第五章 美國法上之董事責任體系
第一節 美國法受託人義務之起源、內涵及移植困境
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第五章 美國法上之董事責任體系
第一節 美國法受託人義務之起源、內涵及移植困境 第一項 概述
本文前已述及董事受託人義務之重要性，而受託人義務之內涵究竟為何，則 關係到眾多公司的董事，是否得以正確履行其職責且不至於混淆不清，以至於無 所適從。尤有甚者，董事受託人義務之範圍若無法界定，則董事須擔負之責任，
恐怕將任由法院恣意決定，例如可能過度限縮董事責任，使得公平正義無法落實，
並犧牲股東權益；從另一方面檢視，法院亦有可能創造或擴張董事之責任範圍，
課予董事負擔遠超過其資力之賠償金額，或使得董事決策躊躇不前，擔心承擔過 於巨大責任。
為避免混淆，本章美國法董事責任體系及其以下與本國法規範相關論述所稱 之善意，皆係由英文「Good Faith」翻譯而來，以與我國民法內通常所稱之善意 係指不知情，明確作個區隔。
本章以做為自由經濟體制代表之美國，作為比較法研究基礎，而美國最讓投 資人信任，且對於商法領域最為專精的是德拉瓦州之公司法制度及司法裁判體系。
舉例而言，1996 年至 2000 年間於美國公開發行之公司，多數選擇德拉瓦州做為 註冊地197，而根據美國財富雜誌每年評選的全球五百大企業，有超過 60%的比例 亦以德拉瓦州做為其註冊所在198。因此本文擬探討該州有關董事受託人義務之內 涵、法規範及司法實務判決，以作為台灣董事責任制度之適用參考，及未來董事 受託人義務具體化之學習借鏡。
第二項 受託人義務起源
197 Between 1996 and 2000, 58% of U.S. public companies are incorporated in Delaware, 85% of the companies that choose to incorporate outside their home state incorporate in Delaware. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 Yale L.J. 553, 578 (2002).
198 Why Businesses Choose Delaware,
https://corplaw.delaware.gov/why-businesses-choose-delaware/, last visited on July 14,2018.
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在釐清德拉瓦州公司法有關受託人義務規範之前，需探究美國公司法制之源 頭，以及董事受託人義務之形成脈絡為何？依據學者研究，美國公司法係源自於 信託法及代理法，因此董事就如同受託人及代理人一般，長久地被認為其對於公 司須承擔注意義務199。亦即在不同法律間移植的過程，信託法及代理法中有關受 託人義務之規範也隨同移入至公司法體系內200。
而在此法律制度間移植的過程，是否使得美國公司法制內董事與公司間權利 義務關係得以明確規範？董事受託人義務之適用有無出現水土不服情況？制度 移植之後，是否因應經濟發展或公司經營管理實務上需求而做適當修正？
本文認為這三個問題甚為重要，因其關係到美國德拉瓦州公司法體系對於董 事受託人義務之內涵是如何界定，以及其體系內有無缺漏。尤有甚者，對於比較 法而言，既然台灣公司法有關董事受託人義務之修法係引自於英美法系，則作為 模範的德拉瓦州公司法，其立法或司法判決形成過程，亦值得身在台灣的立法者、
行政及司法機關參考，作為實務上適用之基礎依據。
第三項 從信託及代理法檢視受託人義務之內涵
壹、信託法有關受託人義務之定義
根據美國法律重編關於信託規範之敘述，對於受託人義務之定義201，其最重 要且根本之義務為忠實義務202，具體包含：
199 Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 651 (2002).
200 When corporate law emerged out of trust and agency law, the fiduciary duties governing the obligations of trustees and principles were transplanted into corporate law. Id. at 651, 671.
201 The core of trust fiduciary law is found in §§ 77 through 79—the fundamental standards of fiduciary conduct in trust administration. These three Sections deal, respectively, with the trustee's duties of prudence (so fundamental to the investment function and further developed in §§ 90- 92), loyalty (often called the “cardinal” principle of fiduciary relationships, but particularly strict in the law of trusts), and impartiality (balancing the diverse interests and competing claims—concurrently and over time—of the various beneficiaries or objectives of typical modern trusts). Restatement (Third) of Trusts 6 15 Intro.
