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第一項 同意權人
委託人或本人為自然人時，行使同意權者，為該自然人本人自無 疑義；惟如委託人或本人為法人，以股份有限公司為例，股東為公司 最終所有人固無疑義，惟召開股東會不易且成本甚高，加以股東未必 有判斷交易內容公平與否的能力，是否為適當同意權人，難謂無疑；
董事會為公司業務執行者，但通常也是涉及利害關係者，能否完全不 受利害影響作判斷，亦有疑問。同意權的行使主要問題在於應由何人 決定關係人交易是否符合公司最大利益，法院、董事會或股東325？
第一款 外國法之規範
外國法多要求關係人交易應經無利害關係董事及無利害關係股 東同意。
325 See Alan R. Palmiter, Corporations, at 264 (6th ed., 2009).
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第一目 無利害關係董事同意
多數大陸法系國家強制要求應經無利害關係董事同意，尤其 是針對公開發行公司。但若干國家對於小型或閉鎖性公司的適用 有除外規定，如法國要求閉鎖性公司僅須經股東會同意，德國針 對大型公司要求應經無利害關係董事同意326。
日本民法第 108 條係規定：「就同一法律行為不能是相對人 代理人，或成為雙方當事人之代理人。但關於債務之履行或本人 預先承諾，不在此限。」日本於 2006 年（平成十七年）修法後 公司法第三五六條規定：「董事於下列情形下，必須於股東會公 開關於該交易的重要事實，且必須由其承認：一、董事為自己或 第三人利益為屬於公司營業內之交易行為。二、董事為自己或第 三人與公司交易時。三、股份有限公司為保證董事與董事以外之 人之債務，公司與董事以外之人間有公司與董事利益相反之交易 時。民法第一○八條的規定，關於承認前項第二款的交易時不適 用之。」但就強制設置董事會的公司（如公開發行公司），公司 法第三六五條則規定：「關於設置董事會公司的第三五六條規定 的適用，同條第一款中的股東大會為董事會。」327
英美法系（Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction）雖未如同大陸法系強制
326 “non-disclosure by an interested director or officer is, in itself, unfair.” See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law, at 171 (1986). Also see See Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transaction, in The anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach of Reinier Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda and Edward Rock, at 106 (2004).
327 李旻諺，董事與公司間之票據行為—兼評最高法院 96 台上字第 915 號判決，輔仁法學，42 期，2011 年 12 月，頁 291。
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要求，關係人交易應經無利害關係董事同意，但也強烈建議關係 人交易應取得無利害關係董事同意。英國鼓勵公司以章程訂立以 無利害關係董事同意取代成本高昂的無利害關係東同意；美國則 提供經無利害關係董事同意之關係人交易司法審查程序上的利 益328。
一、 德拉瓦州公司法
美國德拉瓦州公司法第 144 條(a)(1)規定，如經該董事 向董事會或委員會充分揭露，並於董事會或委員會中，經無 利害關係之董事基於善意以多數同意該契約或交易，即符合 程序規範。即使無利害關係之董事未達出席法定人數，或是 董事或高階職員於董事會或委員會開會同意此交易時在場 或參加，或是該董事或高階職員表決權被計入，亦不會使此 交易當然無效或是可撤銷。
二、 模範公司法
2005 年模範公司法第 8.61(b)(1)條329規定，符合本法第 8.62 條規定經董事會同意，即符合程序規範。依第 8.62(a)
328 See Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transaction, in The anatomy of Corporate Law:
A Comparative and Functional Approach of Reinier Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda and Edward Rock, at 106-107 (2004).
329 MBCA§8.61 JUDICIAL ACTION
(b)A director’s conflicting interest transaction may not be the subject of equitable relief, or give rise to an award of damages or other sanctions against a director of the corporation, in a proceeding by a shareholder or by or in the right of the corporation, on the ground that the director has an interest respecting the transaction, if:
(1) directors’ action respecting the transaction was taken in compliance with section 8.62 at any time;
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(a) Directors’ action respecting a director’s conflicting interest transaction is effective for purposes of section 8.61(b)(1) if the transaction has been authorized by the affirmative vote of a majority (but no fewer than two) of the qualified directors who voted on the transaction, after required disclosure by the conflicted director of information not already known by such qualified directors, or after modified disclosure in compliance with subsection (b); provided that:
(1) the qualified directors have deliberated and voted outside the presence of and without the participation by any other director; and
(2) where the action has been taken by a committee, all members of the committee were qualified directors, and either (i) the committee was composed of all the qualified directors on the board of directors or (ii) the members of the committee were appointed by the affirmative vote of a majority of the qualified directors on the board.
