國家措施對投資人之投資造成的損害

在本文研究案例中，最重要的判斷要素無疑仍是國家措施，對投資人之投資造成的 損害，此種情況與國際習慣法上的徵收判斷標準相符。41 個案例中，只有很少數案例完 全沒有提到國家措施對投資人之投資造成的損害，另外在Gustav v. Ghana案中，針對該 案系爭措施之一，即警察的調查措施，仲裁庭在判斷該措施是否構成徵收時，也沒有提 及措施造成的影響，其他案例則均提及國家措施對投資人之投資造成的損害。在Tecmed v Mexico案與LG &E v. Argentina案，仲裁庭均表示應先判斷國家措施對投資造成的損害，

因為措施對投資造成的損害是區分合理規制措施，與間接徵收的重要標準:「…[措施對 投資造成的損害程度]，是區分國家措施屬於合理規制措施，即透過國家規制權限之行 使，造成財產權的減損；或是事實上徵收，而造成財產或是財產權權的剝奪……極其重 要的區分標準之一……」¹³。甚至有甚多案例強調措施對投資人自成的損害，是判斷徵 收與否唯一的考量。例如前引述Metalclad v. Mexico一案的判斷標準，即以措施對投資人 造成的損害作為唯一判斷標準。

此外，這些案例也顯示，投資人單單只證明國家措施對投資造成損害是不夠的，投 資所受的損害必須重大(substantial deprivation)，方能夠成徵收。此一原則在 Metalclad v.

Mexico、前述 Pope & Talbot v. Canada 案，Feldman v Mexico 案這些較早期的案例確立 了。

Pope & Talbot v. Canada案中，原告為美國的軟木業者，在加拿大的英屬哥倫比亞設

12 有些仲裁庭是以判斷間接徵收的要素稱呼，本文認為實際上在判斷措施構成間接徵收與否，

最關鍵的問題便是判斷國家行為是否屬於合理權限行使，因此實際上這些要素也可說是仲裁 庭用以區分合理規制措施與徵收的要素。

13 Tecmed v. United Mexican States , ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶115 (May 29, 2003);LG&E v. Arg., ¶194.( quoting the Tecmed case.)

( “This determination is important because it is one of the main elements to distinguish, from the point of view of an international tribunal, between a regulatory measure, which is an ordinary expression of the exercise of the state’s police power that entails a decrease in assets or rights, and a de facto expropriation that deprives those assets and rights of any real substance…”)

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有子公司，將軟木從加拿大出口到美國境內。但是受到加拿大的軟木出口限制影響，因 而主張其投資受到損害，其主張包括加拿大違反徵收條款。¹⁴雖然加拿大主張該等措施 並未針對特定個別的投資人，乃是一般性的規制措施，不應受到北美自由貿易協定下的 徵收規範限制，但是仲裁庭如前所述，不認為規制措施自始不會構成徵收，而是國家行 為影響程度的問題。仲裁庭進一步表示，在北美自由貿易協定下，間接徵收之構成，必 須「政府措施造成的損害達到一定程度(whether that interference is sufficiently

restrictive)。」¹⁵而可能構成該等嚴重損害的狀況，仲裁庭舉例包括，例如國家剝奪投資 人對其投資的運營的指揮能力、監禁投資人企業的主管或是員工、監視主管或是員工的 工作、剝奪公司的收入、干涉公司的管理或是股東活動、阻止企業發放股利、介入投資 人指派董事或是經營階層的程序等等。¹⁶其後仲裁庭以原告仍然保有對財產權的控制，

並且在出口限制期間，仍有可觀的收入，因此並不構成徵收。¹⁷

Pope v. Canada案的判斷標準往後並受到Sempra v. Argentina案、PSEG v. Turkey案、

Enron v. Argentina等案引述。在Sempra v. Argentina案中，仲裁庭以「本案所涉的許多措 施，都對商業活動造成相當的影響。但是，……就算措施造成不良影響，也未必能構成 間接徵收，不良影響的程度必須達到使投資人無法繼續控制其投資、或是投資已經喪失 價值，才有可能構成徵收。而本案中並未達到此種嚴重程度。」(粗體強調為本文作者 所加)；¹⁸

14 LG&E v. Arg, ¶189.

(“In order to establish whether State measures constitute expropriation under Article IV(1) of the Bilateral Treaty, the Tribunal must balance two competing interests: the degree of the measure’s interference with the right of ownership and the power of the State to adopt its policies.”)

