迴歸分析中忽略相關變數的後果

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13.3 迴歸分析中忽略相關變數的後果⁶⁷⁴

此一附錄的目的在於扼要說明迴歸分析中忽略相關變數的後果。假設變數

Y 被變數 X

2與 X₃如下解釋：

𝑌𝑌 = 𝐵𝐵₁+ 𝐵𝐵₂𝑋𝑋₂+ 𝐵𝐵₃𝑋𝑋₃+ 𝑒𝑒 若我們忽略了 x₃，而認為 y 僅被變數 x₂如下解釋：

𝑌𝑌 = 𝐵𝐵₁+ 𝐵𝐵₂𝑋𝑋₂+ 𝑒𝑒 因此我們估計：

𝑦𝑦 = 𝑏𝑏₁+ 𝑏𝑏₂𝑋𝑋₂ 並計算 b₂如下：

𝑏𝑏2 =∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_{𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝}− 𝑋𝑋�₂)(𝑌𝑌_𝑝𝑝− 𝑌𝑌�)

∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝− 𝑋𝑋�2)²

如果我們將 Y 與被解釋變數實際上的關係 𝑌𝑌 = 𝐵𝐵1+ 𝐵𝐵2𝑋𝑋2+ 𝐵𝐵3𝑋𝑋3+ 𝑒𝑒 代 入，可以計算：

𝑏𝑏2 =∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_{𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝}− 𝑋𝑋�₂)(𝑌𝑌_𝑝𝑝− 𝑌𝑌�)

∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝− 𝑋𝑋�₂)²

= ∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_{𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝}− 2)[(𝐵𝐵₁+ 𝐵𝐵₂𝑋𝑋_2𝑝𝑝+ 𝐵𝐵₃𝑋𝑋_3𝑝𝑝+ 𝑒𝑒_𝑝𝑝) − (𝐵𝐵₁+ 𝐵𝐵₂𝑋𝑋�₂+ 𝐵𝐵₃𝑋𝑋�₃+ 𝑒𝑒̅)]

∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝− 𝑋𝑋�2)²

=𝐵𝐵₂∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_{𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝}− 𝑋𝑋�₂)²+ 𝐵𝐵₃∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_{𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝}− 𝑋𝑋�₂)(𝑋𝑋_3𝑝𝑝− 𝑋𝑋�₃)+ ∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_{𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝}− 𝑋𝑋�₂)(𝑒𝑒_𝑝𝑝 − 𝑒𝑒̅)

∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝− 𝑋𝑋�2)²

= 𝐵𝐵2+ 𝐵𝐵3∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_{𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝}− 𝑋𝑋�₂)(𝑋𝑋_3𝑝𝑝− 𝑋𝑋�₃)

∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝− 𝑋𝑋���)₂ ² +∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_{𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝}− 𝑋𝑋�₂)(𝑒𝑒_𝑝𝑝 − 𝑒𝑒̅)

∑ (𝑋𝑋^𝑛𝑛_𝑝𝑝=1 2𝑝𝑝− 𝑋𝑋�₂)² 第三項的分子可簡化為：

�(𝑋𝑋2𝑝𝑝− 𝑋𝑋�2)(𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 − 𝑒𝑒̅)

𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝=1

= �(𝑋𝑋2𝑝𝑝− 𝑋𝑋�2)𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑛𝑛

𝑝𝑝=1

− �(𝑋𝑋2𝑝𝑝− 𝑋𝑋�2)𝑒𝑒̅

𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝=1

= �(𝑋𝑋2𝑝𝑝− 𝑋𝑋�2)𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑛𝑛

𝑝𝑝=1

− �� 𝑋𝑋2𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒̅

𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝=1

− � 𝑋𝑋�2𝑒𝑒̅

𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝=1

�

674 CHRISTOPHER DOUGHERTY, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS 252-53 (2011).

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Oxera, Quantifying antitrust damages: Towards non-binding guidance for courts:

Study prepared for the European Commission (2009), available at

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_study.pdf (last visited 23 March 2018).

Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel, 208 F.R.D. 340 (2002).

德文部分 1. 專書

Logemann, Hans Philip, Der kartellrechtliche Schadensersatz: Die zivilrechtliche Haftung bei Verstößen gegen das deutsche und europäische Kartellrecht nach Ergehen der VO(EG) Nr. 1/2003 und der 7. GWB Novelle, 2009.

2. 期刊論文

Brand, US-Sammelklagen und kollektiver Rechtsschutz in der EU, NJW 2012, S.

1116ff.

Haas, Matthias/ Dittrich, Johannes, Anm. zu BGH Urt. v. 28.6.2011 – KZR 75/10, LMK 2012, 327348.

