第四章 默認在國際法領土爭端案例之應用
第二節 默認與條約之嗣後實踐
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其次，關鍵日期之設置對國際秩序之意涵，符合國際法之目的——國際秩序 之穩定、和平。由於國際領土爭端中經常以國家主權行為，40作為判定領土歸屬 之標準。故若不設置一證據截止日，減少國家在爭端具體化後增加主權行為的誘 因，則可能激化國際衝突，甚至引發戰爭。41
參、小結
根據本節各部分之討論，從宏觀角度而言，國際法庭解決領土爭端時，會依 據雙方論據、事實，依序檢視條約、保持佔有主義、有效性是否在特定時間點建 立權利根據，而歷史、地理、文化三個因素，如我們以案例證明的，會發生效 果。而默認在三個層次都可能發揮效果，只是具體的證據要求不同。
在一方建立權利根據後，接著考量雙方之後的行為與態度是否造成權利根據 轉移，若爭端某一方之權利根據在特定時間點為法庭宣告建立，且後無轉移、放 棄的事實，那麼即決定該爭領土主權歸屬。
最後，若以有效性作為司法決定的基礎時，若雙方在相同一段時間都能提出 相應的證據，此時會評價證據的「相對強度」，在這一情況下，爭端具體化、爭 端一方首次抗議後所產生的證據原則上不會被接受，因為極可能是爭端方為了改 善其法律論據而製造的證據。
第二節 默認與條約之嗣後實踐
壹、概論
在領土爭端當中，拘束爭端雙方之條約一定是法庭首先注意到的證據，因為 條約是最容易證明國家接受某項情勢或者法律主張為合法的證據，條約解釋因此
40 或稱「為有效原則」、「和平且持續展示主權」。
41 L.F.E. Goldie, ‘The Critical Date,’ The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1968, pp. 1251, 1253.
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成為爭端方攻防的重點。關於條約解釋與默認的關係，本文已經在「割讓與默 認」小節中做了一簡單的分析；本節著重於更技術性之內容，包含構成嗣後實踐 之主觀要件、嗣後實踐的型態、構成知情的標準、達成協定之標準與嗣後實踐之 合理應用範圍。本部分蒐錄了國際法院之領土爭端中，以嗣後實踐作為條約解釋 的相關案件，並且加上國際法委員會之報告、少數國際仲裁、其他類型爭端司法 決定，作為說明原則之補充。
本節集中討論《維也納條約法公約》第31 條第 3 項(乙)款，因為(甲)款以締 約方單一、共同之行為為前提，故默認在該款幾無應用空間。回顧《維也納條約 法公約》第31 條第 3 項(乙)款：
（乙）嗣後在條約適用方面確定各當事國對條約解釋之協定之任何慣 例；(Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation)
該款可以拆解成以下要件，第一，必須存在實踐；第二，該實踐必須為依據 特定條約之實踐，即主觀要件；第三，必須達成「協定」。以下圍繞此三要件，
探討國際法案例中構成這些要件之事實，並嘗試歸納之。
貳、主觀要件：締約方認為其實踐為條約之應用
若一實踐為條約之嗣後實踐，行使實踐的國家必須主觀上認知其實踐為特定
「條約之應用」，這一要件根據國際法委員會之見解，如國際習慣法中的主觀要 件。42在領土爭端中以嗣後實踐解釋條約，必須主觀上自認依據條約行為，才可 能真正依據條約建立權利根據。
42 Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) supra note 4, pp. 556-557.要證明嗣後實踐之主觀要件，但不要求該行為必須指涉條約 特定條款，只要與條約整體或部分相關即可。
‘That practice of the parties is only relevant under lit b if it occurs “in the application” of the treaty, which plainly indicates that, just as for the development of international customary law, a subjective link is required under lit b: the parties whose practice is under consideration must regard their conduct to fall within the scope of application of the treaty concerned and in
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權利根據與國家單方行為之關係，國際法院已經多次闡明。嗣後實踐、嗣後 佔有可以作為證據，但是必須跟權利根據相關。在「陸地、島嶼與海洋爭端 案」，法院表示：
「分庭認為，⋯⋯在獨立之後的有效性檔案證據，若可以顯示 1821 年之依據保持佔有主義的邊界，可以納入考量⋯⋯由於該有效性與（保持 佔有主義）界定之邊界存在著關聯。」43
國家是否主觀依據特定條約而進行某種實踐，有時可能因特定實踐之背景中 不存在其他可能導致同樣國家行為之情勢間接得知。例如在「比格爾海峽仲裁 案」(the Beagle Channel case, Chile v. Agentine)中，仲裁官表示：
「《維也納條約法公約》並未界定“協議”(agreement)應以什麼方式表 示。在本案中，智利管轄的行為並非有意建立獨立於條約之法源
(sourece)，依據智利的理解，這些行為也非與條約文字矛盾。這些管轄行 為是公開且為阿根廷所知的，且只可能源自於條約。在此情況之下，阿根 廷的沉默可以被推論有確認條約意義的意圖⋯⋯。」44
