商業判斷法則之要件及效果

第一項、要件

商業判斷法則之主要目的，係為了免除公司董事對於其失誤的商業判斷負擔 法律上之責任，並避免影響公司業務之健全運行。但該法則並非使公司董事得以 恣意的為任何商業判斷而影響公司利益。商業判斷法則之適用亦有其要件規定，

符合以下各要件規定始有商業判斷法則之適用，若有違反，公司董事自不得主張 商業判斷法則之保護，而此等要件規定，乃係源於美國法上之實務發展，以下僅 就各要件分述之：

一、董事所為係屬商業性之決定（a business decision）

商業之意義即係指以營利為目的之經濟行為。商業行為是指以發生交易為內 容並符合法律規定之行為。此項要件之用意應在排除董事非商業性之決定，蓋商 業判斷法則係因為商業性之決定可能大多涉及「風險性」或「經濟性」⁸²，在此等 相關事務下，董事之判斷不一定均能處在充分的資訊優勢或充足的討論思考，故 對於董事常有減輕之責任之必要，如處分公司資產、資本投資、股票發行等，對 於董事而言，均屬商業性之決定；反之，若係單純公司之一般事務，自無商業判 斷法則之適用，1993 年德拉瓦州最高法院在 Nixon v. Blackwell 案即表示：「商業判 斷法則的案件中，由無利害關係且具獨立性之公司決策者作出『商業性決定』為 其必備要件」（In business judgment rule cases, an essential element is the fact that there has been a business decision made by a disinterested and independent corporate

decisionmaker.）⁸³。故在檢驗商業判斷法則之初，首先即要求董事之行為即須為「商 業性之決定」。

82 參考李維心，見前揭註 14，頁 138。

83 NIXON v. BLACKWELL，626 A.2d 1366 ,1376(1993)

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董事消極不作為可否屬商業性決定？此為美國法上商業判斷法則發展的爭執 之一。通說認為，公司董事之不作為決定若是為有意識的經營判斷，仍受該法則 之保護⁸⁴。此外，美國德拉瓦州最高法院曾於 1984 年的 Aronson v. Lewis 案⁸⁵中曾 指出：「商業判斷法則僅有在董事之行為上方有適用，董事若有未盡職責或未曾深 思熟慮即為不作為之決定者，自應無商業判斷法則的適用。但倘若該董事之不作 為決定已經深思熟慮者，則該判斷事項自當受商業判斷法則的保護⁸⁶」。此見解德 拉瓦州最高法院在 Rales v. Blasband 一案中再次肯認，判決即提及：「董事缺乏故 意決定為積極行為或阻止積極行為，商業判斷法則並不適用」（Where there is no conscious decision by directors to act or refrain from acting, the business judgment rule has no application.）⁸⁷。故董事之不作為決定亦有可能受商業判斷法則之保護，蓋 若係董事經深思熟慮之決策，自亦屬商業性之決定。

二、董事與該交易無利害關係、具獨立性及重要性（disinterestedness independence

and materiality）

若董事於公司進行交易之過程中，或董事在為公司作出商業決定時，對於交 易本身，或係商業決定本身，係有利害糾葛時，或董事本身在作出決定時係有欠 獨立自主，即難期董事能擺脫自身利害之束縛，仍全心基於公司之立場作出商業 決斷。若董事於作出商業決定時，係為自己利益而為，或係有欠獨立時，卻仍受 商業判斷法則之優勢推斷，排除可能的追訴責任，即難謂公平，是以，在商業判 斷法則之要件上，須以董事與該交易無利害關係且具備獨立性為其前提。

至於「利害關係」及「獨立性」之具體判斷，可參考美國實務上之發展。所

84 Lewis D. Solomon and Alan R. Palmiter, Corporations: examples and explanations(Aspen Law &

Business, New York, 3^rd ed.,1999), pp.207-208. 轉引自戴志傑，公司法上「經營判斷法則」之研究，

月旦法學雜誌第 106 期，2004 年 3 月，頁 168。

85 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).