Hempel, Ende des kollektiven Rechtsschutzes im deutschen Kartellrecht? NJW 2015, S. 207ff.

Kießling, Neues zur Schadensabwälzung, GRUR 2009, S. 733ff.

Montag, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz in Europa und der Gesetzentwurf zur Einführung von Gruppenklagen, ZRP 2013, S. 172ff.

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Podszun, Rupprecht/ Kreifels, Stephan, Kommt der Ausforschungsanspruch? – Anmerkungen zum geplanten § 33g GWB 2017, GWR 2017, S. 67ff.

Schreiber, Kristina, Nach der „ORWI“-Entscheidung des BGH: Was müssen indirekte Abnehmer bei der Geltendmachung von Schadensersatz beachten?

GRUR-Prax 2012, S. 78ff.

Seegers, Martin, Einwand der Schadensabwälzung nach dem neuen § 33c GWB 2017, WuW 2017, S. 236ff.

3. 註釋書

Emmerich, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker, Wettbewerbsrecht, 5. Aufl. 2014.

Hoffmann, in: Dauses/Ludwigs, Handbuch des EU-Wirtschaftsrechts 2017.

Ollerdißen, in: Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 3. Aufl. 2016.

Rehbinder, in: Loewenheim/ Meessen/ Riesenkampff/ Kersting/ Meyer-Lindemann, Kartellrecht, 3. Aufl. 2016.

4. 其他

Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/10207.

Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 15/3640.

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會選擇台灣。他最可能就是選擇美國。因為美國當然他有一個 discovery 制度。

68

對原告來講舉證責任基本上不是一個問題。那在台灣這種沒有 discovery 制度的 69

國家你舉證就遇到很大的困難。而且台灣的賠償金額是相較於美國是很低啦。所 70

以對他來講他為什麼要在台灣起訴，他當然是在美國起訴。而且美國那個市場也 71

大，所以判決的，就是法院的 jurisdiction 我們講管轄權，他 cover 的市場範圍也 72

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A1：對，加上我們又沒有美國的 discovery 這個，你如果去隱匿或銷毀一些文件 99

Q：律師您認為在台灣打 antitrust 民事訴訟的訴訟成本有特別高嗎?像美國有 108

discovery 制度，所以他們起訴往往成本都很高。那在台灣的話呢? 不論是法院的 109

費用或律師費。

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A1：我可以跟你講，美國 discovery 那個律師費會嚇死人。那當然台灣比美國這 111

方面律師費便宜太多了，因為沒有 discovery。這個制度。你如果要提出什麼文 112

件的話，你大概就是想辦法讓法院命對方提出來。而且你知道我們這種制度提出 113

來文件數量上根本跟美國 discovery 提出來的文件數量那是天差地遠。我舉個例 114

子，人家 discovery 找到的文件可能是大一點案件很可能是上百萬頁或是幾十萬 115

是跟美國比我們一定比它便宜很多。但是相對的，我們的 damage amount 也人家 119

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就會有人說在美國，因為他們說 contingent fee，就是說他們律師可以抽成，所以 143

原告來講，反正如果 contingent fee 的話，那它可能一開始所要付的律師費其實 152

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受訪人 A2 訪問紀錄⁶⁷⁶

1 「檢舉處分以處分書為證據提起民事訴訟」的模式將面臨時效問題。

2 公平會可能依職權調查。聯合行為案件調查程序中，相關廠商大概都會被約 談。

3 公平會處分後才知道違法行為存在的，例如消費者，如果金額小，也不會起 訴。

4 公平會如果不處分，反而會形成不利原告的證據。

5 當事人蒐證能力未必足夠。聯合行為案件常需要產業數據做為證據（證明聯 合行為存在），當事人不見得有能力取得這些證據。

6 被害人遇到反競爭行為的反應多是先檢舉。

7 民庭法官對公平法的判斷能力也是問題，他們本於公平法判賠時下手不會那 麼重。

8 國人對公平法上損害賠償請求權基礎的權利意識不高。競爭法民事案件所涉 及的金額也不高。

9 上下游廠商不太會互相提起公平法損害賠償訴訟，因為金額小，還可能破壞 彼此間的關係。

10 若分大廠、小廠討論，小廠可能會起訴。大廠只求不要惹上聯合行為案件。

聯合行為的合理推定已經讓大廠陷於行政處罰風險。此外大廠也不缺損害賠 償判賠的金額。

11 合理推定在美國法上是來自民事，這項規定應該從行政移到民事。

11 合理推定在美國法上是來自民事，這項規定應該從行政移到民事。

在文檔中 建構有效能之競爭法損害賠償制度： 比較法與經濟分析的啟示 - 政大學術集成 (頁 122-153)