principle to be required under that treaty. They must act the way they do for the purpose of fulfilling their treaty obligations. On the other hand, their actions do not have to bear a special reference to a particular provision of the treaty, but can relate to the treaty as a whole or to different parts of it than the one under scrutiny’
43 Ibid., p. 62.
‘The Chamber may have regard also, in certain instances, to documentary evidence of post-independence effectivités when it considers that they afford indications in respect of the 1821 uti possidetis juris boundary, providing a relationship exists between the effectivités concerned and the determination of that boundary.’
44 Case concerning a dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel
(Argentina/Chile) 18 February 1977, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XXI, part II, p. 187, para. 169.
‘The terms of the Vienna Convention do not specify the ways in which agreement may be manifested. In the context of the present case the acts of jurisdiction were not intended to establish a source of title independent of the terms of the treaty; nor could they be considered as being in contradiction of those terms as understood by Chile. The evidence supports the view that they were public and well-known to Argentina, and that they could only derive from the
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在案件中，即使雙方進行某種嗣後實踐，例如勘定領土邊界，只要未能符合 主觀要件，也未必導致在法律上確立邊界。法院在「賽杜杜島案」中，因南非不 認為該合作勘界之結果有法律拘束力，即不符合主觀要件，故不構成嗣後實踐達 成協議。且不具有主觀要件，也不以國家明示抗議、反對為限，持續要求針對邊 界協商可以默示地表示不同意之前所界定的邊界，法院表示：
「法院檢視了上述檔案後，認為1984-1985 年之間，南非與波札那僅 止於同意派出共同專家團。法院不認為兩國以某種方式承認了共同調查團 在1985 年 7 月的結果。雙方之會談中、專家調查團的檔案中沒有任何紀 錄，顯示雙方達成任何協議。此外，南非與波札那後續的書信顯示了協議 不存在；1985 年 10 月 4 日的照會中，波札那要求南非接受勘界結果。南 非不僅沒同意，還強調要求波札那與南非納米比亞政府協商，獨立後的納 米比亞亦是如此。」45
根據南非方面持續要求協商，故欠缺主觀上同意之事實，法院認為：
Treaty. Under these circumstances the silence of Argentina permits the inference that the acts tended to confirm an interpretation of the meaning of the Treaty independent of the acts of jurisdiction themselves.’
45 Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) ICJ Judgement of 13 December 1999, ICJ Reports 1994, para. 68.
‘Having examined the documents referred to above, the Court cannot conclude therefrom that in 1984-1985 South Africa and Botswana had agreed on anything more than the despatch of the joint team of experts. In particular, the Court cannot conclude that the two States agreed in some fashion or other to recognize themselves as legally bound by the results of the joint survey carried out in July 1985. Neither the record of the meeting held in Pretoria on 19 December 1984 nor the experts' terms of reference serve to establish that any such agreement was reached.