86 原文如下: …the business judgment rule operates only in the context of director action. Technically speaking, it has no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to act. But it also follows that under applicable principles, a conscious decision to refrain from acting may nonetheless be a valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy the protections of the rule. 中文翻譯參考 戴志傑，見前揭註 84，頁 168。

87 中文翻譯參考陳錦隆，見前揭註 12，頁 42。

32 縮於「財務上利益或侵害(either a financial interest or entrenchment)⁹²」，且此等主張 須有具體事證，若僅係主張董事對交易有特殊之財務上利益卻未能提出具體事證

（without specific facts regarding specific financial benefit），或主張某交易或行為係 有可能延長董事之任期（a certain decision might lead to the potential of giving a director a longer tenure on the board of directors）（蓋此時非屬金錢利益或侵害）等，

均不足推翻商業判斷法則之推定⁹³。至於原告若主張「侵害」，此時原告則應舉證 董事會為該交易或行為之「唯一」或「主要」之目的係為了要永保董事自身對公

88 Rales v. Balsband, 634 A.2d 927,936(Del. 1993)，原文為：A director is considered interested where he or she will receive a personal financial benefit from a transaction that is not equally shared by the

stockholders.

89 同前註，原文為：Directorial interest also exists where a corporate decision will have a materially detrimental impact on a director, but not on the corporation and the stockholders.

90 LEWIS v. S. L. & E., INC.629 F.2d 769 (1980) 原文為：「But the business judgment rule presupposes that the directors have no conflict of interest. When a shareholder attacks a transaction in which the directors have an interest other than as directors of the corporation, the directors may not escape review of the merits of the transaction」

91 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 812(Del. 1984) 原文為：First, its protections can only be claimed by disinterested directors whose conduct otherwise meets the tests of business judgment. From the standpoint of interest, this means that directors can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders generally. 中文翻譯參考李維心，見前揭註 14，頁 141。

92 GROBOW v. PEROT,539 A.2d 180,188 (Del. 1988)

93 WASHINGTON BANCORPORATION v. SAID,812 F.Supp. 1256,1269 (D.D.C. 1993)

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司之控制權⁹⁴，此時始認原告之舉證已足而認董事具利害關係並推翻商業判斷法則 之推定。

利害關係之認定除了上述美國實務歷來於訴訟中之判斷外，亦有將之明文化 之情形，德克薩斯州公司法第 1.02 條第(12)項對無利害關係亦有定義性之參考，其 規定內容為：「無利害關係，常指董事或他人於契約、交易或其他事務無相關之利 益，意指董事或他人或董事之幕僚（公司及其同事除外）或其他人員，非屬於契 約、交易之一方，或實質上未涉及被請求賠償之行為，另一方面董事在所訂契約 內容中無重大之財務利益，或處分所主張之財產。⁹⁵」就此條文之定義內容看來，

其實就「利害關係」之判斷，與前開歷來之實務判準相去不遠，亦要求董事必須 非屬交易之一方，且於交易中未涉及董事自身重大之財務上利益等情形。

另美國法律協會（American Law Institute）在公司治理原則：分析與建議章第 1.23 條（Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations §1.23）

對董事之利害關係亦有以下定義性規定可供參考：「(a)董事或經理人在以下之交易 或行為中認為具有利害關係：(1)董事或經理人，或其等幕僚為該交易或行為之一 方當事人;(2)董事或經理人，與交易或行為之一方具有商業、財務或家族成員關 係，而該等關係合理預測將影響到董事或經理人為該交易或行為決定，且不利於 公司;(3)董事或經理人，其等之幕僚，或與董事、經理人有商業、財務或家族上關 係，並與其等決定之交易或行為有金錢上之利益（一般使用及經常給予董事之費 用利益除外），而該利益預測將影響到董事或經理人不利於公司之判斷;(4)董事或 經理人受制於控制影響交易或行為之一方，該當事人對交易或行為具有重大金錢 利益，可合理預測董事或經理人對該交易或行為之判斷為不利於公司。⁹⁶」美國法