15 Pope v. Can., ¶102.

16 Pope v. Can., ¶100.

( “…the Investor remains in control of the Investment, it directs the day-to-day operations of the Investment. and no officers or employees of the Investment have been detained by virtue of the Regime. Canada does not supervise the work of the officers or employees of the Investment, does not take any of the proceeds of company sales (apart from taxation), does not interfere with management or shareholders' activities, does not prevent the Investment from paying dividends to its shareholders. does not interfere with the appointment of directors or management and does not take any other actions ousting the Investor from full ownership and control of the Investment.”)

17 Pope v. Can., ¶¶100-05.

18 Sempra v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶285 (Sep.28, 2007).

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在Vivendi v. Argentina (II)案中，仲裁庭也抱持相類看法，以政府措施對投資造成的 損害作為區分合理規制措施與徵收的標準。該案中，來自法國的投資人，與阿根廷

(“Many of the measures discussed in the instant case have had a very adverse effect on the conduct of the business concerned. This is, however, again a question that the Treaty addresses in the context of other safeguards for protecting the investor. A finding of indirect expropriation would require more than adverse effects. It would require that the investor no longer be in control of its business operation, or that the value of the business have been virtually annihilated. This is not the case in the present dispute.”)

19 PSEG v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, ¶278 (Jan.19, 2007).

(“The Tribunal has no doubt that indirect expropriation can take many forms. Yet, as the tribunal in Pope & Talbot found, there must be some form of deprivation of the investor in the control of the investment, the management of day-to day-operations of the company, interfering in the administration, impeding the distribution of dividends, interfering in the appointment of officials and managers, or depriving the company of its property or control in total or in part.”)

20 Enron v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶245 (May 22, 2007).

( “The list of measures considered in the Pope & Talbot case as tantamount to expropriation, which the Respondent has invoked among other authorities, is in the Tribunal's view representative of the legal standard required to make a finding of indirect expropriation.

Substantial deprivation results in that light from depriving the investor of the control of the investment, managing the day–to–day operations of the company, arrest and detention of company officials or employees, supervision of the work of officials, interfering in the

administration, impeding the distribution of dividends, interfering in the appointment of officials and managers, or depriving the company of its property or control in total or in part.” )

21 Vivendi Universal (II) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award (Aug. 20, 2007).[hereinafter Vivendi II]

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SD Myers v. Canada案中，一方面肯定國家的規制權限，另一方面則提出，一般而 言，徵收通常是永久的財產權剝奪，而政府規制措施則造成的損害則比較小，「徵收與

( “Here, the Province's actions — from the very opening months of the concession, continuing through its wrongful regulatory action and culminating in the unilateral amendments to the 8 April Agreement — had the necessary consequence of forcing CAA to terminate the Concession Agreement…”)

24 Vivendi II, ¶7.5.34.

( “Paraphrasing the words of the Tecmed, CME, Santa Elena, and Starrett Housing tribunals, Claimants were radically deprived of the economic use and enjoyment of their investment, the benefits of which (i.e. the right to be paid for services provided) had been effectively neutralised and rendered useless. Under these circumstances, rescission of the Concession Agreement represented the only rational alternative for Claimants. By leaving Claimants with no other rational choice, we conclude that the Province thus expropriated Claimants' right of use and enjoyment of their investment under the Concession Agreement.”)

25 SD Myers v. Can., ¶282.

(“The distinction between expropriation and regulation screens out most potential cases of complaints concerning economic intervention by a state and reduces the risk that governments will be subject to claims as they go about their business of managing public affairs. An expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of an owner to make use of its economic rights although it may be that, in some contexts and circumstances, it would be appropriate to view a deprivation as amounting to an expropriation, even if it were partial or temporary.”)