331 MBCA§8.62 DIRECTORS’ ACTION
(c)A majority (but no fewer than two) of all the qualified directors on the board of directors, or on the committee, constitutes a quorum for purposes of action that complies with this section.
(d)Where directors’ action under this section does not satisfied a quorum or voting requirement applicable to the authorization of the transaction by reason of th articles of incorporation, the bylaws or a provision of law, independent action to satisfy those authorization requirements must be taken by the board or directors or a committee, in which action directors who are not qualified directors may participate.
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332 ALI Principles §5.02 Transactions with the corporation.
(a) General rule. A director or senior executive who enters into a transaction with the corporation (other than a transaction involving the payment of compensation) fulfills the duty of fair dealing with respect to the transaction if:
(2) Either:
(B)The transaction is authorized in advance, following disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the transaction, by disinterested directors, or in the case of a senior executive who is not a director by a distinterested supervisor, who could reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation at the time of such authorization;
333 ALI Principles §5.02 Transactions with the corporation.
(a) General rule. A director or senior executive who enters into a transaction with the corporation (other than a transaction involving the payment of compensation) fulfills the duty of fair dealing with respect to the transaction if:
(2) Either:
(C)The transaction is ratified, following such disclosure, by disinterested directors who could reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation at the time it was entered into, provided
(i) a corporate decisionmaker who is not interested in the transaction acted for the corporation in the transaction and could reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation;
(ii) the interested director or senior executive made disclosure to such decisionmaker pursuant to Subsection (a)(1) to the extent he or she then knew of the material facts;
(iii) the interested director or senior executive did not act reasonably in failing to seek advance authorization of the transaction by disinterested directors or a disinterested superior; and
(iv) the failure to obtain advance authorization of the transaction by disinterested directors or a disinterested superior did not adversely affect the interests of the corporation in a significant way; or
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利益衝突之義務（Duty to avoid conflicts of interest），除非（1）向公司股東揭露並取得其同意；（2）非公開發行公司章程中 沒有禁止規定時，向董事揭露並取得其同意；（3）公開發行 公司且章程有明文規定，得向董事揭露並取得其同意。但第 175(3)條335排除關係企業間交易（a transaction or arrangement with
the company）之適用336。
334 Duty to avoid conflicts of interest “
(1) As a director of a company you must avoid a situation in which you have, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interest of the company.
(2) This applies in particular to the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity (and it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the property, information or
opportunity.)
(4)Authorisation by the company may be given
(a) by the matter being proposed to the members of the company and authorized by them, or (b) where the company is a private company and nothing in the company’s constitution
invalidates such authorization, by the matter being proposed to and authorized by the director;
or
(c) where the company is a public company and its constitution includes provision enabling the directors to authorize the matter, by the matter being proposed to and authorized by them in accordance with the constitution.”
335 原文為：”this duty does not apply to a conflict of interest arising in relation to a transaction or arrangement with the company.”
336 See Paul L. Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, at 530 (8th ed., 2008).
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（incomplete disclosure）、非善意（bad faith）、浪費財產（waste of assets ）、 利 害 關 係 董 事 關 鍵 性 的 表 決 （ decisive voting by a conflicted director）、或有其他不符合同意要件的瑕疵（ other defects fails to satiffy approval requirements）時，將影響同意的效 力337。
337 “non-disclosure by an interested director or officer is, in itself, unfair.” See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law, at 171 (1986). Also see See Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transaction, in The anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach of Reinier Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda and Edward Rock, at 106 (2004).
338 See §320-322 Companies Act (property transactions that exceed UK￡100,000, or 10% of the company’s net assets, subject to a minimum of UK￡2,000), §319 (directors’s contracts of employment that last for more than 5 years), §312 (payments to directors for loss of office) Shareholders of all listed companies must now approve a detailed director remuneration report (see Company Directors’ Performance and Compensation Act of 2002), while shareholders of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange must also approve transactions above 5% of net assets (Listing Rules 11) and long-term incentive schemes, including share option schemes (Listing Rules
13.13-13.17).
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339 See Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transaction, in The anatomy of Corporate Law:
A Comparative and Functional Approach of Reinier Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda and Edward Rock, at 109-110 (2004).
