「判斷的周全性」（the thoroughness evident in its consideration）、「推論的有效性」
（the validity of its reasoning）、「對此一解釋的先前與後續說明的一致性」（its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements）、「其他所有能使解釋具有說服力 的要素」（all those factors which give it power to persuade）等。126
Colin S. Diver教授也曾整理出法院在審查行政機關的法律解釋是否合於授 權時所考慮的不同判準。127如Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States案，128 法院的判準為「系爭的行政機關法律解釋是否根據制定法的文義而來」（whether
124 Id. at 972, 974 (“Although there was no explicit rationale linking the various factors together, the overall approach had an implicit logic…Standing alone, these factors did not comprise, either individually or collectively, what could be described as a coherent doctrine.”); David R. Woodward
& Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 ADMIN.L.REV. 329, 332-41 (1979).
125 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
126 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (“The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”).
127 Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U.PA L.REV. 549, 562 note 95 (1985).
128 Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
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the agency construction was rendered contemporaneously with the statute’s passage）；129而在NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.案，130判準為「系爭的行政機關法 律 解 釋是 否源 於該 機關 長時 間 對該 法律 的持 續適用」（ whether the agency's construction is of longstanding application）；131在Haig v. Agee案，132判準為「行政 機關對系爭法律解釋的立場是否保持一致」（whether the agency has maintained its position consistently）；133在Udall v. Tallman案，134判準為「社會大眾對系爭解釋 是否已產生倚賴」（whether the public has relied on the agency’s interpretation）；135 在United States v. Rutherford案，136判準為「系爭法律解釋是否包含持續中的公共 爭論」（whether the interpretation involves a matter of “public controversy”）；137在 Aluminum Co. of America. v. Central Lincoln People’s Utility District案，138判準為
「系爭解釋是否奠基於專業，或系爭解釋是否包含具技術性與複合性的課題」
（ whether the interpretation is based on “expertise” or involves a “technical and
129 Id. at 315 (“To the external aids that are drawn from history and analogy and administrative practice there is to be added another that may be said to be internal, the aid to be derived from the wording of related sections.”). (emphasis added)
130 National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
131 Id. at 274-75 (“In examining these authorities, we draw on several established principles of statutory construction. In addition to the importance of legislative history, a court may accord great weight to the longstanding interpretation placed on a statute by an agency charged with its administration.”).
(emphasis added)
132 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
133 Id. at 293 (“The history of passport controls since the earliest days of the Republic shows congressional recognition of Executive authority to withhold passports on the basis of substantial reasons of national security and foreign policy”). (emphasis added)
134 Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
135 Id. at 18 (“The Secretary’s interpretation had, long prior to respondents’ applications, been a matter of public record and discussion. The agreement worked out with the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries in 1956, and the approval of the Swanson River leases pursuant thereto, though probably constituting no ‘legislative ratification’ in any formal sense, serve to demonstrate the notoriety of the Secretary’s construction, and thereby defeat any possible claim of detrimental reliance upon another interpretation.”). (emphasis added)
136 United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
137 Id. at 545 (“Such deference is particularly appropriate where, as here, an agency’s interpretation involves issues of considerable public controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct any misperception of its statutory objectives.”). (emphasis added)
138 Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln People’s Utility District, 467 U.S. 380 (1984).
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complex” subject）；139在FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting案，140 判準為「行政機關是否有制定系爭法律（令）的權能」（whether the agency has rulemaking authority）；141在Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin案，142判準為「從母 法的運作而言，行政機關制定系爭法律（令）是否是必要作為」（whether agency action is necessary to set the statute in motion）；143在Zemel v. Rusk案，144判準為「國 會是否一方面察覺到行政機關的法律解釋，另方面卻從未否定它」（whether Congress was aware of the agency interpretation and failed to repudiate）；145在 Investment Company Institute v. Camp案，146判準為「行政機關是否曾公開表示，
系爭法律的解釋是其規劃的行政作為的一環」（whether the agency has expressly addressed the application of the statute to its proposed action）。147
139 Id. at 390 (“The subject under regulation is technical and complex. BPA has longstanding expertise in the area, and was intimately involved in the drafting and consideration of the statute by Congress.”). (emphasis added)
140 Federal Communications Commission v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
775 (1978).