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資，因此只是獨立就該部財產判斷損害的嚴重性，而非不需達到嚴重損害的程度。此外，

本決定並說明，措施造成損害之嚴重性，應考量時間以及影響程度兩個因素。

在LG&E v. Argentina案中，仲裁庭也強調措之必需造成重大損害，程度已達幾乎完 全剝奪財產權或是對財產控制之程度，而此一影響程度的判斷，必須同時參考投資人的 合理期待，以及措施的施行時間。²⁶

由於「措施造成的損害」居於此等關鍵地位，比較近期的案例，開始將此一要素作 為徵收判斷的門檻要件先行判斷之，如果措施造成的損害未達所要求的嚴重性，則不予 考量其他要件。例如在Archer v. Mexico一案，仲裁庭從前案中得出結論，認為雖然考量 因素並不統一，但是可以確定的是，如果措施對投資造成的損害不夠嚴重，那麼一定不 會構成間接徵收：「其他仲裁庭跟原告都利用措施對投資造成的損害程度，作為標準判 斷是否構成間接徵收。司法實務顯示，政府措施對投資造成的經濟衝擊，是判斷措施是 否構成徵收、或是等同徵收措施最重要的考量因素。當措施對投資造成顯著的損害，並 且使投資人喪失其所有或是幾乎所有投資上的利益，即可能構成徵收。學術著作間亦普 遍承認措施造成的損害程度，以及措施持續的時間，為判斷關鍵。」，²⁷「雖然不同前例 的事實彼此間有其差異，而仲裁庭考量的要素也不盡相同，但是仍可從其中找出共同的 判斷標準─只有當政府措施使投資人喪失對投資的控制，或是造成顯著的經濟價值減損，

方能構成間接徵收。」(粗體強調為作者所加)²⁸

在該案中，原告的業務為進口與販售玉米高果糖糖漿，然而後來墨西哥政府對此課

26 LG&E v. Arg., ¶190.

27 Archer v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, Award, ¶240 (Nov. 21, 2007).

(“The test on which other Tribunals and doctrine have agreed —and on which the Claimants' rely— is the “effects test.” Judicial practice indicates that the severity of the economic impact is the decisive criterion in deciding whether an indirect expropriation or a measure tantamount to expropriation has taken place. An expropriation occurs if the interference is substantial and deprives the investor of all or most of the benefits of the investment. There is a broad consensus in academic writings that the intensity and duration of the economic deprivation is the crucial factor in identifying an indirect expropriation or equivalent measure.”)

28 Archer v. Mex., ¶242.

(“ Notwithstanding the fact that previous cases are not identical, and that certain considerations and decisions have not been uniform, a common principle may be extracted: only loss of control over the investment or substantial loss of its economic value may amount to an indirect expropriation.)

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稅，原告主張此舉具有歧視性，因為玉米高果糖糖漿跟墨西哥國內的蔗糖業，都可用於 製造含糖飲料，因此在國內的含糖飲料製造業市場上，互相競爭。原告因此主張這種課 稅是出於保護墨西哥國內蔗糖業，不受玉米高果糖糖漿競爭影響。²⁹

仲裁庭就此認為，雖然有其他要素可供考量，例如歧視性以及措施違背投資人的合 理期待，但是，「雖然原告主張稅務措施的歧視性，以及其違背投資人之合理期待，可 以顯示措施的徵收性質。但是正如前述，若非政府措施造成投資重大損害，是不會構成 徵收的……」(粗體強調為作者所加)³⁰，並且以措施造成的影響做為第一個判斷的要素，

最後認為，無論是從原告對投資的控制，或是從經濟價值觀察，墨西哥的稅務規定都沒 有達到間接徵收的標準，「在本案中，政府措施對原告的投資ALMEX企業，並無直接徵 收，也沒有間接徵收的狀況。國家的稅務規定並未剝奪原告基於所有權的根本權利，也 沒有剝奪其對投資的控制。原告仍然保有完整的財產權，並持續利用ALMEX製造、販

最後認為，無論是從原告對投資的控制，或是從經濟價值觀察，墨西哥的稅務規定都沒 有達到間接徵收的標準，「在本案中，政府措施對原告的投資ALMEX企業，並無直接徵 收，也沒有間接徵收的狀況。國家的稅務規定並未剝奪原告基於所有權的根本權利，也 沒有剝奪其對投資的控制。原告仍然保有完整的財產權，並持續利用ALMEX製造、販