法律層次

Hampshire 案中首次處理到仇恨性言論之議題，認為 Chaplinsky 案中 New

Hampshire 的法律規定：「任何人不得於他人合法處於街道或公共場所時，對其發 表冒犯、嘲弄或惱人之文字；不得以冒犯或嘲弄的方式稱呼其姓名；亦不得在他

444 See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 260-64.

445 See Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: offense versus Incitement, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1145, 1182 (2013).

446 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391-96.

447 42 USC § 2000e–2 :“(a) Employer practices It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”; See Cheryl Kause Zemelman, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 175, 196 (1993).

448 See J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2295, 2295 (1999).

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為;（3）該行為已構成性別或種族恐嚇，嘲笑或侮辱;（4）該行為足夠嚴重、普 遍的改變了原告的就業條件，並創造一個使原告主觀上感受到工作環境有強烈的 敵意（5）一個合理的人處於原告的地位亦會感受到相同的敵意。⁴⁴⁹

有論者認為之所以允許立法禁止工作場所內會造成敵意工作環境之言論，在 於在工作場所內之女性或是少數團體皆是「被人俘虜的聽眾」，⁴⁵⁰沒有避免接觸 該等言論之可能。此種情況與個人在街頭遭受騷擾，可以退避不聽聞該等言論並 不相同。又由於雇主和僱員之間存在著一種特殊關係，因而雇主有責任使僱員免 處於此種敵意的工作環境之中。⁴⁵¹要依靠敵意的工作環境來限制仇恨性言論之散 佈必須證明行為人反覆的散佈種族主義言論，故實踐上並非那麼容易。但美國的 工作場域，可說是美國目前唯一一個可以禁止種族主義言論散佈的場所。⁴⁵² 除此之外，美國的校園也嘗試透過敵意工作環境的概念，建立起仇恨性言論 的管制體系。雖然美國聯邦最高法院的態度仍不明確，但校園並沒有因此放棄對 於仇恨性言論的管制。其嘗試限縮仇恨性言論的範圍來符合聯邦最高法院的要求。

總括而言，美國很多校園將造成校園內創造出一個具有威脅、敵意、冒犯環境之 種族主義言論視為是一種歧視行為，而得予以處罰。⁴⁵³

3.3.2.2 英國－檢察總長起訴型

英國亦沒有批准 ICCPR 第 20 條第 2 項，但此不代表英國未對仇恨性言論加 以管制。英國 1986 年的公眾秩序法（Public Order Act of 1986）為管制仇恨性言 論最主要之立法。⁴⁵⁴該法第 17 條就種族仇恨加以定義，其指出：「『種族仇恨』

意指『以仇恨對待由膚色、種族、國籍、族裔或原國籍定義的群體。』」⁴⁵⁵；第

449 See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.

57, 67 (1986).

450 See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).

451 See Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199 (1981) （本案中法院認為工作場所中，黑人員工長期遭 受種族因素之取笑或是辱罵，構成了敵意的工作環境。雇主必須要因此負責。）; 相關討論可參 David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor Volokh, 17 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 321, 323-24 (1996).

452 SeeBLEICH,supra note 233, at 66-81.

453 Id.

454 於 1986 年至今歷經多次修正。

455 Public Order Act (1986)§17: “In this Part “racial hatred” means hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins.”

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18 條第 1 項則規定：「任何人使用威脅、辱罵或侮辱文字、行為，或展示威脅、

在 2006 年，英國國會通過種族與宗教仇恨法（Racial and Religions Hatred Act 2006）。本部法律制定的目的係為了將 1986 年公眾秩序法中對種族仇恨性言論的

456 Public Order Act (1986)§18(1)、(2) : (1) A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of an offence if-(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or (b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby. (2) An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place, except that no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used, or the written material is displayed, by a person inside a dwelling and are not heard or seen except by other persons in that or another dwelling.”

457 Public Order Act (1986)§19、§20、§21、§22.

458 Public Order Act (1986)§“(1) No proceedings for an offence under this Part may be instituted in England and Wales except by or with the consent of the Attorney General. (2) For the purposes of the rules in England and Wales against charging more than one offence in the same count or information, each of sections 18 to 23 creates one offence. (3) A person guilty of an offence under this Part is liable (a) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years or a fine or both; (b) on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.”