94 參考陳錦隆，前揭註 12，頁 43-44。

95 Tex. Bus. Corp. Act §1.02(A)(12)；原文為：「"Disinterested," when used to indicate a director or other person is disinterested in a contract, transaction, or other matter …means the director or other person, or an associate of the director (other than the corporation and its associates) or other person, is not a party to the contract or transaction or is not materially involved in the conduct that is subject to the claim or challenge and does not otherwise have a material financial interest in the outcome of the contract or transaction or the disposition of the claim or challenge.」中文翻譯參考李維心，見前揭註 14，頁 15。

96 原文為：(a) A director or officer is "interested" in a transaction or conduct if either:

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(1) The director or officer, or an associate of the director or officer, is a party to the transaction or conduct;

(2) The director or officer has a business, financial, or familial relationship with a party to the transaction or conduct, and that relationship would reasonably be expected to affect the director's or officer's judgment with respect to the transaction or conduct in a manner adverse to the corporation;

(3) The director or officer, an associate of the director or officer, or a person with whom the director or officer has a business, financial, or familial relationship, has a material pecuniary interest in the

transaction or conduct (other than usual and customary directors' fees and benefits) and that interest and (if present) that relationship would reasonably be expected to affect the director's or officer's judgment in a manner adverse to the corporation; or

(4) The director or officer is subject to a controlling influence by a party to the transaction or conduct or a person who has a material pecuniary interest in the transaction or conduct, and that controlling influence could reasonably be expected to affect the director's or officer's judgment with respect to the transaction or conduct in a manner adverse to the corporation. 中文翻譯參考李維心，見前揭註 14，頁 143-144。

97 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984)；原文為：Independence means that a director's decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous considerations or influences. 中文翻譯參考陳錦隆，見前揭註 12，頁 44。

98 Id.,p.816；原文為：While directors may confer, debate, and resolve their differences through compromise, or by reasonable reliance upon the expertise of their colleagues and other qualified persons, the end result, nonetheless, must be that each director has brought his or her own informed business

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judgment to bear with specificity upon the corporate merits of the issues without regard for or

succumbing to influences which convert an otherwise valid business decision into a faithless act. 中文翻 譯參考戴志傑，見前揭註 84，頁 170-171。

99 Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368,1378 (Del. 1996) 原文為：The mere fact that the Family Group owned a dominant stock interest does not rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule or call the directors' independence into question 中文翻譯參考陳錦隆，見前揭註 12，頁 44。

100 Benerofe v. Jung Woong Cha, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 115 at*20，21，原文為：However, the fact that the corporation has one controlling shareholder does not, as a matter of law, establish that its directors are dominated or controlled by that shareholder. To establish that a director does not maintain discretion to independently approve a transaction, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the directors are beholden to the controlling shareholder because of personal or other relationships. For example, in Rales, the Court found a reasonable doubt existed as to a director's independence where two employee/directors received salaries of $ 1 million and $ 300,000 respectively. In that case, the Court inferred that the directors were beholden to controlling shareholders for their significant remuneration.

101 See Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton, Stephen A. Radin., The Business Judgment Rule : fiduciary duties of corporate directors (Aspen Law & Business, N.Y., 5^th ed., 1998), p44. 轉引自戴志傑，見前揭 註 84，頁 171。

36 足推翻商業判斷法則之推定。德拉州最高法院在 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.案及 中即表示，當原告欲推翻董事被推定之無利害關係及具獨立性時，其舉證應通過 下列二階段式之檢驗：(1)董事之自我利益對其獨立性判斷之影響已具重要性

（materiality）；(2)任何如此之自我利益對於董事會集體決策之獨立性影響已具重 要性。而前揭重要性之判斷，法院係採所謂「理性人標準」，換言之，原告應證明，

在合理的情形下，理性之董事在董事會之決策過程將受到此等利益之影響¹⁰⁴。而 在 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.案中¹⁰⁵，法院對於董事獨立性之判斷仍是採取 二階段之檢驗方式，但對自我利益「重要性」之判斷，已從上述之「理性人標準」，

在合理的情形下，理性之董事在董事會之決策過程將受到此等利益之影響¹⁰⁴。而 在 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.案中¹⁰⁵，法院對於董事獨立性之判斷仍是採取 二階段之檢驗方式，但對自我利益「重要性」之判斷，已從上述之「理性人標準」，