141 Id. at 793 (“As the Court of Appeals recognized…it is now well established that this general rulemaking authority supplies a statutory basis for the Commission to issue regulations codifying its view of the public-interest licensing standard, so long as that view is based on consideration of permissible factors and is otherwise reasonable.”). (emphasis added)
142 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
143 Id. at 565-66 (“Because legislators cannot foresee all eventualities, judges must decide unanticipated cases by extrapolating from related statutes or administrative provisions. But legislative silence is not always the result of a lack of prescience; it may instead betoken permission or, perhaps, considered abstention from regulation. In that event, judges are not accredited to supersede Congress or the appropriate agency by embellishing upon the regulatory scheme…An agency’s construction of its own regulations has been regarded as especially due that respect…This traditional acquiescence in administrative expertise is particularly apt under TILA, because the Federal Reserve Board has played a pivotal role in “setting [the statutory] machinery in motion…”). (emphasis added)
144 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 617 (1971).
145 Id. at 11 (“Under some circumstances, Congress’ failure to repeal or revise in the face of such administrative interpretation has been held to constitute persuasive evidence that that interpretation is the one intended by Congress.”). (emphasis added)
146 Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
147 Id. at 627-28 (“The difficulty here is that the Comptroller adopted no expressly articulated position at the administrative level as to the meaning arid impact of the provisions of §§ 16 and 21 as they affect bank investment funds. The Comptroller promulgated Regulation 9 without opinion or accompanying statement. His subsequent report to Congress did not advert to the prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act…. If he faces such questions only after he has acted, there is substantial danger that the momentum generated by initial approval may seriously impair the enforcement of the
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雖然以上說明似乎顯示，法院對於行政機關的法律解釋的審查有許多判準，
而文義與立法者原意或目的並不是審查的決定性因素。但實際情形剛好相反，在 以上案例中，法律文本的文義與立法者原意或立法目的，幾乎都參與在法院的審 查中，有時文義優先，有時立法者原意或目的優先，有時候是混合使用，聯邦最 高法院一直沒有定論。
如前述的Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States案，法院是以長時間 持續的適用、其他國家機關—如國會—對此適用的認可，以及文義來審查。但在 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.案，法院的審查判準則是以長時間持續的適用和立法 者原意與目的來審查。而在Haig v. Agee，雖然提出行政機關政策是否一貫的判 準，但法院也在此判準上加上國會持續認可—也就是立法者原意或目的—此一政 策的另一條件。在United States v. Rutherford案，雖然法院主張法院在具公共爭議 的案件中應該依從被國會與法律授權的行政機關的解釋，但法院也指出另一個條 件：國會從未試圖修正被批評為偏離立法目的的系爭解釋。此外在同一份判決主 文中，主筆的Marshall大法官開宗明義指出，法院在審查行政機關的法律解釋的 原則是，除非導致荒謬結果或不符合立法目的，否則只要行政機關將母法的立法 目的以明確且無歧義的文字表示在它的法律解釋中，則法院的職責就是依從這個 法律解釋。148
至於Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln People’s Utility District案，法 院雖然提出在系爭法律所牽涉的主題非常技術性和複雜的前提下，行政機關相應 的專業以及它在該法起草和審查的立法過程的參與是審查判準，但這樣的主張其 實同時強調了立法者原意或立法目的的重要性。因為行政機關的相應專業與它在 立法過程的參與在前述主張所扮演的角色是，有助於釐清立法者原意或立法目的 的內涵。在Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin案，法院主張美國聯邦儲備委員會
（Federal Reserve Board, FRB）的專業對於系爭誠實貸款法（The Truth in Lending
banking laws that Congress enacted.”). (emphasis added)
148 請見 Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 551-52 (“When construing a statute so explicit in scope, a court must act within certain well-defined constraints. If a legislative purpose is expressed in ‘plain and unambiguous language…the duty of the courts is to give it effect according to its terms’…
Exceptions to clearly delineated statutes will be implied only where essential to prevent ‘absurd results’ or consequences obviously at variance with the policy of the enactment as a whole.”).