Moreover, the subsequent correspondence between the South African and Botswana authorities appears to deny the existence of any such agreement: in its Note of 4 November 1985 (see paragraph 65 above), Botswana called upon South Africa to accept the survey conclusions: not only did South Africa fail to acceDt them but on several occasions it emphasized the need for Botswana to negotiate and agree on the question of the boundary with the relevant authorities of South West AfricaINamibia, or indeed of the future independent Namibia.’
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「上述之事實⋯⋯，顯示在 Kasikili/Sedudu 島之法律地位，南非與貝 專納(Bechuanaland)之間欠缺協議(agreement)。那些事件不能構成“應用條 約之嗣後實踐”，而建立雙方關於條約解釋之協議⋯⋯故不屬於條約法公約 第三十一條第三項之（乙）嗣後在條約適用方面確定各當事國對條約解釋 之協定之任何慣例；更不屬於（甲）當事國嗣後所訂關於條約之解釋或其 規定之適用之任何協定⋯⋯。」46
總結言之，一實踐是否為國家主觀認為依據條約之實踐，除了在該實踐之相 關文件可明示表示，也可能依據相關情勢判定；而證明不存在主觀上同意一實踐 為依據條約之實踐，也不以明示抗議為限。
參、實踐的表現形式
《條約法公約》第31 條第 3 項(乙)款所稱之「實踐」如同《國際法院規約》
第三十八條子項第二款。故其形式不限，包含國家的對外行為，可以是官方聲 明，外交文書、新聞稿、在國際組織決議之投票、國家的立法與司法管轄行為等 等。47實踐也不必要是中央政府之行為，也可以是地方政府的行為，只要可以顯 示國家對於條約義務之立場即可。48
46 Ibid., para 63.
‘“From all of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the above mentioned events [...]
demonstrate the absence of agreement between South Africa and Bechuanaland with regard to the location of the boundary around Kasikili/Sedudu Island and the status of the Island. Those events cannot therefore constitute ‘subsequent practice in the application of the treaty [of 1890]
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’ (1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 31, para 3 (b)). A fortiori, they cannot have given rise to an ‘agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’ (Ibid, Art 31, para 3 (a)).”’
47 International Law Commission, ‘Second report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties’, A/CN.4/671, 26 March 2014, p. 555.
‘…ICJ Statute), the notion of “practice” comprises any external behaviour of a subject of international law, here insofar as it is potentially revealing of what the party accepts as the meaning of a particular treaty provision. No particular form is required, so that official
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故(乙)款的實踐可以「沒有分歧」(absence of any disagreement)作為最低證據標 準，51這一表述又比疏於抗議更加精確(absence of protest)，因為即使沒有抗議，也可以透過其他行為間接表示不同意，例如「賽杜杜島案」中，南非強調要求波 札那與南非納米比亞政府協商，52被法院認為視為協議未達成。以沉默表示同意 的案例眾多，包含前文提到的「古寺案」、53「比格爾海峽仲裁案」。54
statements or manuals, diplomatic correspondence, press releases, transactions, votes on resolutions in international organizations are just as relevant as national acts of legislation or judicial decisions. In fact, “practice” in this respect is not limited to the central government authorities of States, rather any public body acting in an official capacity can contribute to demonstrating the state’s position towards its treaty commitments.’
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 20
50 Ibid., p. 29.
‘Silence as a possible element of an agreement under article 31 (3), Although an “agreement”
under article 31 (3) may be informal and need not necessarily be binding, it must nevertheless be identifiable in order to be “established”. This requirement is formulated explicitly only for subsequent practice under article 31 (3) (b), A “subsequent agreement” under article 31 (3) (a) cannot therefore be derived from the mere silence of the parties.’
51 Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach, eds. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: a commentary.
Springer Science & Business Media, 2011, p. 560.
Springer Science & Business Media, 2011, p. 560.