340 See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law, at 168 (1986).
341 See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996); also see Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976).
342 原文為：must come from a majority of the disinterested stockholders. See Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton and Stephen A. Radin, The Business Judgment Rule—Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors, at 830 (6th ed. 2009).
343 MBCA§8.61 JUDICIAL ACTION
(b) A director’s conflicting interest transaction may not be the subject of equitable relief, or give rise to an award of damages or other sanctions against a director of the corporation, in a proceeding by a shareholder or by or in the right of the corporation, on the ground that the director has an interest respecting the transaction, if:
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(2) shareholders’ action respecting the transaction was taken in compliance with section 8.63 at any time; or
344 MBCA§8.63 SHAREHOLDERS’ ACTION
(a)Shareholders’ action respecting a director’s conflicting interest transaction is effective for purposes of section 8.61(b)(2) if a majority of the votes cast by the holders of all qualified shares are in favor of the transaction after (1) notice to shareholders describing the action to be taken respecting the transaction, (2) provision to the corporation of the information referred to in subsection (b), and (3) communication to the shareholders entitled to vote on the transaction of the information that is the subject of required disclosure, to the extent the information is not known by them.
345 MBCA§8.63 SHAREHOLDERS’ ACTION
(c) For purpose of this section: (1) “holder” means and “held by” refers to shares held by both a record shareholder (as defined in section 13.01(7)) and a beneficial shareholder (as defined in section 13.01(2)); and (2) “qualified shares” means all shares entitled to be voted with respect to the transaction except for shares that the secretary or other officer or agent of the corporation authorized to tabulate votes either knows, or under subsection (b) is notified, are held by (A) a director who has a conflicting interest redpecting the transaction or (B) a related person of the director (excluding a person described in clause (vi) of Section 8.60(5)).
(d) A Majority of the votes entitled to be cast by the holders of all qualified shares constitutes a quorum for porposes of compliance with this section. Subject to the provisions of subsection (e), shareholders’ action that otherwise complies with this section is not affected by the presence of holders, or by the voting, of shares that are not qualified shares.
(f) Where shareholders’ action under this section does not satisfied a quorum or voting requirement applicable to the authorization of the transaction by reason of the articles of incorporation, the bylaws or a provision of law, independent action to satisfy those authorization requirements must be taken by the shareholders, in which action shares that are not qualified may participate.
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（substantial property transaction），應經股東事前同意。幕後 董事與公司進行具重大性（substantial）非貨幣資產交易
（ non-cash asset ）、 資 金 貸 放 及 信 用 擔 保 交 易 （ loans, quasi-loans, and credit transactions）時，亦須經股東會同意方
346 §5.02 Transactions with the corporation.
(a) General rule. A director or senior executive who enters into a transaction with the corporation (other than a transaction involving the payment of compensation) fulfills the duty of fair dealing with respect to the transaction if:
(2) Either:
(D) The transaction is authorized in advance or ratified, following such disclosure, by disinterested shareholders, and does not constitute a waste of corporate assets at the time of the shareholder action.
347 See Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton and Stephen A. Radin, The Business Judgment Rule—Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors, at 387-398 (6th ed., 2009).
348 See Paul L. Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, at 544-545 (8th ed., 2008).
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得為之。第 191 條規定349所謂「重大性」（substantial）之定 義係指，超過公司資產價值百分之十並超過五千英鎊，或者 超過十萬英鎊350。
對於上市公司之關係人交易，依照金融服務主管機關
（Financial Services Authority）制定的上市規則（Listing Rules），所有的關係人交易，無論金額或標的為何，均須經 股東會同意，包括交易對象為董事、幕後董事、持有表決權 數達百分之十以上之大股東或是同一企業集團的關係企業，
以及過去十二個月內曾任董事之人或董事的助理351。
第二款 我國法之規範
我國民法第一○六條規定：「代理人非經本人之許諾，不得為本人 與自己之法律行為，亦不得既為第三人之代理人，而為本人與第三人 之法律行為。但其法律行為，係專履行債務者，不在此限。」為處理 代理人關係下利益衝突之基本規定，但在關係人交易下，除了證券交
349 See British Companies Act 2006, §223 provides that:
Meaning of “substantial”
(1)This section explains what is meant in section 190(requirement of approval for substantial property transaction) by a “substantial” non-cash asset.
(1)This section explains what is meant in section 190(requirement of approval for substantial property transaction) by a “substantial” non-cash asset.