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Act, TILA）的管制法規的形成是必要，故國會以默示授權的方式，使FRB根據自 身專業來形成管制法規以使TILA正常運作。但這無非是說，國會的默示授權的 原意證成了FRB的法律解釋的正當性。而在Zemel v. Rusk案，國會長時間的認可 證成了行政機關的系爭法律解釋。在Investment Company Institute v. Camp案，行 政機關的法律解釋必須奠基於國會當初授權的公示程序規定，否則將危害系爭法 律的執行和運作。而這也就是說，公示程序規定表示國會的授權邊界，違反程序 規定，則超出國會授權的原意。
在Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sloan案149，聯邦最高法院以文本的 文義和立法者原意這二項判準裁定行政機關法律解釋不正確。在Sloan案，美國 證券交易委員會（Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC）主張系爭行政機關 裁定是國會通過1934年證券交易法（Securities Exchange Act of 1934）授權給SEC 制定行政規則以實現保障公共利益與交易安全的目的，且由此行政規則而做出的 裁定具有長時間持續的相同解釋，而此一行政規則的制定也在母法立法時獲得國 會委員會的認可，因此，其裁定所依據的行政規則是正確的法律解釋。但法院主 張SEC的主張是錯誤的，因為謹慎分析後的文義並不支持此一解釋，且委員會記 錄的極少數陳詞並不是足以代表立法者原意的證據。150而Chevron的前案之一 ASARCO v. EPA案，151主筆的特區巡迴上訴法院Wright法官主張，EPA將總量管 制工業污染排放的泡泡概念（bubble concept）應用在1970年潔淨空氣法第111條 (a)項(4)款152的既存設施的「改建」（modification）上的行政命令，153使得廠商能 藉以迴避1970年潔淨空氣法第111條提出「新污染源性能標準」（New Source Performance Standards, NSPS）的「立法目的」—改進空氣品質（to enhance air quality）。
依此，我們可以說，美國法院藉以審查行政機關法律解釋的判準在 Chevron 之前，呈現一種混合的、紛雜的發展趨勢。然而，它們也都以某種程度與傳統的
149 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
150 Sloan, 436 U.S. at 117-21.
151 ASARCO Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
152 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4), CAA § 111(a)(4), 84 Stat 1683; Pub. L. 91-604.
153 36 Fed. Reg. 58,419, 40 CFR § 60.14.
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法律文義、立法者原意或目的聯繫起來。一直到 Chevron，主筆判決主文的 Stevens 大法官才以立法者原意或目的和法律文本的文義為判準，建立一種相對單純的審 統的混合判準審查非常不同的二階段審查 two-step review，其次是擴大解釋國會 的授權方式。156
154 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
155 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
156 姑且不論總量管制的法律解釋是否正確或適當，EPA 放鬆潔淨空氣法的管制密度的決定不
一定是全然錯誤的政策，因為工廠設備的汰舊換新或改建牽涉到複雜的誘因與管制手段問題。
Chevron 案本身是一件牽涉潔淨空氣法管制政策與手段、雷根政府去管制化的理念、行政國 家的發展等議題，但由於本文目標在於說明美國立法目的主義與文本主義的論爭發展，而本 章目標在於說明 Chevron doctrine 如何提供上述二陣營進一步論爭的素材，故為避免模糊焦 點，本文對於 Chevron 的完整前因後果及與本文要旨無關的重要議題不多做說明。關於 Chevron 的完整前因後果及所牽涉的重要議題，請參考 Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Sometimes Great Cases Are Made Not Born, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 164-194 (2011). 湯德宗，〈美國空氣汙染管制策略之研究〉，