Note (2007).
202 (1) Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, a trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries, or solely in furtherance of its charitable purpose.(2) Except in discrete circumstances, the trustee is strictly prohibited from engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing or that otherwise involve or create a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary duties and personal interests.(3) Whether acting in a
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fiduciary or personal capacity, a trustee has a duty in dealing with a beneficiary to deal fairly and to communicate to the beneficiary all material facts the trustee knows or should know in connection with the matter. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 (2007).203 An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship. Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 8.01 (2006).
204 An agent has a duty not to acquire a material benefit from a third party in connection with transactions conducted or other actions taken on behalf of the principal or otherwise through the agent's use of the agent's position.
Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 8.02 (2006).
205 An agent has a duty not to deal with the principal as or on behalf of an adverse party in a transaction connected with the agency relationship. Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 8.03 (2006).
206 Throughout the duration of an agency relationship, an agent has a duty to refrain from competing with the principal and from taking action on behalf of or otherwise assisting the principal's competitors. Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 8.04 (2006).
207 An agent has a duty (1) not to use property of the principal for the agent's own purposes or those of a third party; and (2) not to use or communicate confidential information of the principal for the agent's own purposes or those of a third party. Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 8.05 (2006).
208 (1) Conduct by an agent that would otherwise constitute a breach of duty as stated in §§ 8.01, 8.02, 8.03, 8.04, and 8.05 does not constitute a breach of duty if the principal consents to the conduct, provided that
(a) in obtaining the principal's consent, the agent (i) acts in good faith,
(ii) discloses all material facts that the agent knows, has reason to know, or should know would reasonably affect the principal's judgment unless the principal has manifested that such facts are already known by the principal or that the principal does not wish to know them, and
(iii) otherwise deals fairly with the principal; and
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(1)得到本人同意時，代理人需出自於善意；揭露所有代理人所知曉或應知曉且 會合理影響本人判斷之重大事實資訊；公平地對待本人。
(2)本人所同意事項需與在代理關係存續期間內，可被合理期待發生之特定行為 或交易、或特定類型之行為或交易有關。
此外，於兩頂帽子同時戴的情況，亦即就同一交易，雙方或多方代理時，代 理人之義務為何？
法律重編規範其義務如下209： (1)善意地對待每一個本人。
(2)將代理人多方代理之情形揭露於每一個本人。揭露所有代理人所知曉或應知 曉且會合理影響本人判斷之重大事實資訊。
(3)公平地對待每一個本人。
參、注意義務係受託人義務之延伸
由上述檢視，與信託法有關之受託人忠實義務，須極盡考量受益人之利益，
而非以較低標準之受益人最佳利益衡量。此外，信託法嚴格禁止自我交易或避免 利益衝突之內涵，相較於代理法，不僅更為嚴謹且使得受託人必須循規蹈矩，而 似乎呈現司法上無法妥協的僵固性。代理法所述之受託人義務則較為寬鬆，且接 近公司法領域所繼受的受託人義務內涵。
而事實上，代理法所述之受託人義務其主要內涵僅為忠實義務相關之概括或 具體行為。本質上，於代理法脈絡內，注意義務並非受託人義務，而係延伸出去 後，具體執行其代理行為時應具有之注意程度、技能、勤勉，亦即工作上表現要
(b) the principal's consent concerns either a specific act or transaction, or acts or transactions of a specified type that could reasonably be expected to occur in the ordinary course of the agency relationship.
Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 8.06 (2006).
209 (2) An agent who acts for more than one principal in a transaction between or among them has a duty
(a) to deal in good faith with each principal, (b) to disclose to each principal
(i) the fact that the agent acts for the other principal or principals, and (ii) all other facts that the agent knows, has reason to know, or should know would reasonably affect the principal's judgment unless the principal has manifested that such facts are already known by the principal or that the principal does not wish to know them, and
(c) otherwise to deal fairly with each principal.
Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 8.06 (2006).
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210 Subject to any agreement with the principal, an agent has a duty to the principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents in similar circumstances. Special skills or knowledge possessed by an agent are circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether the agent acted with due care and diligence. If an agent claims to possess special skills or knowledge, the agent has a duty to the principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents with such skills or knowledge. Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 8.08 (2006).
211 The courts have expanded the duties of an agent over the years by describing a duty to disclose and a duty of candor.“The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his agent.”The duty of care is a negligence concept quite unlike the duty of loyalty. Equating the duty of care with the duty of loyalty is bad law and worse semantics. Using legal terms with fixed meanings that have developed over centuries in different ways leads only to confusion and chaos. William A. Gregory, The Fiduciary Duty of Care: A Perversion of Words, 38 Akron L. Rev. 181, 183 (2005).
212 The conflation of negligence (duty of care) and intent (duty of loyalty) began by the Delaware Supreme Court should be condemned, because it destroys clear legal concepts and substitutes vague terminology. The Mothew decision should be seen as a lodestar that leads toward clarity and precision. The muddled state of the law of fiduciary breach can be improved if the courts realize that negligence and intent are quite different concepts. Id. at 181, 206.
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213 In general terms, the law governing fiduciary obligation addresses two questions: First, in what circumstances does fiduciary obligation apply? Second, what does the obligation require a person to do? Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke L.J. 879, 882 (1988).
214“Contemporary debates over corporate governance ills and reforms have, in a rather puzzling way, forgotten some basic distinctions between two critical participants in corporate governance: directors and officers. First, directors, unlike officers, are elected and can be removed by stockholders.” , “Second, neither the board of directors as a body, nor individual directors, are agents of either the stockholders or of the corporation.”, “Third, directors
are fiduciaries for the corporation and its stockholders notwithstanding the fact that they are not agents.” Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1597, 1605–07 (2005).
215 If a person in a particular relationship with another is subject to a fiduciary obligation, that person (the fiduciary) must be loyal to the interests of the other person (the beneficiary). The fiduciary's duties go beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the beneficiary's best interests. The fiduciary must avoid acts that put his interests in conflict with the beneficiary's. ……the fiduciary must be candid and must evince utmost good faith. See DeMott, supra note 213, at 879, 882.
216 See Rock & Wachter, supra note 199, at 651, 671.
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學者即論述美國法上將信託法之受託人義務移植至公司法，本身即存有制度 及觀念上瑕疵。其最大的差異即在於，信託及代理法所規範之受託人義務，是以 過失基礎為標準，因為當事人間關係，根本上是以市場及契約為規範，此時係習 慣地且有效地適用法律規範及法院的約束能力；但董事與股東（或公司間）關係 並非以市場為基礎，而是公司內部體系關聯的一部分，亦即在公司內部應適用不 具法律強制力之規則或標準。實際上若從法律語言觀察，市場與公司間之界限，
就是法律規範與公司治理間，司法管轄權的疆界217。 貳、成功與困境
有關上述學者對於受託人義務移植至公司法領域可能出現的問題，本文將所 移入之受託人義務區分成忠實義務及注意義務，並舉其重要內涵摘述如下：
一、忠實義務
首先在忠實義務方面，或許其移植的結果較為成功，但有較佳結果的真實因 素有兩個：
(1)在公司組織內，公司法領域所規範受託人忠實義務，某種程度上，即須透過 法律上強制力，以約束或抑制內部人之竊盜或極不正當行為。由於公司內部 力量過於薄弱，而無法控制惡意之董事自我交易行為，此時透過法院實施的 司法監督得以發揮功能，也並非不正確地跨越司法管轄權的疆界。
(2)相較於信託及代理法所嚴格規範的受託人忠實義務，亦即其忠實義務適用之
(2)相較於信託及代理法所嚴格規範的受託人忠實義務，亦即其忠實義務適用之