459 SeeBLEICH,supra note 233, at 23-29.

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種族與宗教仇恨法另外又增訂第 29 條 A 定義仇恨性言論：「宗教仇恨係指以 仇恨對待信仰或不信仰特定宗教群體內之個人。」⁴⁶⁰並參照對於仇恨性言論管制 之體例，在 Public Order Act of 1986 增加第 29 條 B、第 29 條 C、第 29 條 D、第 29 條 E、第 29 條 F 等條文，禁止使用文字、行為、展示文本、出版、散佈文本、

公共展演、散佈影音、廣播節目之方式散佈宗教仇恨性言論。⁴⁶¹在新增的第 29 條 L 同樣亦規定，散佈宗教仇恨性言論者，「得處以七年以下有期徒刑，或併科 罰金」惟此刑事程序之開啟，亦需要經過檢察總長同意。⁴⁶²

3.3.2.3 德國－一般管制型（特殊言論管制型）

德國就仇恨性言論之管制，係透過刑法直接規範二種仇恨性言論之類型並由 一般檢察官起訴，而無特殊的程序設計。第一種類型為一般性的仇恨性言論禁止。

德國刑法第 130 條第 1 項：「以足以擾亂公共秩序之方法而為下列行為，處 3 個月 以上至 5 年以下有期徒刑：1. 煽動他人對於一國籍、種族、宗教、或具有共同民 族淵源之團體一部人群或身為前述團體或人群一員之個人產生仇恨，或要求他人 對其實行暴力獨斷之措施者；2. 辱罵、惡意中傷、誹謗前述團體一部之人群或屬 於前述團體或部分人群之個人，致侵害其人性尊嚴者。」同條第 2 項並處罰：「1.

就『煽動對於特定群體或特定國籍、種族、宗教群體產生仇恨，呼籲對於這些群 體採取暴力或獨斷行為，或以侮辱、惡意中傷或、誹謗之方式攻擊這些群體人性 尊嚴』之文字著作：(a) 散佈。(b) 公開陳列，或以他法供人觀覽。(c) 提供十八歲 以下之人，或使其得以接觸。(d) 意圖從事(a)至(c)之行為而製造、儲存、提供、

販賣、或進出口系爭文字著作之原本或複本。2. 以廣播方式傳送『煽動對於特定 群體或特定國籍、種族、宗教群體產生仇恨，呼籲對於這些群體採取暴力或獨斷 行為，或以侮辱、惡意中傷或、誹謗之方式攻擊這些群體人性尊嚴』之信

息。」⁴⁶³

460 Racial and Religious Hatred Act (2006)§29A: “In this Part “religious hatred” means hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief.”

461 Racial and Religious Hatred Act (2006)§29A、29B、29C、29D、29F.

462 Racial and Religious Hatred Act (2006)§29L.

463 田仁杰，前揭註 34，頁 193-197；翁乙仙，前揭註 16，頁 79-82。

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第二種，為禁止否認納粹暴行或是支持納粹主張之言論。⁴⁶⁴德國刑法第130

466 BVerfG, 1 BvR 1056/95 vom 6.9.2000, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 45)（本案之憲法訴願人為週刊記者於 1992 年Regensburg市進行時寫道：「選舉進入白熱化階段，文化部門：一個猶太人？」因此，訴願人遭 巴伐利亞聯邦最高法院依刑法第130 條第1項判刑。其因此提起憲法訴訟，德國聯邦最高法院廢棄 原判決。）轉引自翁乙仙，前揭註16，頁82-83。

467 Id.

468 BVerfG, 1 BvR 232/97 vom 12.11.2002, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 25)（本案中憲法訴願人以傳單散佈「土 耳其人在德國的恐怖攻擊」、「土耳其人在德國的恐怖攻擊」等言論，地方法院認為已足以引起 他人對於土耳其人之敵視，故依據刑法第 130 條第 1 項判刑。其因此提起憲法訴訟，德國聯邦最 高法院廢棄原判決。）轉引自翁乙仙，前揭註 16，頁 83-85。

469 BVerfG, 1 BvR 1753/03 vom 25.3.2008, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 47) （本案憲法訴願人散佈「老美、老俄、

外國人滾開，主人總算回家了！」等歌曲，地方法院認為等歌詞已構成仇恨性言論。其因此提起 憲法訴訟，德國聯邦最高法院廢棄原判決。）轉引自翁乙仙，前揭註16，頁85。

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生還的猶太人之侮辱且侵害其人性尊嚴」，因此處罰否認納粹罪刑之言論，並不

