

(20) Tibetan antelopes were killed every year.4 That’s when Liang Congjie’s Friends of Nature decided to step in. . On the international front, Liang targeted the consumers. Since Britain was one of the biggest buyer countries of the shahtoosh shawls, Liang began by writing to then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, during the latter’s visit to Beijing. In responses, Blair personally met Liang and promised to put a stop to the illegal trade.5 While in the domestic arena, FoN introduced a local armed anti‐poaching. 政治大 sympathetic articles on the plight of the Tibetan antelopes and drew nation‐wide 立. team, the Wild Yak Brigade, to Beijing’s journalists, who wrote a series of. ‧ 國. 學. attention to the cause.6 Thanks to their conservation efforts, the number of Tibetan antelopes tripled from less than 20,000 in 1998 to 60,000 in 2008.7 . sit. y. Nat. Yangliuhu Dam. ‧. al. er. io. Before the momentous victory over the NRP, there was Yangliuhu Dam. Early. v. n. 2003, Sichuan Province’s Dujiangyan Bureau of Administration proposed to. Ch. engchi. i n U. build a dam that measures 1,200 meters wide, 23 meters high, as part of the larger Zipingpu hydropower project. The problem was that the proposed site would only be 1,300 meters away from the Yuzui (fish mouth) part of China’s historical Dujiangyan Irrigation System, which means it would threaten the more than 2,200 year‐old World Heritage Site.8 Many officials within the Dujiangyan government contested the plan, though the project got the go‐ahead from SEPA. . 4 China Tibet Information Center. “Appeal for Rescuing Tibetan Antelopes.”. 5 Bao, Jiannu. “Bloody Shawls Exterminating Chiru,”China Daily, 14 January 1999. 6 Sun, Yanfei and Zhao, Dingxin. (2008) “Environmental Campaigns,” in Kevin J. O’Brien (Ed.). Popular Protest in China. Harvard University Press: Cambridge. pp. 144‐162. 7 Lu, An. “Endangered Tibetan antelope triple since 1998 in China,” Xinhua, 22 April 2008. 8 Han, Ling. “New dam faces opposition,” China Central Television, 8 April 2003.. 15.

(21) As it so happened, when the provincial government was about launch the project in June 2003, Wang Yongchen and Zhang Kejia were attending a conference in Sichuan. A municipal official approached Wang and Zhang, pled with them to expose the story.9 . Upon her return, Zhang Kejia published, “The United Nations Worries the New Dam Constructed Near Dujiangyan Will Destroy the World Heritage Site’s Original Appearance” on July 9, 2003.10 Wang Yongchen also featured the. 政治大 Southern Weekend picked up from there, with two stories of their own: “Dam 立 Yangliuhu story at China National Radio’s program “News Background.” Then. ‧ 國. 學. Only 1310m from Dujiangyan” on July 31st, and “Water Enclosure: Disputes Over Intensive Construction of Hydropower” on August 14th. Moreover, Southern. ‧. Weekend followed the issue with a front‐page coverage and series called. sit. y. Nat. “Renzonghai Shocked by Hydroelectricity.”11 All in all, there were over 180. al. er. io. domestic and international media reports on this issue, invoking great public. v. n. pressure on the provincial government. On August 29, 2003, Sichuan’s provincial. Ch. engchi. i n U. government unanimously decided to terminate the project, for good.12 . Yuanmingyuan Park The controversy around Beijing’s 18th century historical site, Yuanmingyuan Park, also known as the Old Summer Palace, began with a tip‐off from a 9 Mertha, 2008: 100‐1.. 10 Zhang, Kejia. “The United Nations Worries the New Dam Constructed Near Dujiangyan Will. Destroy the World Heritage Site’s Original Appearance,” (Shijie Yichan Dujiangyan Yaojian Xinba, Lienheguo Guanyuan Guanzhu) China Youth Daily, 9 July 2003 11 Yan, Yan. “China’s Media Power Evidenced in ‘Anti‐Dam’ Movement,” Science News, 22 October 2009. 12 Zhang, Wei. (2007a) “Green News and the Rise of Chinese Environmental Journalists,” (Luse Xinwen Yu Zhongguo Huanjing Jizhequn Zhi Jueqi) The Journalist Monthly.. 16.

(22) professor. In March 2005, Professor Zhang Zhengchun chanced upon the park, and found workers busy laying down waterproof sheets on the bottom of the lake at the park. He posted a letter on the Internet, and called People’s Daily reporter Zhao Yongxin. At that point, the project to cover the bottom of Yuanmingyuan’s lake was already approved and was part of the Beijing Olympics’ plan to conserve water. Proponents of the project claimed that by waterproofing the lakebed, it would prevent the water from seeping into the ground, thereby saving water. Opponents of the project, though, thought it would. 政治大. destroy the ecology of the lake.13 . 立. ‧ 國. 學. After seeing the site for himself, Zhao Yongxin first wrote an internal reference report on 26 March, then exposed the construction project in People’s Daily on. ‧. March 28, whereas other reporters who had also interviewed Professor Zhang. sit. y. Nat. waited.14 Zhao’s report ignited a media storm around the project, and SEPA soon. al. er. io. organized a public hearing on the case; this became the first‐ever public hearing. v. n. in the history of PRC for an environmental issue.15 Zhao did not stop there, he. Ch. engchi. i n U. continued to follow up on the issue, even prompting People’s Daily website to do an online survey on the issue, and showed over 92% of those polled were against the case.16. In the end, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) conducted by Tsinghua University recommended the waterproofing of lakebed be modified, though not . 13 Li, Fei. “Yuanmingyuan lake bed project questioned,” China Daily, 30 March 2005.. 14 Zhang, Zhengchun. “Congratulations to the results of Green China Person of the Year Awards,”. (Zhuhe Luse Zhongguo Niandu Renwu Pingxuan Jiexiao) Tianya Forum, 29 November 2005. 15 Ma, Ji et al. (2009) “On sealing a lakebed: mass media and environmental democratization in China,” Environmental Science & Policy 12, pg. 74. 16 Li, Fei, China Daily, 30 March 2005.. 17.

(23) removed. Yet the silver lining, researchers noted, was not necessary the outcome of the waterproof sheets; rather, it was the fact that Chinese government was willing to allow public hearing on an environmental‐related project that had already been approved, and that the EIA report was published for all to see.17 What’s more, the journalist who first wrote about the story was awarded 2005 Green China “Person of the Year” for his contribution to environmental reporting.18. 政治大 Match made in Heaven: Partnership between ENGOs and Media 立 Literature Review. ‧ 國. 學. The collaborative relationship between ENGOs and media is said to be as perfect as “match made in heaven.”19 In China, commercialized media must. ‧. cater to the readers’ preferences, and reporters are finding that environment‐. sit. y. Nat. related news are often well‐received.20 In general, any social movement needs. al. er. io. the media, for better visibility, validation to the members, legitimacy to the. v. n. issue at hand, and most of all, to balance the inequality of power dynamic. Ch. engchi. between movement and the authorities.21 . i n U. Former reporter for China Environmental News and environmental activist, Wen Bo saw the “Greening of Chinese Media” as partially government‐driven. “Due to China’s large population and limited government resources,” Wen wrote, “the . 17 Ma et al., 2009: 75.. 18 Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China. (Updated 2010). “People’s Daily Reporter Zhao Yongxin,” (Renmin Ribao Jizhe Zhao Yongxin).. 19 Wang, Hsinhsien. (2007) “Embeddedness or Autonomy? Environmental NGOs in Transforming. China: The Perspective of Bureaucracy Competition Model,” Paper presented at Public Administration and Civil Society Development Academic Seminar, 12 June 2007, Taipei, Taiwan. 20 Author’s interview with Yu Xiaogang. 21 Wolfsfeld, Gadi. (1997) Media and political conflict: News from the Middle East. New York: University of Cambridge. Pg. 77.. 18.

(24) government relies on mass media to publicize its environmental protection campaigns.”22 He then went on to cite how SEPA sponsors television and radio programs on environmental protection education. The interesting part about his argument arrives at the chain‐effect of citizen motivation. Since Chinese government grants media the freedom to report on environmental issues, ENGOs are happy because they want to raise publicity for their cause and their organization. The ENGOs in turn, through the media coverage, encourage ordinary citizens to get involved in environmental protection issues.23. 政治大 Similarly, in her insightful analysis on China’s environmental crisis, Economy 立. ‧ 國. 學. concluded that, as Chinese authorities delegate environmental protection responsibilities to lower‐level and local officials, they need the media and. ‧. ENGOs to help:. sit. y. Nat. By promoting the growth of environmental NGOs and media coverage of environmental issues, the Chinese leadership hopes to fill the gap between its desire to improve the country’s environment and its capacity to do so.24. n. al. er. io. While this seems rather irresponsible of the authorities, to simply walk away. i n U. v. from, and turn their back on the duties at hand, Economy sees it differently.. Ch. engchi. She believes that this is essentially, an authoritarian government’s way at liberalization, because it allows greater freedom for the civil society to engage and manage their affairs.. It is under these circumstances that journalists and ENGOs are forming a mutual benefiting rapport. Guobing Yang (2005) notes the close relationship between journalists and environmentalists grew out of a shared characteristic . 22 Wen, Bo. (1998) “Greening the Chinese Media,” China Environmental Series, Issue 2. pg. 42 23 Ibid.. 24 Economy, Elizabeth. (2004) The River Runs Black. New York: Cornell University. pg. 130. 19.

(25) of being “sandwiched” between the state’s political authority and the market’s economic constraint. 25 According to Yang, journalists find reporting on environmental issues as a win‐win choice that is political safe while advancing both the newspaper’s status and readership: “Media reports about environmental problems can be critical – and thus assert some degree of media autonomy – without directly challenging state legitimacy.”26 . Zhan Jiang (2011) sees the competitive media industry as the driving force. 政治大 The growing commercialized media industry also allows 立. behind reports on environmental protection, because they are perceived as “news‐worthy.”27. ‧ 國. 學. more press freedom when the state exercises media crackdown, in the sense that private media entities are less expected to follow the state’s censorship. sit. y. Nat. ‧. rules.28. al. er. io. Zeng Fanxu (2009) proposed that the rise of Chinese environmental media has. v. n. begun to form what he calls “Media‐Oriented Civil Society.” Applying the state‐. Ch. engchi. i n U. society framework to the recent surge of media‐ENGO alliance, Zeng points out the media’s partnership with social groups, is effectively strengthening China’s civil society. After “inputting” public concern, Chinese environmental media then pursues the following strategies to exert pressure on the government: active reporting, journalists assuming the spotlight, and mobilizing international media and organizations. According to Zeng, as long as journalists can evoke “media . 25 Yang, Guobin. (2005) “Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China,” China. Quarterly, 181, pg.46‐66. 26 Ibid. 27 Zhan, Jiang. (2011) “Environmental Journalism in China,” in S. Shirk. (Ed.) Changing Media, Changing China. New York: Oxford University Press. pg.118 28 Ibid., 125.. 20.

(26) resonance,” then opportunities and platforms are created, on which the public can then engage the government, even participate on the decision‐making process of setting the policy agenda.29. Though in order to affect policy, some think, would be impossible without the support from at least some portion of the government. Wang Hsinhsien (2007) attributes the success of China’s ENGOs to SEPA’s willingness to collaborate with them. Wang quotes Tsinghua University’s NGO Research Center’s director. 政治大 The biggest lesson from the preliminary success of “Battle to Protect Nujiang” is that civil organization 立 found a partnership from inside the government, and it. Wang Ming:. ‧ 國. 學. would be impossible to imagine affecting government policy without the support from inside the government.30. Indeed, in a structurally top‐down authoritarian regime, it can be difficult to. ‧. imagine the civil society having any meaningful input into the national agenda. y. Nat. without at least some support from a branch of government. Many scholars. n. al. er. io. sit. have thus analyzed this issue from the perspective of state versus society.. Ch. Media in China: Third Estate, still under One State. engchi. i n U. v. Anti‐NRP campaign’s success has drawn the interest of many scholars and students, where the point of intrigue is often focused at the heart of China’s political structure. Some see the growth of environmental activism as the representative rise of civil society, and deem it a likely step toward future democratization in China.31 The most employed theoretical basis upon which anti‐NRP studies are analyzed is that of state‐society relations, where China’s 29 Zeng, Fanxu. (2009) “The Rising of Media‐Oriented Civil Society in China: How Grassroot. Voices Influence Policy Agenda” Communication Research, 100: pp.187‐200.. 30 Wang, H. 2007: 18.. 31 Johnson, Thomas. (2010) “Environmentalism and NIMBYism in China: promoting a rules‐based. approach to public participation,” Environmental Politics, 19:3, pp. 430‐448. Economy, 2004.. 21.

(27) post‐totalitarian regime is paired against that of slowly developing civil society.32 . Indeed, in a country where the ruling party is still upheld above the constitution, and the national military is sworn to protect the Communist Party, rather than the state, it is easy to see matters in a state‐society dichotomy. So much so that even when scholars employ other theories such as the political opportunity model,33 or the Multiple Stream Policy framework,34 the layout is. 政治大. still drawn as a power struggle between the CCP‐controlled state and the people, or the civil society. . Thriving between the Cracks of Concrete: Power of ENGOs. 學. ‧ 國. 立. ‧. Yanfei Sun and Dingxin Zhao (2008) point out that change in China’s state‐. sit. y. Nat. society relations is the reason why anti‐NRP campaign succeeded while anti‐. al. er. io. TGP campaign did not.35 The political atmosphere of the early 1990s when the. v. n. anti‐TGP campaign reached its peak, it coincided with the aftermath of the. Ch. engchi. i n U. 1989 Democracy Movement, when leaders of CCP could not allow another wave of political dissent to emerge. . . 32 Yang, 2005. Zeng, 2009. Johnson 2010. Stalley, Philip and Yang, Dongning. (2006) An. Emerging Environmental Movement in China? China Quarterly, 186: pp. 333‐356. Büsgen, Michael. (2006) “NGOs and the Search for Chinese Civil Society Environmental Non‐ Governmental Organizations in the Nujiang Campaign,” Working Paper Series, Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands. 33 Chan, Kin‐man and Zhou, Yan. (2007) Political Opportunity and Anti‐dam Construction Movement in China. Paper presented at the National Central University of Taiwan’s International Conference on Non‐Profit Sector in Asia‐Pacific Region: 16‐17 November 2007. 34 Kingdon, John W. (1984) Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Bostin: Little, Brown and Company. 35 Sun and Zhao, 2008: 161.. 22.

(28) As China relaxed its rule on civil society in the mid‐1990s, Chen Jie (2010) saw that accompanying the rise of NGOs in China, there was gradual increase of International NGOs (INGOs) as well. The number of INGOs grew from 11 in 1994 to 68 in 2005, about half of such are located in Yunnan, and out of 126 Chinese NGOs surveyed in 2004, 71% admit to having contact with INGOs.36 Moreover, Chen argues that an example of INGOs’ “facilitation of Chinese NGOs’ domestic impact” can be evidenced, when global anti‐dam group International Rivers Network (IRN) became a direct funder of the primary anti‐NRP ENGOs. 政治大 Most importantly, INGOs provided the necessary personal 立. Green Watershed (GW), Green Earth Volunteers (GEV), and Global Village of Beijing (GVB).37. ‧ 國. 學. connections that put Chinese NGOs in touch with Western media, and help present their issues to the international stage.. ‧. sit. y. Nat. Peter Ho and Richard Edmonds (2008) credit anti‐NRP activists’ success to. al. er. io. their framing of the issue in legal terms, especially because the activists were. v. n. careful to avoid political connotations. According to Ho and Edmonds, activists’. Ch. engchi. i n U. efforts in working with the rules provided by the state is a manifestation of “embedded activism,” or working within the framework of CCP’s state system, as opposed to working to dismantle the state system. By Ho and Edmonds’ account, anti‐NRP activists’ use of values and even personnel within the state against their pro‐NRP opponents “is a resourceful and negotiated strategy...to. . 36 Chen, Jie. (2010) “Transnational Environmental Movement: impacts on the green civil society. in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, 19:65, pp. 503‐523.. 37 Ibid., 514.. 23.

(29) gain maximum political and social influence, at least in name, by professing to uphold the principles of Chinese Communist Party and state.”38 . Ho and Edmonds call this strategy “limiting while enabling.”39 They even go as far as comparing Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 Open Door Policy to embedded activism: since the China’s leaders opted the incremental strategy with which to execute Economic Reforms: “In this light, we might view embedded environmentalism as a transient phase which is itself changing through time, a. 政治大. transitional feature of a burgeoning civil society in a semi‐authoritarian context.”40. ‧ 國. 學. 立. In the same vein, Thomas Johnson’s (2010) calls activists’ strategy to cooperate. ‧. with the state as “rules‐based activism,” echoing anti‐NRP activists’ success lies. sit. y. Nat. in playing inside the system. In particular, Johnson argues that the Chinese. al. er. io. state’s introduction of environmental protection laws, such as the. v. n. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and the Administrative Licensing Law. Ch. engchi. i n U. (ALL), allowed activists to engage in public policy through legal framework. According to Johnson, activists framed their issue “in legal terms by advocating formal public participation in the decision‐making process according to the rules,”41 made “adherence to participatory rules their bottom line.”42 . . 38 Ho, Peter and Edmonds, Richard Louis. (2008). “Perspectives of time and change: rethinking. green environmental activism in China,” in Ho and Edmonds. (Ed.) China’s Embedded Activism: Opportunities and constraints of a social movement. New York: Routledge. pg. 220. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., 222. 41 Johnson, 2010: 437. 42 Ibid., 442.. 24.

(30) Andrew Mertha (2008) claims that environmental activists’ framing of the issue was key to mobilization,43 which turned out to be extremely effective in initiating new activists in the sense of not “preaching to the choir.” Sun and Zhao also attribute issue‐framing as the critical factor in swaying the campaign’s momentum. In particular, they use the tug‐of‐war between pro‐ dam and anti‐dam activists’ ability to issue‐framing to prove that, “...it is the power to frame and the framing of the issue that matters.”44. Theoretical Framework Multiple Streams Model. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. In the study of how a policy gets onto the agenda of decision‐makers in the United States government, John Kingdon (1984) argues that an issue has the best. ‧. chance of being selected onto policy agenda, when the Policy Entrepreneur can. sit. y. Nat. bring, or “couple” together all the streams: problem, political, and policy, at an. al. er. io. opportune time in which the policy window is open. This is where “an. v. n. opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push. Ch. engchi. i n U. attention to their special problems.”45 In addition, Kingdon suggests that those most likely to have an impact on policy agenda are the “visible participants,”46 meaning those in the government’s as the president, or elected officials, have the most power in the decision‐making process.. 43 Mertha, 2008: 14.. 44 Sun and Zhao, 2008: 161. 45 Kingdon, 1984: 173. 46 Ibid., 72.. 25.

(31) Figure 1 demonstrates the process through which the environmental activists. 政治大 show how the environmental 立 journalists influence central government’s policy were able to influence policy agenda. I use Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model to. ‧ 國. 學. plan. In the case of anti‐NRP campaign, the problem stream is the controversy over building dams on the Nujiang. The political stream is an atmosphere where. ‧. the central government has formally recognized environmental protection as. sit. y. Nat. one of the nation’s top priorities, launched the China Century Environmental. n. al. er. io. Protection (CCEP) campaign to help educate the public on the issue, and Premier. i n U. v. Wen Jiabao is a geologist who understands the technical problems with building. Ch. engchi. large hydropower plants on unstable land. The policy stream consists of the Environmental Impact Assessment Law and environmental‐oriented media. . The policy entrepreneurs – anti‐NRP activist journalists – combined all of these streams, when the opportunities of policy windows are open. The first time in 2004, when media leaked a private comment Premier Wen Jiabao wrote for the NDRC report, turning an internal suggestion for further research into a public stance, an order to halt the NRP. The second time in 2009, after the May 2008. 26.

(32) Sichuan Earthquake took away nearly 70,000 lives47 in the nation’s biggest earth‐shattering tragedy. After initial reports on the devastation and death toll of the earthquake trailed off, researchers began to wonder, just what caused the magnitude‐7.9 quake. Seismologist speculated that 5.5 km from the epicenter,48 the nearby large hydropower plant Zipingpu was perhaps to blame, because the reservoir, containing hundreds of million tons of water, was putting too much stress on the fault. However, during both times of the policy windows, alternative solutions had not reached consensus, so even though the national. 政治大 the process return to step one, hence the arrows from Policy Output go back to 立. sentiment was strong enough to at least force suspension on the construction,. ‧ 國. 學. the three streams. Interestingly, while Kingdon stresses that the inclusion of alternative solution is a prerequisite of a successful policy proposal, he also. ‧. admits that, “mass media, elections, parties, campaigns, and changes in mass. sit. y. Nat. public opinion or national mood were all found to affect the agenda more than. al. er. io. the alternatives.”49 As is evidenced in the anti‐NRP campaign, this is at least true. n. during the Hu‐Wen administration. . Ch. engchi. . i n U. v. 47 Associated Press. “Devastating Sichuan earthquake may have been caused by dam,” 6 February. 2009. 48 Ibid. 49 Kingdon, 1984: 73.. 27.

(33) Chapter III – Case Study: The Anti‐NRP Campaign “Those who call us anti‐dam are not really listening to our opinions...What we want is public participation and for the Environmental Impact Assessment reports to be made public.” – Wang Yongchen,1 CNR reporter and GEV founder.. Nujiang Hydropower Project In 1994, China published the “China Agenda 21” white paper, which outlined the country’s strategic policies on sustainable development.2 China’s water resources primarily concentrate in the southwestern region, thus the Great Western Development Plan (2000) included hydropower electricity as part of. 政治大. the strategic policy. Eventually, China plans to fully cultivate its water‐rich. 立. areas, so that 15% of its total renewable energy production will come from. ‧ 國. ‧. 學. hydropower.3 . Preliminary surveys to build dams on the Nu River began in the 1970s, and. y. Nat. io. sit. more thorough research was done in the 1980s, which became part of the “Nu. n. al. er. River development plan of 1989.”4 Findings from the 1989 research were then. Ch. i n U. v. incorporated into the 1991 “China Hydropower Photo and Figures Collection”. engchi. report. This Hydroelectricity Bureau of the Department of Energy report called for six hydropower stations in the Nu River valley with a total capacity of 10,900,000 megawatts or 10 percent of China’s entire hydropower.5 Eight years later, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) . 1 Zhang, Ke. “Wang Yongchen: we are not anti‐dam,” (Women bushi fanba renshi) Diyi Caijing. Daily, 8 January 2008, pg. A06.. 2 Yang, Guobin and Calhoun, Craig. (2008) “Media, civil society, and the rise of a green public. sphere in China,” in Ho and Edmonds (Ed.) China’s Embedded Activism: Opportunities and constraints of a social movement. New York: Routledge. 3 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. China’s Energy Conditions and Policies. 26 December 2007. 4 Brown, Philip H. and Xu, Yilin. (2010) “Hydropower Development and Resettlement Policy on China’s Nu River,” Journal of Contemporary China, 19:66, pp. 777‐797. 5 Mertha, 2008: 116‐7.. 28.

(34) decided to adopt the Nu River Project (NRP) for energy production purposes, and asked the Water Resources Hydropower Planning Institute to organize a bidding contest. Eventually they decided on two planning units, the Beijing Survey and Design Institute and the Huadong Survey and Design Institute, to plan out the NRP. Their final design called for two reservoirs and thirteen dams.6 (See Map 1). 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. On 14 March 2003, the hydropower investor, Huadian, signed an intent agreement to jointly develop hydroelectric power with the Yunnan provincial government, with Liuku as the first construction site. Three months later,. 6 Brown and Xu, 2010: 783.. 29.

(35) Huadian and Yunnan provincial government formed the Yunnan Huadian Nujiang Hydroelectricity Development Corporation to carry out the task.7. Almost at the same time as the hydroelectricity deal was being negotiated, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) approved the Three Parallel Rivers as a World Natural Heritage Site on 3 July. Two weeks later, the Yunnan Huadian Corporation announced that the construction of the first site, Liuku, would begin on 20 September, and the dam. 政治大 minority’s Lisu leaders, the “Report on Nujiang middle and lower stream 立 was scheduled to be operational in 2007.8 With the support of the ethnic. ‧ 國. 學. hydroelectricity construction plan” was sent to Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture of Yunnan Province, then to the NDRC in August for review. The. ‧. sit. al. er. io. Nat. environmental impact assessment meetings on the issue. . y. NDRC swiftly approved the NRP upon receipt of the proposal, and held. v. n. During the August NDRC meeting, a SEPA official Mu GuangFeng refused to. Ch. engchi. i n U. endorse the NRP due to lack of impact assessment. Mu phoned environmental journalist Wang Yongchen during a break at this meeting, asking for contact info of experts who might be able to provide useful information on. Wang became interested in the NRP, and gave Mu the number of a Yunnan‐based scholar researcher He Daming. As the head of the Asian International Rivers Center at. 7 Ibid., 784.. 8 Ibid.. 30.

(36) Yunnan University, born and raised in Yunnan, He is said to be the most knowledgeable person on Nujiang in the entire China.9. This would be the beginning of a collaborative relationship between SEPA officials and environmental activists. During the subsequent assessment meetings on NRP, environmental journalists helped arrange the attendance of anti‐dam experts, meanwhile the media‐battle ensued from mid‐2003 onward. Environmental journalists initiated a three‐pronged approach that targeted the. 政治大 the Nujiang local region, and emphasized the importance of preserving both the 立 bureaucratic process of EIA procedures, lent focus on the affected residents in. ‧ 國. 學. pristine nature of Nujiang and its World Heritage status; all the while, heightening the media exposure on the issue, charging the army of Green. ‧. Reports Salon journalists to write up on environmental protection stories.. sit. y. Nat. During one of the Green Reporters Salon sessions, former journalist‐turned‐. al. er. io. ENGO‐leader Ma Jun reportedly told the audience: “Information disclosure is a. v. n. powerful way to achieve environmental protection,” and directly asked his. Ch. engchi. fellow reporters to write on the issue.10. i n U. Environmental journalists’ media campaign successfully attracted public interest and invoked public discussion on the NRP, thereby culminating to the famous February 2004 decision in which premier Wen Jiabao himself showed hesitation on the NRP, prompting a general praise of the anti‐NRP campaign as the most successful case of China’s environmental activism. Yet six months . 9 Mertha, 2008: 119.. 10 Asahi News, 2006/12/20.. 31.

(37) later, preliminary construction on the first NRP site already began, and by the end the year, the EIA report had advanced to the next level. The following years featured constant advances and setbacks on both sides, with the final decision on NRP dangling in the air, though proponents of the NRP were clearly gaining the upper hand, as plans to develop China’s southwestern water resources were again written into the 11th Five‐Year Plan. . Until the tragic 2008 Sichuan earthquake, in whose aftermath experts began. 政治大 seismic activities. Given the grieving national mood over the earthquake deaths 立 questioning the relationship between large hydroelectricity plants and unusual. ‧ 國. 學. and various renowned geologists’ public stance against building large dams on active fault lines without further scientific inquiries, May 2009 saw a repeat. ‧. order to halt the NRP construction. The state of political stalemate of the NRP. sit. y. Nat. has continued to this day, and as of March 2012, the official statement on the. al. n. hydropower construction on the Nujiang.. Ch. engchi. er. io. NRP maintains that without further scientific research, there will be no formal. i n U. v. Problem Stream Kingdon (1984) differentiates between “problem” and “condition;” whereas a condition is in the realm of bad weather or poverty, a “condition” becomes a “problem” when one decides to do something about it.11 The same logic applies in the controversy over damming the Nujiang, after all, hydroelectricity development is nothing new to the southwestern part of China, and it is part of the CCP’s nationwide policy plan. In the section below, I will show how 11 Kingdon, 1984: 115. . 32.

(38) proponents and opponents of the NRP present their arguments, making a public policy into a public debate that spiraled into a “problem” for the central government.. Argument I: Environmental Protection Opponents: Ecological diversity Dubbed “Grand Canyon of the Orient,”12 Nujiang is where 173 mammal species, 417 species of birds, 59 reptile, 36 kinds of amphibias, 76 fresh water fishes, 31. 政治大 be found in the Three Parallel Rivers region, where it supports 50% of animal 立. species of butterflies and insects called home.13 In fact, 6,000 plant species can. ‧ 國. 學. species in China, and 25% of animal species in the world.14 In addition, there are more than 10 unique fish species in the Nujiang, as well as wild grass species. ‧. that can only be found in the lower reaches of the Nujiang.15. sit. y. Nat. al. er. io. Proponents: Protect Environment from the Villagers. v. n. “Local people always used timber to make fire,” said Jie Yi, Nujiang prefecture’s. Ch. engchi. i n U. Party Secretary. “If we replace timber with electricity, then we have avoid cutting down more than 400,000 cubic meters of trees each year.”16 Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) scholar He Zhuoxiu claimed that during a tour to the region in April 2005, he saw “up to 1,500 meter high of the mountains were bare,” because. . 12 Watts, Jonathan. “China’s big hydro wins permission for 21.3GW dam in world heritage site,”. The Guardian, 1 February 2011. 13 Wang, Yongchen. (2005) “Nujiang: rushing freely in the valley,” (Nujiang: zai xiagu zhong ziyou liutang) China Nature, 3. pp. 41‐43. 14 International Rivers Network, 2006. 15 Ibid. 16 Tang, Jianguang. (2004) “Who shall decide the fate of Nujiang?” (Shei lai jueding Nujiang mingyun?) China News Weekly, 18, pp. 16‐38.. 33.

(39) the local villagers were cutting down trees to make fire.17 “In fact, only by developing the Nujiang would we have money to implement Ecological Relocation,” said Warton Economic Institute’s director Shen Hanyao. “So as to prevent the vegetation from being damaged by the local villagers’ survival needs.”18. Argument II: World Heritage Site Opponents: World Heritage Site as Prestige Recognition. 政治大 the richest temperate regions of the world in terms of biodiversity.” 立. Described on the UNESCO website as “epicenter of Chinese biodiversity… one of 19 Opponents. ‧ 國. 學. of the NRP used the prestigious recognition from the international organization to argue that, it is the interest of China as a nation to preserve the natural. ‧. environment, and keep the title of World Heritage site. Senior reporter for the. sit. y. Nat. China Youth Daily wrote an entry entitled: “World Heritage Three Parallel Rivers. al. er. io. under Threat: Hydroelectricity Development Destroys Ecological Environment”. v. n. in July 2006, detailing how the region was listed as “World Heritage in Danger”. Ch. engchi. i n U. for three consecutive years since winning the status in 2003.20 Macao Daily also published an editorial, calling on Chinese government to better protect its World Heritage sites.21. . 17 Sun, Rongfei and Ye, Jing. “Ban on Nujiang Hydroelectricity Gradually Lifted,” (Nujang shuidian. jianbei jiejin) Diyi Caijing Daily, 3 June 2005, page‐A06.. 18 Ibid.. 19 UNESCO World Heritage Centre. (Updated 2010) “Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected. Areas.” 20 Zhang, Kejia. “Three Parallel Rivers Regions Listed in the ‘Key Observation and Protection Program’ of the World Heritage List: Hydropower Development Endangers the Environment,” China Daily Youth, 17 July 2006. 21 China Review News. “Macao Daily: China should improve protection over World Heritage,” (Aomen Ribao: Zhongguo Ying Jiaqiang Shijie Yichan Baohu) 30 June 2006.. 34.

(40) Proponents: Below 2,000 meter Not Included in Protected Area Just when every domestic and international media headline screamed “World Heritage site to be destroyed!” proponents of the NRP trumped everyone with a crazy wild card, and it turned out to be pre‐meditated, too. The Yunnan office in charge of World Heritage Site Protection claimed, despite Nujiang belonging to the Three Parallel Rivers, hydroelectric development would not harm the protected area. By their account, the portions of Nujiang under protection are above 2000 meters, and the tallest of the planned dams would not even come. 政治大 when they filed the application for World Heritage Status. 立. close. Moreover, this is something they had already considered back in 2002, 22 Then in 2005, the. ‧ 國. 學. local government announced plans to redraw the boundaries of the protected area; UNESCO monitor team believed the purpose of rezoning was to. ‧. accommodate existing mining operations within the World Heritage Site.23. sit. y. Nat. al. n. Opponents: Preserve Natural Flow; Big dams are passé. Ch. engchi. er. io. Argument III: Hydropower. i n U. v. Nujiang, in Chinese means the “Angry River.” The river got its name from the loud noise it makes as the river runs, especially in the summer. However, the construction of the dam would stop the natural flow of the Nujiang, essentially stopping the rapid flow, turning a lively, fierce river that has existed since the ancient times, into a pool of dead water. Leader of the survey team at the Songta dam site told filmmakers of the documentary Silent Nu River: You will never see the Nujiang again. I don’t think the Nu will flow rapidly after the completion of the cascade 13 dams. As a matter of fact, the Nu will be turned into a lake.. . 22 Yan, Xueshi. (2004) “Who aroused the waves of Nujiang,” Western Forum, 3, pp. 30‐34. 23 Lopouhkhine, Nikita and Jayakumar, Ramasamy. (2006) “Report of a Joint Reactive Monitoring. Mission to the Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas, China,” UNESCO.. 35.

(41) Only a lake, so you won’t see the Nu as it used to be. (The rapids will be gone?) Gone.24 . Opponents of NRP highlighted that the era of large dams has come to an end, at least for major western countries. Forestry Economy reporter quoted the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to say, “Americans’ era of hydropower dams is over.”25 According to the magazine, the U.S. has retired more than 500 dams by 2004, most of them due to concerns over conservation of water and fish resources. In Norway, where 99% of their power generation comes from hydroelectricity, has now banned the building of dams. In addition to European countries such as. 政治大 major rivers. Even developing countries in Africa and Thailand have either 立 France, Sweden, and Latvia enacting laws to ban the construction of dams on. sit. Nat. Proponents: Underdeveloped Water Resources are Wasteful. y. ‧. ‧ 國. the dams.26. 學. canceled plans to build hydropower plants, or make changes to how they handle. al. er. io. One of the arguments used to justify the development of Nujiang was essentially,. v. n. if we did not cultivate the rivers for their capacity to generate power, then it. Ch. engchi. i n U. would be a shameful waste. Theoretically, China’s vast rivers altogether contain 676 GW of potential generation capacity, out of which the exploitable potential is 378 GW.27 “Our country’s water resources are abundant, ranked number one in the world,” boasted NDRC’s Vice Chairman Zhang Guobao. “But currently we have only cultivated about 20% of that, comprising only 24% of the country’s. . 24 Hu, Jie. (2006) Silent Nu River. (DVD) Hong Kong: Visible Record Limited.. 25 Sun, Danping. (2004) “Is the dam construction in the sunrise or at the sunset?” Forestry. Economy, 1, pp. 22‐26. 26 Ibid. 27 Lako, P. et al. (2003) “Hydropower Development with a Focus on Asia and Western Europe,” study for ECN Policy Studies and Verbundplan.. 36.

(42) total power generation.”28 Compared to the United States, where the exploitation of hydropower reached 80%; while Brazil and Norway already tapped over 90% of their hydropower capacity, China only under 25% of cultivation does seem comparatively lower.. Indeed, pro‐dam officials lamented the under‐achievement. In an interview with People’s Daily, China Electricity Council Vice President Sun Yucai reasoned from an even broader scheme of things. From perspective of strategic resource. 政治大 hydropower, not realizing its potential would be a terrible waste. “…We cannot 立. development, Sun argued, as long as China possesses the God‐given advantage of. ‧ 國. 學. starve ourselves, just because we were worry that we might choke,” Sun used an old Chinese saying (yin ye fei shi) to arrive at his point. “Giving up on hydropower. ‧. development would mean, regrettably letting the rapid rivers flow away under. y. sit. al. er. io. Nat. your nose.”29. n. Argument IV: Human Factor. Ch. engchi. Opponents: Dam Migrants Worse Off. i n U. v. About 50,000 villagers in the region would have to relocate in order to make way for the planned dams. Leader of the Yunnan‐based grassroots NGO, Green Watershed (GW), Yu Xiaogang said that, instead of informing the villagers exactly what would happen to them after the move, the local government turned to slogan‐propaganda. “The day of hydroelectricity is the day of happiness” (Fa dian . 28 Ma, Hongtao. “The Fight over Damming the Nujiang,” (Nujiang jianba zhi zheng),. Jingjibanxiaoshi, 29 December 2003.. 29 Ruan, Yongping and Wu, Jiang. “What is the future of China’s Hydroelectricity” (Zhongguo. shuidian he qu he cong) People’s Daily, 1 November 2004, pg. 15.. 37.

(43) zhi ri jiu shi xing fu zhi ri).30 So Yu decided to take a group of Xiaoshaba villagers from Nujiang to visit the Manwan area, to see for themselves the reality of displaced people from the Manwan and Xiaowan hydropower stations. From 25‐ 28 May 2004 Yu toured the Lancang river with the Nujiang villagers, and filmed the interviews he conducted on site.31. What the Nujiang villagers saw, stunned them. Before their eyes was a 78 year‐ old elderly woman picking through trash, next to her was a 26 year‐old mother,. 政治大 picking through trash,” the elderly woman told the Nujiang villagers. “If we’re 立. carrying a two year‐old child on her back. “We can earn 10 to 20 cents each day. ‧ 國. 學. lucky, maybe even one to two yuan.” The young mother wasn’t so resigned to life; she burst into tears as she spoke. “No land, no job,” she said, “if I don’t pick. ‧. through trash and sell the recycling, we would have no way to live.”32 Migrants. sit. y. Nat. complained that there was no adequate compensation for the relocation. The. al. er. io. numbers would even more telling. Before their villagers were flooded, villagers. v. n. of Manwan were making decent income. In fact, they made 11.2% more than the. Ch. engchi. i n U. province’s average, and 63.5% more than the average of the dam region. Yet after their hometown was flooded in 1997, their income dropped drastically, down to less than 50% of the area average.33. “Of course the power company will be the biggest recipient of benefits in the construction of hydroelectricity plants,” Yunnan‐based Professor He Daming said. . 30 Author’s interview with Yu Xiaogang. 31 Mertha, 2008: 128‐130. . 32 Yin, Hongwei. (2004) “Social forces take on dam construction on the Nujiang,” (Minjian. liliang duijue Nujiang jianba) China Society Periodical, 8, pp. 34‐36. 33 Li, Ziliang. (2004) “Nujiang Face‐off” (Nujiang zheng ba) Outlook Weekly, 49, pp. 24‐31.. 38.

(44) “Local government will likely get out of poverty too, but it would be hard to know whether this money will be spent on the average folks.”34 He’s candid analysis of the trickle‐down economic theory is a slap in the face for those who champion economic development as the only way out of poverty for Nujiang’s residents, but what stings the most is probably this following analogy. “Blindly go into development is like killing the hen to get at the eggs.”35. In 2006, the first site of the NRP, Liuku, began to evacuate migrants for the. 政治大 134 households, totaling 537 migrants had voluntarily agreed to relocate. 立 preparation of preliminary construction. The local leaders claimed that all of the. ‧ 國. 學. However, when reporter went to the town to verify the facts, he found that the migrants were unhappy about the compensation. Compared to an annual income. ‧. of ¥4‐500 on a single mango tree, the migrants were paid a once‐compensation. sit. y. Nat. of ¥200. “If they can’t take care of a few hundred migrants,” CAS researcher Lee. al. n. thousands of migrants?”36. er. io. Yuchuang asked. “How can we expect them to adequately relocate tens of. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Proponents: Economic Benefits as Means of Poverty Alleviation Out of Nujiang’s total hydroelectric capacity of 42 GW, the plan to build a cascade of 13 dams on the river would produce a total installed capacity of 21.3 GW, exceeding that of the TGP (which has installed capacity of 18 GW), and. . 34 He, Daming. (2004) “The Pros and Cons of Building the Dam,” National Park of China, 6, pp. 26‐. 27.. 35 Ibid. 36 Li, Yuchen. “Chiang Kaoming: Nujiang hydroelectricity development should consider both. sides,” (Chiang Kaoming: Nujiang shuidian keifa heide quanheng libi) Beijing News, 2 March 2008.. 39.