470 BVerfGE 90, 241-Auschwitzlü g（本案憲法訴願人為德國國家民主黨（NPD）之地方性組織，

其於 1991 年在慕尼黑舉辦「德國在政治抹黑陰影下之未來？」活動中邀請請如 David Irving 等修

正社會主義學家，提到「猶太人在第三帝國時期並未遭到迫害」。地方法院認為此等言論構成仇

恨性言論，其因此提起憲法訴訟，德國聯邦法院亦維持原判決。）轉引自翁乙仙，前揭註 16，頁 86-87。

471 BVerfGE 124, 300-Rudolf Heß Gedenkfeier（德國極右派組織 2001起在納粹第二號戰犯Rudolf Heß 埋骨處Wunsiedel進行紀念Rudolf Heß的活動，活動中極力推崇Rudolf Heß且將納粹惡行極盡 混淆扭曲。）轉引自翁乙仙，前揭註16，頁88-89。

472BLEICH,supra note 233, at 29-36.

473 La loi du 29 juillet 1881 (The Law on the Freedom of the Press of 29 July 1881) .轉引自 Guy

Haarscher, Religious Revival and Pseudo-Secularism, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2799, 2807-08 (2009); Lyombe Eko, New Medium, Old Free Speech Regimes: The Historical and Ideological Foundationsof French &

American Regulation of Bias-Motivated Speech and Symbolic Expressionon The Internet, 28 Loy. L.A.

Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 69, 99-104 (2006).

474 See Esther Janssen, Limits to expression on religion in France, Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2012-45; Institute for Information Law Research Paper No. 2012-39, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018277 (last visited May 14, 2014).

475 Id.

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相關規定，⁴⁷⁶在 1990 年並制定蓋索法（Gayssot Act），禁止發表否認納粹大屠殺 的言論。⁴⁷⁷

法國法院曾因為 Faurisson 教授從事納粹大屠殺進行學術研究時，主張納粹並 沒有在集中營建造毒氣室來進行大屠殺而以蓋索法對之加以處罰。⁴⁷⁸亦曾因法國 演員 Brigitte Bardo 致力於動物權的維護主張回教徒每年度舉辦的宗教儀式中，未 將羊隻擊昏即從羊隻的喉嚨取出血液之行徑相當殘忍，而透過上述法律對其言論 刑法第 153B、298、505 條亦有類似之規定。⁴⁸²

476 法國仇恨性言論刑法，availabel at

http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=1B09771D3B23D96B137C9169E86B67F4.tpdjo 13v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000257363&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLien=id. (last visited May 14, 2014).

477 Robert Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993 , U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (1996), available at http://documents.un.org/welcome.asp?language=E (last visited April 1, 2014); Eko, supra note 473, at 101-04.

478 Id.

479 SeeBLEICH,supra note 233, at 29-36.

480 See Venkat Eswaran,Advocacy of Ntional, Racial and Religious Hatred: the Indian Experience, in STRIKING A BALANCE:HATE SPEECH,FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 171,171-81 (Sandra Coliver ed, Article 19, International Centre Against Censorship and Human Rights Centre, University of Essex 1992).

481 Indian Penal Code (1860) §153A.(1) “(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities.”

482 Indian Penal Code (1860) §153B、298、505.

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除此之外，印度的電影放映法賦予行政機關事前審查電影得法出版之權限，

483 The Cinematograph Act (1952); Arpan Banerjee, Political Censorship And Indian Cinematographic Laws: A Functionalist-Liberal Analysis, Drexel L. Rev. 557, 595-98 (2010).

484 The Cinematograph Act (1952): “(1) A film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the opinion of the authority competent to grant the certificate, the film or any part of it is against the interests of [(Ins. by Act 49 of 1981 (w.e.f. 161983) the sovereignty and integrity of India) the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or involves defamation or

contempt of court or is likely to incite the commission of any offence.”

485 See Eswaran, supra note 480, at 176-77.

486 The punjab special powers (press) Act (1956)§2 “(1) The State Government or any authority so authorized in this behalf if satisfied that such action is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the maintenance of communal harmony affecting or likely to affect public order may, by order in writing addressed to a printer, publisher or editor:- (a) prohibit the printing or publication in any document or any class of documents of any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects for a specified period or in a particular issue or issues of a newspaper or periodical.

Provided that no such order shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof

Provided that no such order shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof